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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
No. 860340
COPPER STATE THRIFT & LOAN CO.,
VALLEY BANK & TRUST CO., and
COTTONWOOD THRIFT & LOAN CO.
Defendants/Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Does the absence of reference to a notary public's place

of

residence

certification

and
of

commission

expiration

a mechanic's

date

from a

lifen verification

or

acknowledgement invalidate the mechanic's lien?
2.

Does the rule of strict compliance apply to a notary

certification of a mechanic's lien verification and/or
acknowledgement or does the rule of substantial compliance
apply?
3.

Does a notary certification which contains the notary's

signature, official title and official seal substantially
comply with the certification requirements of the mechanic's
lien and recording statutes?
_ 1 -

4.

Do Utah Code Annotated, Sections 38-1-11 and 38-1-13

(1953) require all parties claiming an interest in real
property subject to a mechanic's lien foreclosure to be
named

as parties defendant within twelve months after

completion of the original contract?
5.

Does an amendment of a complaint in a mechanic's lien

foreclosure action naming additional defendants who have
knowledge of the action relate back to the original date of
filing of the complaint under Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure?
6.

As a matter of law, is there a unity of interest between

Valley Bank and Trust Co. and parties named in the original
complaint such that an amendment of the original complaint
naming Valley Bank would be deemed to relate back to the
date of the original complaint?
7.

As a matter of law, is the partial release of lien

prepared by Defendant Bradshaw and executed by Plaintiff
ambiguous on its face such as to allow parole evidence to
determine the extent and coverage of said release?
8.

As a matter of law, does an unambiguous partial release

of

lien allow

an assumption by the trial court that

Cottonwood Thrift & Loan Co. reasonably relied upon said
partial release of lien without further inquiry as to the
facts

and

circumstances

surrounding

reasonable reliance?

- 2 -

such

purported

9.

Does a dispute as to a material fact exist as to the

meaning and intent of the partial release of lien and the
subsequent purported reliance by Cottonwood Thrift & Loan
upon said release?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This action arises out of the construction of a condominium
project in Salt Lake County, State of Utah known as the Highland
Orchards Condominium Project.
Amended

Complaint,

Record

(See Complaint, Record at p.2, and
at p.242).

Plaintiff

Projects

Unlimited was the general contractor and performed work on the
project

pursuant

Development.
Record

to two contracts with Defendant

Bradshaw

(See Complaint, Record at p.2, Amended Complaint,

at p.242, Affidavit of David Mast, Record at p.487,

Affidavit of Phil Hofstetter, Record at p.508, and Memorandum,
Record at p.464).

The first contract between Plaintiff and

Defendant Bradshaw Development was entered into on or about
September 15, 1982 for the construction of two units and the
second was entered into on or about April 13, 1983 for the
construction of six units.

(See Affidavit bf David Mast, Record

at p.487).
Prior to commencement

of construction under these two

contracts and during construction, Defendant Copper State met
with Plaintiff and Defendant Bradshaw Development to discuss the
financing for the project.

(See Affidavits of David Mast, Record
- 3 -

at p.487, and Phil Hofstetter, Record at p.508).

Plaintiff

commenced work on the project on or about October 10, 1982 and
performed the last work on the project, due to non-payment on or
about October 7, 1983.

(See Affidavits of David Mast, Record at

p.487, and Phil Hofstetter, Record at p.508).
Plaintiff

faithfully

performed

its contracts

for the

construction of the project and received certain payments from
Defendant Copper State as the proceeds of a construction loan to
Defendant Bradshaw Development for the project.
p.490).

(Record at

The construction loan was secured by trust deeds naming

Defendant Copper State as beneficiary which were recorded in
December, 1982 for the first two units and by trust deeds naming
Defendant Copper State as beneficiary which were recorded on June
6, 1983 for the remaining

six units.

(Record

at p.465).

Plaintiff received the last of the progress payments during June
of 1983.

After the last payment from Defendant Copper State,

Plaintiff was told by Defendant Copper State that although there
was money remaining in the construction loan for the project,
Defendant Bradshaw Development had exceeded its lending limit and
no more funds would be disbursed on behalf of Defendant Bradshaw
Development.

(Record at p.490).

Defendant Bradshaw Development

failed to otherwise pay Plaintiff the amounts due and owing under
said contracts and all changes and additions thereto as agreed.
(See Affidavits

of David Mast, Record

Hofstetter, Record at p.508).

- 4 -

at p.487, and Phil

During construction, three of the units were sold.

The two

original units were financed through Defendant Valley Bank with
trust deeds filed on May 25, 1983.

(Record at p.465).

Defendant

Copper State subordinated its interest, to the extent not paid by
the Valley Bank loans, by way of trust deeds filed on June 23,
1983.

(Record at p.465).

The third unit was financed through

Defendant Western Savings with a trust deed filed on September 7,
1983.

(Record at p.465).

After Plaintiff had halted construc-

tion, two additional units were sold and were financed by
Defendant Cottonwood Thrift with trust deeds being recorded on
December 12, 1983.

(Record at p.465).

Due to non-payment, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Lien against
the subject property with the Salt Lake County Recorder pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 38-1-1 et seq. (1953 as amended)
on November 15, 1983.

(Record at pp.618-620).

Thereafter,

Defendant Bradshaw Development requested, and Plaintiff and
Defendant Bradshaw Development negotiated, a partial release of
lien whereby Plaintiff agreed to release its lien on the two
units financed by Defendant Cottonwood Thrift to the extent of
monies received from the proceeds of the loans made for those
units.

(Record at p.538 and un-numbered page between 624 and

625)(See Partial Release of Lien attached as Exhibit "A" to the
Affidavit of Phil Hofstetter in Response to Affidavit of John
Bradshaw, Record at p.542).

Following payment of $85,000.00

under the partial release of lien (Record at p.538), Plaintiff
filed an amended notice of lien with the Salt Lake County
- 5 -

Recorder to reflect the amount remaining due and owing after
crediting

the

actual

Cottonwood Thrift loans.

amount

Plaintiff

received

from

the

(Record at p.621-624).

When no further payments were forthcoming, Plaintiff duly
filed a lis pendens with the Salt Lake County Recorder pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 38-1-11 (1953) on March 16, 1984
(Record at pp.48-50) and commenced the instant action for breach
of contract and for foreclosure of its mechanic's lien in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah
by complaint dated March 16, 1984.

(Record at p.p.2-47).

of an amended complaint dated May 24, 1985,

By way

Plaintiff joined

Defendant Valley Bank and others, who are not party to this
appeal, to the foreclosure action.

(Record at pp.242-258).

The

default of Defendant Bradshaw was entered and a judgment by
default was signed by the trial court on December 3, 1985.
(Record at p.420)
Defendants Copper State Thrift and Loan Company, Cottonwood
Thrift and Loan Company and Valley Bank & Trust Company all moved
the trial court for summary judgment on their counterclaims
against Plaintiff.

(Record at pp.481-484).

Plaintiff also moved

the trial court for partial summary judgment against Defendant
Copper State Thrift and Loan Company.

(Record at pp.551-554).

The trial court held that:
1)

Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was invalid due to the

lack of a statement of the notary's place of residence
and

commission

expiration
- 6 -

date

in

the

notary

certification of the lien verification required b y Utah
Code Annotated, Section 38-1-7
t

I .1 (»*V:jt as ainerniprl pjioi:

);

2)

Since Plaintiff h a d

cjr

ioined Defendant

Valley

Bank £ Trust Compp
the

twelve

i

nu . •

perio

Annotated, Section 38-1
f i nni as'^M'l iiiK-i

s*r*

: * *

-.

(1953) Plainti* * w

I". II

-

Code

barred

Uetenaant Val-- j v Bank;

.

and
defendant Cottonwood Thrift and Lorw l> u1 M-»a,sonat; J y
release

o f lien

regarding one

condominium unit thus preventing Plaintiff from asserting

its

1 i en

against

IV f»< nrlnnt

I 11a I pai:t icul ar ui\i t.
(Record at p.698).
Plainti f i i i mini i y

i i I»II ,i NUI. i n

mattex before this Court

Record at p.7 3 2 ) .

SUMMARY OF

appea:

laintiff

ml A| i)'n^ei i in bring the

ARGUMENT

asserts

Aim.-

that
notwithstanding t h e failure: •:•£"

the notary public to include a statement o f t h e notary's place oi
residence a n d commission e x p
¥i th

respect

to the notary

*
issue i s that

Pi ai n1 i M ««

-

a statement

< *

notary's place of residence and commission expiration <•

'

"^n

not mandatory requirements under Utah mechanic's lien law and the
Utah recording statutes.

In the alternative, Plaintiff asserts

that a certification of a mechanic's lien verification which does
not contain a statement of the notary's place of residence and
commission expiration date substantially
mechanic's lien and recording statutes.

complies with the
Therefore, Plaintiff

holds a valid and enforceable mechanic's lien against the subject
property.

If Plaintiff is successful in these arguments, the

summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Defendant
Copper State will need to be reversed.
In this appeal, Plaintiff also asserts that under Utah law
it is allowed to join additional parties its mechanic's lien
foreclosure action which was commenced within the prescribed time
period state in the mechanic's lien laws.

If Plaintiff is

successful in these arguments, the summary judgment dismissing
Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Valley Bank will need to be
reversed.
Finally, in this appeal, Plaintiff asserts that it is not
clear on its face whether the partial release of lien is a total
release of all mechanic's lien claims against the two units
financed by Defendant Cottonwood Thrift and that there are
questions with regard to Defendant Cottonwood Thrift's alleged
reasonable reliance on the partial release of lien in approving
the financing of two units.

If Plaintiff is successful in these

arguments, the summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims
against Defendant Cottonwood Thrift will need to be reversed.
- 8 -

ARGUMENT

Plaintiff is seeking review

'• a"l court" F, graft nf

•

Motions for

Defendants Copper State,

Valley Bank and Cottonwood Thrii•:.

policy with regard + o

motions for summary judgment has :-:• *
a

3

versies to he decided MI. merits yjhere

possible
- - \

Citi

tr > Utah Supreme Court in Bowen v, Riverton

;uh
'

:

mf\? \

1/

j fo3 1 owi ng standard to

eview of summary judgments.

The Bowen Court

stated:
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning
questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in the
favor of the opposing party.
Thus, the court must
evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences
fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
(Citations omitted.)
error of

Id. at

- , >

court s holdings and decisioi
s

nterpreting H n
: :ications

trie trir

errors

** 1: - - a

First, the trial cour~ cummi
JIU at. it applies to

mechanic*^

ommitted

error

v

erifications,

Second,

nterpr^
tiling tif lis pendens

i

joindei

i • *

I

mechv :
and

addition, as always, an

is subject
:-* r. . ; o

erro:

*

mechanic; fs lien foreclosure

parties
- 9 -

action.

And thirdly, the trial court committed

error in

interpreting the law of mechanic's lien releases and in its
factual findings of the circumstances surrounding the partial
release of lien negotiated by Plaintiff and Defendant Bradshaw
and executed by Plaintiff.

I.

NOTARY CERTIFICATIONS OF MECHANIC'S LIEN VERIFICATIONS ARE
VALID WITHOUT STATEMENTS OF THE NOTARY'S PLACE OF
RESIDENCE AND COMMISSION EXPIRATION DATE.

In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court held that
mechanic's liens which do not recite the residence of the notary
public and the expiration date of the notary's commission are
invalid as not meeting the requirements for a valid lien or that
they were improperly recorded and therefore ineffective.

This is

the only issue ruled upon by the trial court with regard to
Defendant Copper State's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Such a

holding by this Court would be a departure from the intention of
the notary and mechanic's lien statutes and will have a severe
and widespread impact on the construction industry.

A.
THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 46-1-8 ARE
NOT MANDATORY.

Defendant

Copper

State

and

the

lower

court

have

misinterpreted the scope and application of Utah Code Annotated,
Section 46-1-8.

Title 46 of Utah Code Annotated contains the

provisions for the creation, powers and management of notaries
- 10 -

public.

""

instructions

addition,
-

notaries-

s-

I1!1, contains

Title
"

J

\\\ Codn

sections

instructions to notaries

IKM*

^ f o r m a t i o n and
"'!">" I 8

setting

forth

information and

Section states:

To all a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s , o a t h s , a f f i r m a t i o n s and
Instruments of every kind taken and certified by a
notary public he shall affix to hi|s signature his
official title and his place of residence and the date
011 which his commission expires.
] egislaturt-T s

There

i^fen-1- that a

notary certification is to be deemed invalid it *^
: l i *.

"istructions set *
• .,.*.

&^idity

; taiy

*

.on

s certification

- p*

affect the

«cknowledgem€
rejudice innocent

elied
IJIi-* ?

(

* - notary :>, r \ .*.-.

verificatior

I jr

notary fails

.

n-r u: y public to carry out his

duty •

Such

i I in II Iini

handed down

"In I Ii is supported

upreme Court,

il<

* decisions

In Stahl v. Utah Transit

Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980)
this impoildiiii!

KT

i I

I Jiiluti ry construction as follows:

We are guided in construing the language of the instant
statute by the principal that generally a direction in
a statute is considered "mandatory" wFjten consequences
are attached for failure to act. Conversely, when a
statute requires an action to be taken without
prescribing a penalty for failure 1fo so act, the
requirement is not often deemed mandatory. (Citations
omitted) (Emphasis Added).
m1

would

consequences" specified
^udioaie

ihnHii

Mm

Section

i i i n > i i m tained

t h e r e i n ait

mandatory,

at least with regard to the notary's place of

residence and commission expiration date.
This argument is further strengthened by the fact that
regardless of whether the notary includes his or her place of
residence and commission expiration date, these two items of
information can only be verified or proved by consulting the
master lists established pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
46-1-2.

The notary's signature will of necessity be "deemed

mandatory"

even without

consequences

attaching

since that

information is required by Section 57-2-5 to establish the
identity and authority of the person certifying a verification or
acknowledgement and to allow anyone to consult the master lists
and ascertain that the person making the certification is in fact
an authorized notary public.
The lack of a statement of a notary's place of residence and
commission expiration date does not invalidate the notary's
certificate.

1 Am.Jur. 2d Acknowledgements, Section 55 states,

"It is not essential to the validity of the certificate that it
state the officer's place of residence."

After researching the

issue of residence, Plaintiff is unaware of any case in any
jurisdiction which invalidates either notary certifications or
the effect of a recording due to lack of a statement of the
notary's residence (with the exception of In Re Williamson which
is discussed in Section B. below).

There are, however, numerous

cases which hold that such an oversight does not invalidate the

- 12 -

instrument containing the certification nl
See

29 A.L.R. 974

i

Furthermore
states

Acknowledgements,
ommission •-: ^^

::

officer 1

was
that

doesnft

he

the

roi h t u "

"

certify

when

effectiveness
fl

"dTchar..-

Plaintiff

:

a n a w a r e ot

his

of
:

term

• -iw\
will

expire

m s t r umcjii I

the

\t. - - ^

t y can*:

^
:

.ommission
-:

there

»iti

nmiii'iiui

does

not

invalidate

certification
A • j j . « . .

'

• • <r'

of

the
iii

i i

h »

IAIIIIII

expiration
which

I <i s t a t e m e n t

I n Re W i l l i a m s o n w h i c h i s d i s c u s s e d <
:

oversight

not

jurisdiction

» c o m m i s s i o n e x p i r a t i o n , da «.- ( w i t h t : -

however

57

t he fact
ik.cs

In

invalidates notary c e r t i f i e r
f I

Section

•> nm acknowledgement

-

destroy

date,

tht> acknowledgement•

t asf > w l i n h
the

acknowledgement.

u

Section

below),

hulil

instrument
See 29

e x c e p t i o n of

n

that

A] i
such

containing
1 V

u Mi,

an
the
n

\ 1.

Based upon the foregoing, ii is cleai that the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated,

Section 46-1

1f

i

1

mlitji)

* nice

ttitjly <u <i ii I mandatory, they do not destroy the effectiveness of
the instrument for which the notary certifies an acknowledgement
ox verification.

B.
NEITHER THE UTAH RECORDING STATUTES NOR THE UTAH M E C H A N 1 C t S
LIEN STATUTES REQUIRE THAT A NOTARY PUBLIC INCLUDE HIS OR HER
RESIDENCE NOR HIS OR HER COMMISSION EXPIRATION DATE IN THE
CERTIFICATION OF EITHER A VERIFICATION OR AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ft
MECHANICfF LIEN.

- 13 -

The Utah mechanic's lien statute, Utah Code Annotated,
Section 38-1-7 (1953 a amended prior to April 29, 1985) required
that a mechanic's lien must be "verified by the oath" of the lien
claimant or by someone else having knowledge of the facts and
circumstances giving rise to the lien claim.
statutory form specified for a verification.
the

Utah

courts

have

developed

the

There was no

Through the years,

requirements

for a

verification by starting with the form of an acknowledgement,
which

is

specified

in

the

statutes.

acknowledgement form is quoted hereinafter).

(The

statutory

To understand the

requirements of a verification, it is appropriate and necessary
to review the statutes dealing with acknowledgements.

1.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 46-1-8 (1953) Does Not Apply to
the Recording Statutes.
Defendant Copper State claims that Plaintiff's notices of
lien are defective since they do not contain a statement of the
notary public's residence nor the notary public's commission
expiration date following the verification.

Defendant Copper

State relied entirely on Section 46-1-8 of Utah Code Annotated
for this conclusion.

However, this reliance is ill founded since

that section should not apply to the mechanic's lien or recording
statutes.
However, notwithstanding

the information set forth in

Section 46-1-8, the recording and mechanic's lien statutes are
self-contained

with regard to the requirements of a notary

certification of an acknowledgement or verification for recording
- 14 -

purposes.

Utah Code Annotated,

Section

57 - J 6 states In

pertinent part:
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument
of writing setting forth an agreement to convey any
real estate or whereby any real estate may be affected,
to operate as notice to third persons shall be . .
acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed by
this title and recorded in the 1office of the recorder
of the county in which sin-h re*? A^ta^r* i~ situated...
(Emphasis added).
Tit.]*;1' "V" " doe1.-, not require t h e i n c l u s i o n o f e i t h e r t h e n o t a r y ' s
p l a c e of r e s i d e n c e or c o m m i s s i o n e x p i r a t i o n d a t e a s pai f nl i 1 •;
p r e s c r i b e d acknowledgers

,ements.

'Kfah Cudi! Annotated, Section ^;
be consulted

: • .? '

Secti:- • n\

,st

determine the requirements for c_

certification oi

i

,

l:.a\

r recording purposes.

Section states in pertinent pari:
Every officer who shall take the...acknowledgement of
any conveyance affecting any real estate shall make a
certificate thereof, and cause such certificate to be
endorsed on or annexed to such conveyance.
Si ich
certificate shall be:
(1) when made t'w aTvy judge or clerk, under the hand ol
such judge or c.^i* and the seal of the court.
(2) when made Oy any other officer, under the hand and
official seal of such officer. (Emphases Added).
Ther^ a~-

requirement
cer%

require "any

including notaries public

residence and commission expiration date
order to achieve

-

;ua e

i

u uius t

-ddgemer

<"IT verification

J r

i ecording purposes.
The Utah mechanic ' s J i f«n statutes
i n * * I in1 11 mi

i

I

H I I

, place ^
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i

i

i et.ju i i e ' '»»

residence and commission

expiration date in the verification or acknowledgement in order
to achieve a valid notice of lien.

As mentioned previously, the

Utah mechanic's lien statutes (prior to April 29, 1985) required
that notices of liens be verified.

Yet, there are no require-

ments in the mechanic's lien statutes which mandate that such
verification contain a notary public's residence and commission
expiration date.

See Utah Code Annotated, Section 38-1-1 et seq.

Moreover, there

is no Utah

statue which

specifically

mandates that a notary public include his or her place of
residence and commission expiration date for a proper recordation
of a notice of lien.
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated, Section 46-1-8 do not apply to the recording
and mechanic's lien statutes.

Since they are not applicable, the

lack of a statement of the notary's place of residence or
commission expiration date does not destroy the effectiveness of
the instrument for which the notary certifies the acknowledgement
or verification.

C.
THE HOLDING IN IN RE WILLIAMSON, 43 B.R. 813 (BANK. D. UTAH
1984) IS ERRONEOUS AND IS NOT BINDING ON THIS COURT.

While Plaintiff is familiar with the case and holding of In
Re Williamson, 43 B.R. 813 (Bank. D. Utah 1984), the sole case
relied upon by Defendant Copper State with regard to the notary
issue, that case is not binding on the State courts of Utah.

It

should also be noted that In Re Williamson does not cite a single
- 16 -

authority wherein

nvalidated by failure x

the notary

-e

ssinn expiration date.

While that case may have some influence on the decisions rendered
by trie Utah State courts

o not nuid any pr Hrnrlnnt i ••• I vdilue

for x

^ rase at bar.

This principal

greater degree when H fieri si on by ^he

should be applied

bankruptcy court erroneously intei
•' i oiding ^.

j I.I i ii*.il<". ,1 bad

^ Williamson case Is one - * at both

creates bad II aw and erroneously interprets Utah law as

> I'^PII

set forth hereinabove.

THE STANDARD OF STRICT COMPLIANCE DOE$ NOT
PUBLIC"' CERTIFICATIONS.

wool i) have this Court apply a iiile ol
compliance for notary certifications which i s morn strict than
that required by the Utah Supreme •
I'laR

^ standard *

upreme Court
* applied i.;-: determin:na

compliance with the verification of a mechanic's "I

i *

is one of substantial

i bxaii v. Boise Cascade

Corporation, 660 P.2a

Chase v. Dawsor

295, 215 P. 2d 390 (1950).
requirement * * ~
compl i ai ic-

i

The standard o 1 eomp 1 i r
v I ir-ilyenn-;

u I Gu one nl substantial

^see Deseret National Bank v» Kidman, 71 __ :

Vw^ai i

1903).
However
applying

the

Williamson Court stated ^ '
substantial

compliance
- I"/ -

test

foi

tite note

certification, it in fact required strict compliance under its
erroneous interpretation of the requirements for certification of
the verification.
The test of substantial compliance involves determining the
purpose of the statute and an analysis of whether the offered
compliance adequately fulfills that purpose.

See Stahl v. Utah

Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980).

The Williamson

Court did not make the necessary determination and analysis to
apply the substantial compliance test.

It simply looked to see

what is stated in Utah Code Annotated, Section 46-1-8 (the
statute dealing with the commissioning of notaries public) and
strictly applied those notary guidelines to the mechanic's lien
and recording statutes.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-2-1 discusses the manner of
acknowledging conveyances for recording purposes.

That Section

states, "Every conveyance in writing whereby any real estate is
conveyed or may be affected shall be acknowledged...and certified
in the manner hereinafter provided."

This is a two part process.

Part one is that the conveyance must be acknowledged

(or

verified)

(or

and

step

two

is that

the

acknowledgement

verification) must be certified.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-2-7 sets forth the form of a
certificate of acknowledgement.

That Section reads:

A certificate of acknowledgement to any instrument in
writing affecting the title to any real property in
this state may be substantially in the following form:
State of Utah, County of
- 18 -

On the
day of
, %9
, personally
appeared before me
, the signer of
the above instrument^ who duly acknowledged to me that
he executed the same.
It is important to note that the notary Certification does not
appear as part of the acknowledgement.
It is ciear from the above-quoted Section that the notary
certification of an acknowledgement is sepatate and distinct from
the acknowledgement.

By analogy, and due to the derivation of

the verification form from the acknowledgement form, it likewise
follows that the notary certification q>f a verification is
separate and distinct from the verification itself.
In addition, while the Utah Supreme Court has in practice
held to a high standard of compliance in the verification
requirement, it would likely not do so in the future.

In the

1985 legislative session, the Utah State legislature was moved to
do something

about the strict technical! requirements being

imposed on mechanic's lien claimants by the Utah courts.

Since

the verification requirement was being used! by some courts as a
hypertechnicality
opportunity

to unreasonably

to recover monies

deny lien claimants the

justly

due

and owing, the

legislature eliminated the verification requirement altogether
and sent a strong message to the courts that the legislature did
not intend that there be such technical requirements which would
deny recovery to unpaid mechanics and materialmen who had
improved the property of others.

See Utah Code Annotated,

Section 38-1-7 (1953 as amended in 1985).

Thus, this Court

should follow the legislative directive and not require technical
- 19 -

compliance

for

any

portion

of

the

verification

or

acknowledgement, including the notary certification.
Even if this Court determines that the items stated in Utah
Code Annotated, Section 46-1-8 are necessary for recording and
the creation of a valid mechanic's lien, it must apply the
substantial compliance test in determining whether there has been
compliance.

In the endeavor to determine whether there has been

substantial

compliance with any statute, it is helpful and

necessary to explore the purpose and policy of the statute.
The purpose of the notary public statute is to provide
readily available authorized persons who can provide certainty
and formality to important transaction by placing their signature
and official seal on documents.

Under this purpose, it is easy

to understand the instruction to notaries in Section 46-1-8.
That Section reads, "To all acknowledgements, oaths, affirmations
and instruments of every kind taken and certified by a notary
public he shall affix to his signature his official title and his
place of residence and the date on which his commission expires."
It is well within reason to hold that at the very least, a
notary must legibly sign an acknowledgement and affix his or her
official title to that signature.

Otherwise, there would be no

way to independently prove the notary's authority.
requirements

of residence

and commission

However, the

expiration

statements should not be deemed mandatory.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 46-1-2 provides:
Hereafter, whenever a notarial commission is issued to
any person, the governor and the director of the
- 20 -

date

Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall
certify to a master list of notaries public.
The
issuance of all commissions shall be certified to each
of the several clerks of the district courts giving the
dates of issuance and the expiration of same. . . .
The purpose of the above-quoted Section is clearly to allow
for the independent proof of the notary's authority.

Obviously,

if a person had a concern over the validity of the notary's
power, he could verify that the notary was in fact authorized by
checking

with

the master

list

kept

Corporations or with the district courts.

at

the

Division

of

In fact, regardless of

whether the notary includes his expiration date or his place of
residence, in order to be certain of the authority of the notary,
the master list must be consulted.

This is true since the

realities of our society are such that it ^ould be very easy to
obtain a seal and feign notarial authority.

The only sure method

of determining and relying on the notary's authority is to check
the master list.
In the case at bar it is of little consequence to Defendant
Copper

State

that

the

notaries

certifying

Plaintiff's

verification of its notices of lien did not include their
respective places of residence or commission expiration dates.
Is there anything lost with regard to certainty or protection
against fraud and the need for formality by not having the
notary's residence and the expiration of qis or her commission
appear

in

a

certification

acknowledgement?
residence

and

of

a

lien

verification

The answer is a resounding no.
commission

expiration

- 21 -

date

or

The notary
are

merely

hypertechnicalities

which

are being

used

to challenge a

mechanic's lien claimant's valid claims for monies which were
rightfully earned.

E.
THE STRICT APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 46-11 ET SEQ. TO THE VALIDITY OF MECHANIC'S LIENS WOULD BE
DEVASTATING TO THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY SINCE MOST OF THE LIENS
FILED ARE ON COMMERCIALLY SUPPLIED FORMS WHICH DO NOT CONTAIN
BLANKS FOR EITHER THE NOTARY'S RESIDENCE OR THE NOTARY'S
COMMISSION EXPIRATION DATE.
Another important factor to consider in determining whether
to apply Section 46-1-1 et seq. to notices of lien is the impact
of such a rule of law if it were applied by all of the Utah
courts to all notices of lien.

The vast majority of mechanic's

liens in Utah are prepared on printed forms from commercial
printers or on forms copied from these commercially prepared
forms. (See Affidavit of Glenn M. Acomb, Chief Deputy County
Recorder for Salt Lake County, in the Addendum).
suppliers of mechanic's
Printing

The two largest

lien forms, Kelly Company

and Gem

Company, do not include a line for the notary's

residence nor commission expiration date.
are contained in the Addendum.

Copies of these forms

Gem alone estimates that they

sell over 4,000 mechanic's lien forms in year.

(See Affidavit of

Frank Nelson of Gem Printing in the Addendum).

This figure

obviously does not reflect the number of photocopies and manual
copies made of these mechanic's lien forms each year.

It is not

unreasonable to assume that there have been tens of thousands of
mechanic's liens prepared on or patterned after the printed
- 22 -

forms. For many years, these liens have been upheld as valid by
the courts to the extent that members of) the construction
industry have come to rely on the accuracy of these forms.

It

would be difficult to estimate the overwhelming impact of a
ruling that liens prepared on these forms are invalid.

It

should, however, be abundantly clear that the effect would be
devastating.
Another

important

consideration

regarding

the

proper

emphasis placed on the notary certification ils shown by the Salt
Lake County Recorder's instructions to mechanic's lien claimants
following the 1985 amendments which eliminated the verification
requirement.

The Salt Lake County Recorder's current policy with

regard to mechanic's liens is that they are not required to be
notarized

at all in order to be properly recorded.

(See

Affidavit of Glenn M. Acomb, Chief Deputy County Recorder for
Salt Lake County in the Addendum).

In order to have a valid

mechanic's lien, a lien claimant "must file for record" a notice
of lien containing the necessary information with the county
recorder of the county in which the property, or some part
thereof, is situated. . . . "
38-1-7.

See Utah Cod£ Annotated, Section

If the notice of lien is accepted by the county

recorder, is filed on the correct property and does not contain
any fatal defects, it has satisfied the requirements of the
mechanic's lien statutes.

F.

SUMMARY
- 23 -

The statutory provisions and the rules of law discussed
above provide adequate means whereby this Court can and should
rule that the lack of a statement of the notary's residence and
commission expiration date does not invalidate the mechanic's
liens of Plaintiff.

The need to so rule becomes compelling when

the public policy, the legislative intent and the devastating
impact on the construction industry of a contrary ruling are
considered.

II. A MECHANIC'S LIEN CLAIMANT MAY JOIN A PARTY WHO CLAIMS
AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY UP TO THE TIME OF TRIAL.

In order

to understand

the procedure of commencing a

mechanic's lien foreclosure action and the joinder of parties
thereto, two sections in the mechanic's
explored.

lien law must be

With regard to the joinder of parties, the Utah

mechanic's lien statute states that:
Lienors not contesting the claims of each other may
join as plaintiffs, and when separate causes of action
are commenced the court may consolidate them and make
all persons having claims filed parties to the action.
Those claiming liens who fail or refuse to become
parties plaintiff may be made parties defendant, and
any one not made a party may at any time before the
final hearing intervene.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 38-1-13 (1953).
The

section

dealing

with

the

time

period

for

the

commencement of the action is found in Utah Code Annotated,
Section 38-1-11 (1953).

That Section states in pertinent part:
- 24 -

Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for must
be begun within twelve months after completion of the
original contract, or the suspension! of the work
thereunder for a period of thirty days. Within the
twelve months herein mentioned the lien claimant shall
file for record with the county recorder of each county
in which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency
of the action, in the manner provided in actions
affecting the title or right to possession of property,
or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who
have been made parties to the action and persons having
actual knowledge of the commencement of the action. . .

The trial court was apparently persuad0d by the erroneous
characterization of Section 38-1-11
Memorandum
Judgment

by Defendants in their Reply

in Opposition to Plaintiff's IMotion for Summary

and in Support

Judgment.

The

case

of Defendants' potion

of AAA

Fencing

Company

for
v.

Summary
Raintree

Development and Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289 (Utah Jan. 13, 1986)
stands for the proposition that when a mechanic's lien which is
not foreclosed within twelve months after the completion of the
original contract under which the claim arisps, a court does not
have jurisdiction to entertain a foreclosure action on the
mechanic's lien.

The AAA Court's reasoning is based upon the

fact that under Utah law, if the lien foreclosure action is not
commenced within the time prescribed, the mechanic*s lien expires
and there is no longer a lien claim which is enforceable under
the law.

The Court stated that

M

a mechanics' lien foreclosure

action must be brought within twelve month$ after the original
contract between the lienor and the lienee is completed . . . ."
Id. at 291.
- 25 -

However, unlike the AAA case, there is no dispute that
Plaintiff's mechanic's lien foreclosure action was commenced
within twelve months after the completion of the original
contract between the lienor (Plaintiff) and the lienee (Defendant
Bradshaw Development).

Defendant Valley Bank claims only that

the failure to join it as a party within the same twelve months
deprives the court of jurisdiction to hear and decide priority
issues between Plaintiff and Defendant Valley Bank.

Defendant

Valley Bank's challenge is solely to the propriety of the joinder
of parties which is governed by Section 38-1-13.

This is quite a

different issue than whether a mechanic's lien foreclosure action
has been commenced in a timely as determined by Section 38-1-11.
The Court in AAA Fencing stated that " . . .

liens . . .

arising under the statute will be liberally construed to effect
the desired object . . . ."
the

Id. at 291.

The Court stated that

"desired object" of the mechanics' lien statute is to

"provide protection to those who enhance the value of a property
by supplying labor and materials."

Id.

Defendant Valley Bank argues that Projects Unlimited is
barred from enforcing its claims against them by the one year
statute of limitations for enforcement of mechanic's liens, Utah
Code Annotated. Section 38-1-11.

Projects Unlimited's notice of

lien indicates that it performed its last work in October of 1983
and although the original complaint and lis pendens were filed in
March of 1984, Valley Bank was not named as a defendant until May
of 1985, when an amended complaint was filed.
- 26 -

As indicated in its memorandum in opposition to defendant
Carolyn Nielsen's motion for summary judgment, it is Projects
Unlimitedfs position that the doctrine of relation back as set
forth in Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should
be applied in this case.
(Utah 1976).

See Doxey-Layton v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902

The rationale for applying that doctrine to this

defendant is especially compelling.

At the ti[me that Valley Bank

recorded their trust deeds, Projects Unlimited was still working
on the project.

Copper State, the construction lender, agreed to

subordinate its trust deeds to those of Valley Bank.

Thus,

Valley Bank simply stepped into Copper State's position as to
those units.

Further , Section 38-1-11 provides an exception to

the one year limitation for persons having actual knowledge of
the proceedings to enforce the lien.
In this case, Projects Unlimited filed and recorded its lis
pendens in March of 1984.

In June of 1984, Valley Bank commenced

foreclosure proceedings on one of the units <^n which it had made
a loan.

In August of 1984, Valley Bank sent a copy of its notice

of default and a letter from its attorney to Projects Unlimited.
The letter mentions a foreclosure report - that report included
the lis pendens filed by Projects Unlimited.

Thus, it is obvious

that Valley Bank had actual knowledge of the commencement of this
proceeding in August of 1984.
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff should not precluded
from enforcing its lien against Valley Bank.

- 27 -

III. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE IS REASONABLE RELIANCE ON
A LIEN RELEASE IS NOT ONE THAT CAN BE DECIDED THROUGH A
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The issue of whether a party has reasonably relied upon a
partial release of lien presents a unique question to a trial
court at a motion for summary judgment.

It involves both rulings

of law as well as determining issues of fact.

The first question

which a trial court must address is one of law:
release clear and unambiguous on its face?
important because generally

Is the lien

This question is

an owner or a mortgagee cannot

reasonably rely upon an ambiguous lien release.
However, even if a trial court finds that the lien release
is unambiguous and clear on its face, it does not mean that an
owner or mortgagee is unquestionably deemed to have reasonably
relied thereon.

Whether there was reasonable reliance is a

determination of law which is based upon all of the facts of the
case.

Such a determination is based upon very difficult factual

findings since the party asserting reasonable reliance usually is
the only party who has the knowledge of the factual background
which may or may not be the basis for a sound finding on the
legal issue of whether there was reasonable reliance.
The case at bar is an ideal example of these points in at
least two respects.

First the trial court held that as a matter

of law that the partial lien release was unambiguous on its face
- 28 -

and

that

it totally

released

the two uiliits in question.

Plaintiff assigns error to this finding and asserts that either
the partial

lien release was clearly a release of the two

properties only to the extent of the amount stated in the partial
release or that at least the partial lien release is indeed
ambiguous

and parole evidence should be allowed to make a

determination as to the nature and extent df the partial lien
release.

Since no parole evidence was considered by the trial

court, its determination that the partial p.ien release was a
complete release of the two units should be overturned.
Second, based upon the uncontroverted legal conclusion of
Charles Brazier in his affidavit

(see Record

at 674) that

Defendant Valley Bank had reasonably relied upon the partial
release of lien, the trial court ruled that ^here was reasonable
reliance upon the partial release of lien.

Defendant did not

allege facts which would support such a finding by the trial
court but merely asserted a legal conclusion.

Without such

findings of fact to support such a conclusion by the trial court,
this ruling must also be overturned by this Cfcurt.
This is particularly true in this case where the person
asserting

such

a conclusion

is the only

party

with the

information upon which the trial court could make the necessary
factual

determination.

There is no possible way for the

Plaintiff to controvert such a conclusion dn summary judgment.
This type of factual dispute can only bei settled with full
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discovery and a complete evidentiary hearing such as would be had
at trial.
Plaintiff relies on Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676
P.2d 387 (Utah 1984), in support of its position that when a
material

issue

appropriate.

of

fact

exists, summary

judgment

is not

In Frisbee, the defendants made a motion for

summary judgment accompanied by an affidavit of one of the
parties.

Appellants in Frisbee, did not proffer affidavits in

opposition to the motion.

The Court held that it is not always

required to proffer affidavits in order to avoid judgment.
The lower court failed to recognize the inherent problem
with this type of factual determination and incorrectly ruled on
the issue at summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the summary judgments entered against it
in favor of Defendant Copper State, Defendant Valley Bank and
Defendant Cottonwood Thrift and that this Court remand the case
for trial on the merits.
DATED this

^fAy of {J-2^^

r 1986.
& BABCOCK

F. Ba}
Darrel J. Bos^wick
Attorneys For Plaintiff/
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Appellant Projects Unlimited
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD; 3]$ICIKL DISTRICTp p^J,

»\s

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAtTE OF UTAH

PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

C-84-1644

Plaintiff,
vs.
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT, INC., a
Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendants Copper State
Thrift and Loan Company, Cottonwood Thrift and Loan Company,
Valley Bank and Trust Company, and Westtern Savings and Loan
Company came before the Court in a spec|ial setting at 11:00
a.m., on Friday, March 21, 1986, the Honoraple Judith M. Billings
presiding. Also before the Court was a Motion for Summary Judgment
by plaintiff Projects Unlimited, Inc. as against defendant Copper
State Thrift & Loan Co. Plaintiff, Project^ Unlimited, Inc., was
represented by Ellen Maycock, Esq.

Defendants Copper State

Thrift and Loan Company, Cottonwood Thrift and Loan Company,
Valley Bank and Trust Company, and Westiern Savings and Loan
were represented by James A. Boevers, Eisq.

The Court heard

oral argument, and reviewed the Memoranda submitted by counsel
for all parties involved, and hereby enters its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Lav; as incorporated in this Memorandum
Decision.

V , +.J'*s ••-...
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

FACTS
Defendant Copper State moves for Summary Judgment against
plaintiff's claims arising out of a mechanic's lien for work
performed on a condominium project.

The plaintiff filed a Notice

of Lien on November 14, 1983, and an Amended Notice of Lien
on December 27, 1983.

Both Notices contained a statement that

the facts contained in the Notice were true, as was at that
time required by Utah Code Ann., Section 38-1-7 (1953).

The

notarizations on the Notices of Lien filed by the plaintiff,
however, failed to include a statement as to the notary's residence
and the date that the notary's commission would expire.

Defendants

contend that these omissions render the required verification
void and that, therefore, the Notices and lien are also void.
OPINION
Utah Code Ann., Section 38-1-7 (1953), as it stood at the
date of the Notices involved in this action, required that the
notice of lien set forth the claim of the lienor, and that the
"claim must be verified by the oath of himself or some other
person."

In First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d

919 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court explained the rationale
and importance of this requirement stating:
A lien creates an encumbrance on property
that deprives the owner of his ability to
convey clear title and impairs its credit.

PROJECTS V. BRADSHAW
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

The filing of the lien for an! excessive
amount could be used to force a settlement
unfairly weighted in favor of the claimant.
Such abuse is made a misdemeanor by Section
38-1-25. These serious consequences justify
the statutory imposition of a requirement
that one who makes the claim must furnish
a sworn statement to the truthfulness of
the facts that give rise to it. Frivolous,
unfounded, and inflated claims ban thereby
be minimized, and the prejudgment property
rights of the individuals reqeive their
due protection.
Id. at 922.
The Court held that a notice of lien lacking the proper verification
was ineffective, and the lien void even though the notice of
lien bore the notarized signature of the claimant.
The question here is whether or not the omission from the
notarization of the residence of the notary and the date the
notary's commission expires is fatal to the Notice of Lien filed
by the plaintiff.

If these omissions render the notarization

ineffective, then the verification is also ineffective, and
under First Security Mortaacre Co. v. Hansei), 631 P.2d 919 (Utah
1981) , the Notices of Lien and the lien claimed by the plaintiff
in this action are void.

Although the jresult may be harsh,

this Court is bound to follow the requirements of the statute.

. . . A mechanic's lien is statutory and
not contractual, a lien cannot be acquired
unless the claimant complies with the statutory

• - ; \>
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provisions. Where the statute fails, courts
cannot create rights, and should not do
so by unnatural and forced construction.
Id. at 922.
Utah Code Ann., Section 46-1-8, sets forth certain of the
requirements for a valid notarization.
To all acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations
and instruments of every kind taken and
certified by a notary public, he shall affix
to his signature his official title and
his place of residence, and the date on
which his commission expires.
The statute provides that the notarization "shall" contain these
statements.

In determining whether or not omissions of some

or all of these statements is fatal to the validity of a notarization, it has been held that similar statutory language that
a notary must set forth certain information was mandatory, and
required strict enforcement and construction of the statutory
requirements.

Lee County Savings Bank v. Snodqrass Bros.f

166 N.W. 680 (Iowa 1918); Crown Cascade, Inc. v. O'Neal, 100
Wash.2d 256, 668 P.2d 585 (1983).
Furthermore, this Court must presume that the legislature
carefully considered the language used in the statute and will
construe such language so as to give effect to all of the statute's
provisions.

Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P. 2d 934 (Utah

19 80) ; Durfey v. Board of Ed. of Wayne County School District,
604 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980); Horman v. Liquor Control Commission,
21 Utah 2d 294, 445 P.2d 4 (1968).

To validate a notarization
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lacking any of the information required by Section 46-1-8 would
abrogate the purpose of the statute, and would render it a nullity.
Such a finding would be contrary to reqognized principles of
statutory construction.
This Court is aware of the following statement of the Utah
Supreme Court regarding the determination of whether statutory
language is mandatory or permissive.
We are guided in construing the language
of the instant statute by the principle
that generally a direction in a statute
is considered "mandatory" when consequences
are attached for failure to act. Conversely,
when a statute requires an action to be
taken without prescribing a penalty for
failure to so act, the requirement is not
often deemed mandatory.
Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 4^0, 481 (Utah 1980).1
Although helpful in the construction of I Section 46-1-8, this
principle is not to be applied to the exclusion of the principles
of statutory construction discussed above.

This Court believes

that the only construction giving effect to Section 46-1-8 is
to deem the inclusion of the information called for.in its provisions
to be essential requirements of a valic^ notarization.

Other

Utah courts have also found the provisions of Section 46-1-8
to be mandatory requirements of a valid notarization.

In Re:

Williamson, 43 B.R. 813 (D. Utah 1984).
^It should be pointed out that the Stahl case was decided
largely upon grounds of substantial compliance rather than the
determination of whether or not the statutory] language was mandatory
in nature.
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Although some courts have held that the omission of information
such as the residence of the notary and the date of expiration
of the notary's commission does not effect the validity of the
notarization, these cases are distinguishable from the present
situation inasmuch as those cases interpreted statutes expressly
allowing for such omissions or which contain optional or permissive
language rather than the mandatory language found in Section
46-1-8.

Kelly v. Carter, 216 Ark. 491, 226 S.W.2d 53 (1950);

Tildesly Coal Co. v. American Fuel Corp., 130 W. Va. 720, 45
S.E.2d 75 (1947); Sheridan County v. McKinney, 79 Neb. 223,
115 N.W. 548 (1907).
This Court finds that the failure to set forth the required
information regarding the notary's place of residence and the
date upon which the notary's commission expires renders the
notarization ineffective

under

Section

46-1-8, Utah Code

Ann. (1953).
Section 38-1-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953), required, at the
time of the Notices involved here, that valid, notices of lien
contain a verification of the claims set forth therein.

A proper

verification necessarily requires a proper notarization.

Section

4 6-1-8 requires that a notarization, in order to be effective,
must set forth the residence of the notary and the date the
notary's commission expires.

Without this information, there

is no information on the notarization regarding the authority
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of the notary to acknowledge the verification required in tne
Notice of Lien.

The notary seal, although important to the

notarization, does not alone state that the notary was authorized,
inasmuch as it contains no date as to the expiration of the
notary's commission.

Only with a prope^ statement as to the

expiration of the notaryfs commission, is there sufficient information to indicate to interested parties that the notary was
currently authorized to acknowledge the verification.
This Court further finds that the ineffective notarization
renders the verification on the Notices of Lien, as well as
the Notices themselves ineffective, and t^iat the liens claimed
by plaintiff in this action are therefore Void.
Mortgage Co. v.

Hansen, 631 P.2d 919

First Security

(Utah 1981); In Re:

Williamson, 43 B.R. 813 (D. Utah 1984).
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is, therefore,
hereby granted and it is further ordered that icounsel for defendants
prepare an Order in/ conformance with this Memorandum Decision.
Dated this

L

2

_day of March, 1986.

jfrtflTH M. BILLINGS
DISTRICT COUR

AT
H. DIXC
By

—

(L,
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

<31

day of March, 1986:

Ellen M. Maycock
Attorney for Plaintiff
620 Kearns Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Jaiaes A* Boevers
Attorney for Defendants
424 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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assistance of counsel. He does not, however, point out specifically any conflict except to suggest that his co-defendant's plea
to a lesser charge may have been in exchange for a promise "that he would testify against Barella." There is nothing in
the record which would even remotely support such speculation. On the contrary,
co-defendant Skinner was not called to testify at Defendant's trial by either side.
The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed a
similar contention in the case of State v.
Jclks, 105 Ariz. 175, 461 P.2d 473 (1969),
and cited with approval the language in
United States v. Lugo, 350 F.2d 858 (9th
Cir.1965), where the court stated:
[W]hile we cannot indulge in nice calculations about the amount of prejudice
which results from a conflict of interest
. . . neither can we create a conflict of
interest out of mere conjecture as to
what might have been shown.
IdL at 859.
[2] While we recognize that conflicts of
interests could arise when office associates
represent co-defendants and that defense
counsel should exercise care to avoid conflicts, both potential and real, the defendant has not shown and we are unable to
perceive any conflict under the circumstances of this case. We hold therefore
that defendant received the effective assistance of counsel to which he was entitled.
Conviction affirmed.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

AAA FENCING COMPANY and Ronald
L. Kendell, Plaintiffs land Respondents,
v.
RAINTREE DEVELOPMENT AND ENERGY COMPANY ahd Galen J. Ross,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 19870.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 13,|1986.
Mechanics' lien foreclosure action was
filed against both vendors and purchasers
of property. Action was consolidated with
purchaser's quiet title action. The Second
District Court, David County, J. Duffy
Palmer, J., entered j ummary judgment
against purchaser in kmount of hen, and
purchaser appealed. The Supreme Court
held that untimehness of mechanics' lien
action affected rights of parties, and thus
was jurisdictional, foreclosing plaintiffs'
rights.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Stewart, J., concurred in the result.
1. Mechanics' Liens <k=260(6)
Untimeliness of mechanics' lien action
affected rights of parties, and thus was
jurisdiction, foreclosing plaintiffs' rights.
2. Mechanics' Liens p=*3
Purpose of mechanics' lien law is to
provide protection to those who enhance
value of a property lj>y supplying labor or
xnaterials.
3. Mechanics' Liens I0116
Although liens and pleadings arising
under mechanics' liei statute [U.C.A.1953,
3S-1-1 et seq.] will e liberally construed
to effect desired ol ect, compliance with
statute is required efore a party is entitled to benefits created by statute.
Brant H. Wall, SAlt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
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Darrell G. Renstrom, Ogden, for plaintiffs and respondents.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal arises out of a mechanics'
lien foreclosure action.
Plaintiffs furnished labor and materials
on premises purchased under contract by
defendant Raintree Development and Energy (Raintree) and completed their work on
January 10, 1982. When Raintree failed to
pay, plaintiffs placed a timely lien on the
premises but then sued Raintree for breach
of oral contract. Plaintiffs obtained a money judgment against Raintree on January
14, 1983.
On June 29, 1982, the sellers of the property here at issue sold the property to
defendant Galen J. Ross (Ross) when Raintree defaulted under its contract. Ross
later brought suit to terminate the rights
of Raintree to the property and to quiet
title against plaintiffs and Raintree. Raintree was served with process but failed to
answer or otherwise respond. On May 2,
1983, Ross obtained judgment against
Raintree quieting title to the property and
declaring all of Raintree's rights, title, interest and lien or estate in the land null and
void.
Meanwhile, on March 7, 1983, after they
discovered that Raintree was judgmentproof against their money judgment, plaintiffs instituted their mechanics' lien foreclosure action against defendants. Ross
answered, but failed to plead the statutory
bar as an affirmative defense. Plaintiffs'
action was consolidated with Ross's quiet
title action for purposes of trial. Both
parties moved for summary judgment, and
Ross for the first time raised the issue that
1. 38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for—Lis pendens—Action for debt not affected.—Actions to
enforce the liens herein provided for must be
begun within twelve months after the completion of the original contract, or the suspension
of work thereunder for a period cf thirty days.
Within the twelve months herein mentioned the
lien cbimani shall file for record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is
recorded a notice of the pendency of the action,
in the manner provided in actions affecting the
title or right to possession of real property, or

plaintiffs were barred from bringing the
foreclosure action as it was not filed in a
timely manner. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and
entered judgment against Rcss in the
amount of the lien, together with costs and
attorney fees. Ross filed motions for an
amendment of findings and a new trial
which were denied. This appeal followed.
Ross appeals on several grounds, but his
claim that plaintiffs' foreclosure action was
barred for failure to institute their claim
within the time prescribed by section 38-111 of the mechanics' lien statute is dispositive here. That section provides that actions to enforce liens must be begun within
twelve months after the completion of the
original contract.1 Plaintiffs concede that
they filed their complaint late, but argue
that Ross has wraived his rights to the
statutory bar as he failed to plead it as an
affirmative defense. They also claim that
filing a lawsuit is only one form of "taking
action to enforce the lien," and that filing a
notice of lien is another action which they
took in time. Moreover, continues their
response, the foreclosure of a mechanics'
lien is a matter of equity, and this Court
should therefore construe the statute liberally in accordance with section 6S-3-2 of
the Utah Code.
[1] Properly framed, the issue before
us is whether an untimely action under our
mechanics' lien statute affects the rights or
merely the remedies of the parties. We
disagree with plaintiffs that it affects
merely their remedies and is therefore subject to waiver and estoppel as are procedural statutes of limitations and hold instead
the lien shall be void, except as to persons who
have been made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action, and the burden of proof
shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him to show such actual knowledge.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
impair or affect the right of any person to
whom a debt may be due for any work done or
materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the same.
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that it is jurisdictional and forecloses their
rights.
[2,3] Mechanics' liens are statutory
creatures unknown to the common law.
The purpose of the Utah mechanics' lien
law is to provide protection to those who
enhance the value of a property by supplying labor or materials. Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, Utah, 648 P.2d
13S2 (19S2). Although liens and pleadings
arising under the statute will be liberally
construed to effect the desired object, compliance with the statute is required before
a party is entitled to the benefits created
by the statute. First Security Mortgage
Co. v. Hansen, Utah, 631 P.2d 919 (1981);
see also Schofield v. Copeland Lumber
Yards, Inc., New, 692 P.2d 519 (1985);
Lewis v. Wananiakcr Baptist Church, 10
Kan.App.2d 99, 692 P.2d 397 (1984).
The law is clear in this jurisdiction that a
mechanics' lien foreclosure action must be
brought wiihin twelve months after the
original contract between the lienor and the
lienee is completed, or relief will not lie.
Motivated Management International v.
Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (1979) (dictum); Roberts v. Hansen, 25 Utah 2d 190, 479 P.2d
345 (1971); Totorica v. Thomas, 16 Utah
2d 175, 397 P.2d 984 (1965). That failure to
enforce a mechanics' lien within the statutory period is a jurisdictional question has
not heretofore been decided by this Court.
We therefore look to our sister jurisdictions with similar mechanics' lien statutes.
The definitive statement of the law on
this issue was first rendered in Flcshman
v. Whiteside, 148 Or. 73, 34 P.2d 648 (1934),
93 A.L.R. 1456. The court in that case
2. California predicates its construction of the
statutory limit as procedural statute of limitations upon a constiiutional provision and requires that the statutory limitation be affirmatively pleoded. California Constitution article
XX, section 15 reads as follows:
Mechanics, materialmen, artisans, and laborers of even- class, shall have a lien upon the
property upon which they have bestowed labor or furnished material for the value of
such labor done and material furnished; and
the Legislature shall provide, by law, for the
?;vedy and efficient enforcement of such
hens.

rejected the plaintiffs' identical argument
that defendants had waived the defense of
the statutory bar by failing to raise it by
demurrer or answer and stated in pertinent
part:
While the contrary is held! in California,2
it is the rule in most jurisdictions that
[the time limit provided lor actions to
enforce mechanics' liens] is not a statute
of limitations, which is waived if not
pleaded, but a statute lim ting the duration of the lien. The remedy forms a
part of the right and must be pursued
within the time prescribed, or else both
are lost. If an action is not brought
within the time limited, the court is without jurisdiction to depree a foreclosure
34 P.2d at 650, 93 A.L.R. at 1459.
That rule is still good lawechoed in Diamond National Corp. v.
Dwelle, 164 Conn. 540, 325 ^.2d 259 (1973),
where the court addressed the same issue
and citing Fleshman v. Whiteside pronounced the statutory bar! substantive or
jurisdictional rather than procedural or personal. As the mechanics' lien is a creature
of statute and fixes the time within which
the right must be enforced, the court reasoned that "it is a limitation of the liabilitv
itself as created, and not of the remedy
alone." Similar results wt ere reached in
Well Done Heating & Shdet Metal Co. v.
Ralph Schwartz & Associates, 112 111.
App.3d 438, 68 Ill.Dec. 3, |445 N.E.2d 451
(1983), accord Garbe Iron\Works, Inc. v.
Priestcr, 99 111.2d 84, 75 Ill.Dec. 425, 457
N.E.2d 422 (19S3) (dieturrO; Regal Wood
Products, Inc. v. First Wisconsin Nation(Emphasis added.) For a historical abstract of
the California Mechanic Lien Statute, see Robinson v.S&SDevelopment, 256 Cal.App.2d 13, 63
Cal.Rptr. 663 (1967); accord Petersen v. W.T.
Cram Co., 41 Cal.App.3d 217. 115 Cal.Rptr. £74
(1974). A procedural statute has been defined
as one which neither enlarges nor impairs substantive rights but rather relates to the means
and procedures for enforcing these rights.
Bellegarde Custom Kitchens |v. Leavitt, Me., 295
A.2d>09, 911 (1972).
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al Bank of Milwaukee, Fla.App., 347 So.2d
643 (1977); Federal National Bank and
Trust Co. of Shawnee v. Calsim, Inc., La.
App., 340 So.2d 611 (1976); Bellegarde
Custom Kitchens v. Leavitt, Me., 295 A.2d
909 (1972).
In Cox v. Bankers Trust Co., 39 Colo.
App. 303, 570 P.2d 6 (1977) (dealing with
untimely joinder under the Colorado statute), the court held that the trial court was
not vested with jurisdiction after the statutory period. Both in that case and in King
v. IF./?. Hall Transportation and Storage
Co., Colo., 641 P.2d 916 (1982) (also barring
joinder after the statutory period), the
court stated that the strict application of
the statutory limit was based on the principle that extending the lifetime of a perfected lien would vest a lien creditor with
greater rights than were granted by the
statutory provision creating the rights. In
addition, strictly limiting the time during
which property is encumbered renders titles to real property and to interests and
estates therein more safe, secure, and marketable. Id. at 920. See also Wood Panel
Structures, Inc. v, Grangaard, 55 Or.App.
294, 637 P.2d 1320 (1981). In distinguishing mechanics' lien statutory periods from
procedural statutes of limitations, the court
in Bellegarde Custom Kitche?isf supra,
held that the trial'court had no jurisdiction
where a lienor filed one day late because
the last statutory day for enforcing the lien
fell on a Sunday. 'The Legislature saw fit
to provide that this right should exist only
during a limited period, and the Court is
without jurisdiction to entertain such an
action as this when the period of its availability has expired/' Id. at 912. The vitality of a lien created solely by statute depends on the terms of the statute, and
parties may not by estoppel enact or enlarge a statute. Boyce v. Knudso7i, 219
Kan. 357, 548 P.2d 712 (1976).3
Plaintiffs claim that Ross knew about
the lien when he purchased the property
and the lower court therefore did not err in
3. It should be noted that Kansas law requires
the recorder to cancel the lien after the statu-

enforcing the lien against him. A similar
claim was made in DM. Foley Co., Inc. v.
North West Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 122 Ill.App.3d 411, 77 Ill.Dec. 877, 461
N.E.2d 500 (19S4). The court there found
that a lien foreclosure filed after the statutory period was not valid even against
those who purchased an interest in the
property after the filing of the lien and
who therefore had notice of it, because the
statutory period "is not merely a statute of
limitations but a condition of liability itself
and not just a limitation on the remedy."
The court held that the potential liability of
subsequent purchasers perished inchoate
when plaintiffs failed to bring suit within
the period allowed after completion of the
work.
The same result is mandated here. The
time for enforcing mechanics* liens set out
in section 38-1-11, supra, limits a lienor's
rights to twelve months after his work is
completed. At that point, both his rights
and his remedies under the statute are
extinguished.
Because we find that plaintiffs were too
late in bringing their lien foreclosure action
against Ross, we must also reverse the
award of their attorney fees. The successful party shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney fees. U.C.A., 1953,
§ 3&-1-18. Ross successfully defended
against plaintiffs' action and attorney fees
should be awarded to him. However, plaintiffs resist Ross's claim for attorney fees
on the ground that it is first raised on
appeal. An award of attorney fees is proper to the successful party under section
38-1-18. Palombi v. D. & C. Builders, 22
Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969). Moreover, the record indicates that Ross briefed
the trial court to the effect that the prayer
of his counterclaim asked for costs incurred and for such further relief as would
be proper in the premises. He also argued
to the trial court that under section 38-118 attorney fees were to be taxed as costs,
and his affidavit of attorney fees asked for
tory period.
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$2,500 to the date of the summary judgment. We hold that Ross is entitled to
attorney fees as stated above. Petty Investment Co. v. Miller, Utah, 576 P.2d 883
(1978).

Commission was immune from liability
with respect to lender's claim.

No appeal has been taken from the money judgment plaintiffs obtained against
Raintree, and that judgment therefore
stands, though it apparently is of little
value. The trial court's summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against
Ross is reversed with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of Ross and remove the
lien from the land. The case is remanded
to the trial court for a hearing on a reasonable amount of attorney fees to Ross, including those incurred in this appeal.

States 0=>191(1.19)
State Tax Commissioh was immune
from liability with respect to claim that
Commission and its employees had negligently failed to advise lender that duplicate
automobile certificate of title had been issued and that Commission had improperly
issued title certificate to borrower on which
lender relied in making its loan. U.C.A.
1953, 41-1-56, 60-30-3, G3-30-10(l)ic, f).

STEWART, J., concurs in the result.

Boyd M. Fullmer, Salt I Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.

Affirmed.

David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Mark K.
Buchi, Salt Lake City, foil defendants and
respondents.
PER CURIAM:
METROPOLITAN FINANCE CO.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Utah, The State Tax Commission of Utah, and John Does 1
through 25, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 19291.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 15, 1986.
Lender brought action against State
Tax Commission alleging that Commission
had erroneously issued borrower an automobile certificate of title. The Third District Court, Sal: Lake County, Timothy
Hanson, J., granted Commission's motion
for summar}' judgment, and lender appealed. The Supreme Court held that state tax
1. All statutory references are to U.C.A., 1953, as
amended (Supp.l9S5), unless otherwise provided.

Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment below dismissing plaintiff's complaint
against the Utah State Tax Commission.
The lower court ruled that plaintiffs claims
were barred by governmental immunity under sections 63-30-3 aijd 63-3O-10(l)tc),
(f).1 We affirm.
The Motor Vehicle Division of the State
Tax Commission issued an automobile certificate of title to a Mr. Melby in No\ ember
1974. Later, a duplicate certificate of title
was issued in 1975 to Melby as the automobile owner. In June 1978, a Mr. Stephen
Gibbs presented the original title certificate
and the automobile to plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining a $15000 loan. Gibbs
purported to give plairniff a lien in the
automobile as security for the loan's repayment. After Gibbs presented the origin J
Melby title to the state's Motor Vehicle
Division and obtained a pew certificate of
title showing Gibbs as thje owner and plain-
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ber of years of the husband's employment.
The wife is entitled to one-half of that
portion pursuant to the award of the trial
judge in this case, which our modification is
intended to sustain.
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in
part and remand to the trial court so that
the order may be amended to conform with
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and
HOWE, JJ., concur.

O

| KEY NLM3ER SYSTEM

Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowen,
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, her
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.

RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corporation, Sterling R. Draper and Enoch
Smith Suns Company, Defendants and
Respor dents.
No. 17732.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 4, 1982.
In a personal injury action, the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S.
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment for
city and subsequently, pursuant to motions
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dismissed all claims, counterclaims and cross
claims with prejudice except for claim
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. The
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1)
appeal was timely filed, and (2) whether
city fulfilled its duty to maintain city
streets in safe condition was question of
fact for jury, precluding summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded for trial.

1. Appeal and Error <£=>430(1)
Since failure to file timely notice of
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme Co Urt
lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal if notirv
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules
42(a), 73(a).
2. Appeal and Error <s=>344, 428(2)
Trial court's April 13 order, entered
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both
consolidated actions, was final judgment in
each case for purpose of calculating timeliness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely
filed appeal from trial court's grant of summary judment on January 26 for city.
3. Judgment c»181(2, 3)
Summary judgment is proper only if
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law.
4. Judgment c=>185(2)
If there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, doubt should
be resohed in fa\or of opposing party on
motion for summary judgment and thus
court must evaluate all evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from evidence in light most favorable to party opposing summary judgment.
5. Judgment <s=>180
Summary judgment is appropriate only
in the most clear-cut negligence cases.
6. Municipal Corporations <s=> 757(1)
City has nondelegable duty to exercise
due care in maintaining streets within its
corporate boundaries in reasonably safe
condition for travel and may be held liable
for injuries proximately resulting from its
failure to do so.
7. Municipal Corporations <s=>798
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty to
maintain streets, it is necessary for cities to
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe,
visible and working condition.
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$. Judgment ^181(33)
Whether city, which was arguably negi.-ent in not conducting immediate inspect"ns of signs where road maintenance work
*as done, and which after receiving notice
that stop sign was down sent individual to
repair sign rather than calling police to
regulate traffic until sign could be raised,
fulfilled its duty to maintain city streets in
safe condition was question of fact to be
determined by jury, precluding summary
judgment in action arising from automobile
collision at intersection.
9. Municipal Corporations <s=>798
Municipality has duty to respond in
reasonable fashion once it is on notice of
defective sign or signal.
John G. Mulliner, Orem, Gary B. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Raymond Berry, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
STEWART, Justice:
In this personal injury action, plaintiffs
appeal an adverse summary judgment on
the ground that there are issues of material
fact which should be tried by a jury. Riverton City, the defendant, seeks affirmance
of the summary judgment and, in the alternative, argues that plaintiffs failed to file a
timely notice of appeal and that the appeal
should therefore be dismissed. We reverse
the summary judgment and remand for a
trial on the merits.

Prior to the accident, a parsing motorist
noticed the sign was down and notified
Riverton City at 12:50 p.m., Approximately
eighteen minutes before the accident. A
Riverton City employee responded to the
notice of the fallen sign, but arrived after
the accident.
On November 29, 1978, thel Bowens filed
suit (Bowen suit) against Stirling Draper,
Riverton City, and Enoch Smith Sons Company, a construction company that had
worked on the intersection the day prior to
the accident. On January 25 1979, Draper
filed suit (Draper suit) against Kristine
Bowen, Riverton City, and Enoch Smith
Sons Company. The Bowen suit alleged
that Riverton City was negligent in maintaining the stop sign and in responding
negligently when it received notice of the
downed stop sign. Crossclaims and counterclaims were subsequently filed by the
defendants. On motion of Riverton City,
the trial court ordered the Bowen and
Draper cases consolidated pursuant to Utah
R.Civ.P. 42(a).

On January 26, 1981, the trial court
granted summary judgments for Riverton
City in both the Draper and the Bowen
actions. On January 27, 1981, summary
judgment was granted in favor of Enoch
Smith Sons Company, a defendant in the
Draper action, and against all other parties.
On February 2, 1981, the Bowens, as plaintiffs in the Bowen action and as crossdefendants in the Draper action, filed a "notice
of intent to appeal" the summary judgment
entered in favor of Riverton City. On
At approximately 1:08 p.m. on Saturday, March 25, 1981, pursuant to stipulation, the
April 9,1978, two cars collided at the inter- trial court awarded Bowens a money judgT
section of 12600 South and 2700 West in ment against Sterling Draper in the Bow en
Riverton, Utah. The vehicle driven by action. On April 13, 1981, counsel for Sterplaintiff Kristine Bowen was westbound on ling Draper, Florence Draper, Kristine
12600 South. The other vehicle, driven by Bowen, and Cynthia Bowen stipulated and
Sterling Draper, was travelling north on agreed that all claims, counterclaims and
2700 West. Traffic on 2700 West is re- crossclaims set forth in thi Bowen and
quired U> stop and yield the right of way to Draper actions could be dismissed with prejtraffic on 12600 South. However, on the udice, except for claims against Riverton
d
ay of the accident, the stop sign regulating City, since such claims, counterclaims and
northbound traffic on 2700 West was lying crossclaims had been fully compromised and
on the ground and the Draper and Bowen settled. On the same day tpe parties remaining in the Bowen and Ipraper actions
automobiles collided in the intersection.
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moved for an order dismissing the actions
since all matters but ior the claims against
Riverton City had been compromised and
settled. On April 13, 1981, pursuant to the
motions and stipulations filed by the parties
in both actions for dismissal with prejudice
and in an order bearing the heading and
numbers of both the Bowen and Draper
actions, the court ordered that all claims,
counterclaims and crossclaims, except for
the claim of Kristine Bowen against Riverton City, be dismissed with prejudice. On
May 12, 1981, Bowens filed a notice of
appeal in the Bowen suit.
Riverton City claims that the final judgment in the Bowen suit was rendered
March 25, 1981, and since the notice of
appeal was not filed within the jurisdictional one-month period from that time, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this
appeal.1 The Bowens, on the other hand,
argue that the final judgment in these
cases was not entered until the order dated
April 13, 1981. Since the Bowens filed their
notice of appeal within one month from
that date, they contend the appeal is properly before this Court.
[1] Since failure to file a timely notice
of appeal is jurisdictional, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear an appeal if notice was
not timely filed. In re RatHff, 19 Utah 2d
346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967); Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955).
[2] Without deciding whether consolidated actions should be treated as a single
action for purposes of appeal,2 we shall deal
with the actions in this case as separate and
distinct for determining the timeliness of
appeal. Nevertheless, we hold the April 13
order, entered pursuant to the stipulation of
counsel in both actions, is the final judgment in each case for the purpose of calculating the timeliness of the appeal. Calculating the timeliness of the appeal as of the
entry of that order dismissing all claims,
1. Utah R.Civ.P 73(a) provides in part: 4<[T]he
time within which an appeal may be taken
shall be one month from the entry of the judgment or order appealed from
A party
may appeal from a judgment byfilingwith the
district court a notice of appeal . "

counterclaims, and crossclaims in both ac
tions, we hold the Bowens timely filed thi*
appeal.
The next issue is whether summary judgment was appropriately awarded to Rkerton City in this action. The Bowens as-ert
that Riverton City was not only negligent
in maintaining the stop sign but also responded negligently upon receiving notice
that the sign was down.
[3-5] Summary judgment is proper only
if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and
admissions show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. In re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d
83, 348 P.2d 683 (1960). If there is any
doubt or uncertainty concerning questions
of fact, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the opposing party. Thus, the
court must evaluate all the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawTn from the
evidence in a light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment. Durham v. Margetts, Utah, 571 P.2d 1332
(1977); Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16
Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964). Although
summary judgment may on occasion be appropriate in negligence cases, it is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case. FMA
Acceptance Co: v. Leatherby Insurance Co.,
Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979)/ See Preston v.
Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P 2d 1021 (1968).
In Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292,
294, 431 P.2d 126, 128 (1967), this Court
stated:
Summary judgments are more frequently given in contract cases . . . .
However, when it comes to determining
negligence, contributory negligence, and
causation, courts are not in such a good
position to make a total determination for
here enters a prerogative of the jury to
make a determination of its own, and
that is: Did the conduct of a party meas2. See generally State ex rel. Pacific Intermountain Express Inc v Dist Court of Second Judicial Dist, Wyo, 387 P.2d 550 (1963), 9 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2386 (1971)
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•re up to that of the reasonably prudent
nan, and, if not, was it a proximate cause
0f the harm done?
[6_g] In evaluating the facts of this case
•- a light most favorable to the Bowens, we
}\\i that summary judgment in favor of
p-verton City was improperly awarded.
The city has a nondelegable duty to exercise
(iuc care in maintaining streets within its
corporate boundaries in a reasonably safe
condition for travel, Murray v. Ogden City,
Utah, 548 P.2d 896 (1976); Sweet v. Salt
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913);
Bills V. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 507, 109 P.
745 (1910), and the city may be held liable
for injuries proximately resulting from its
failure to do so. Nyman v. Cedar City, 12
Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961). See also
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 41-6-22 and 63-30-8. In
fulfilling this duty, it is necessary for cities
to maintain traffic signals in a reasonably
safe, visible, and working condition. Smith
\. City of Preston, 97 Idaho 295, 543 P.2d
£43 (1975). Whether the city fulfilled its
duty to maintain the city streets in a safe
condition in the instant case is a question of
fact to be determined by the jury. See
Snugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah 320,159
P. 530 (1915).
In Riverton City's answers to the Bowens' interrogatories, it stated that visual
inspections were made by city personnel of
all traffic signs within Riverton City on an
annual basis to insure that the signs were in
place. It is arguable that Riverton City
was negligent in not conducting immediate
inspections of signs where road maintenance work was done. Reasonable persons
flight differ as to whether the annual inspections conducted by Riverton City were
sufficient under the circumstances. Enoch
Smith workers present at the intersection
the day before the accident stated that the
Sign was loose and blowing in the wind.
[9] Riverton City argues that the eighteen minutes between its receipt of notice
and the accident was insufficient time to
take corrective action. Of course, a jury
might so find. But clearly, a municipality
has a duty to respond in a reasonable fashion once it is on notice of a defective sign or

signal. Gaspard v. Stutes, La.App., 3S0
So.2d 201 (1980); Bergen v. Koppenal, 97
N.J.Super. 265, 235 A.2d 30 (1967), app'd 52
N J . 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1%S). In Lochbaum
v. Bowman, La.App., 35^ So.2d 379, 381
(1978), the court stated:
[T]here was no attempt [by the highway
department] to notify law enforcement
personnel to direct traffic until repairs
could be accomplished. The Department's radio operator simply notified the
service man on call, who got dressed,
went to the office to pick up tools, and
finally arrived on the! scene after the
accident had occurred.
We conclude that th^ Department was
negligent both in failing to properly
maintain the traffic signal at the intersection and in failing to take steps when
notified of the malfunction to alert the
proper authorities so tnat traffic at the
intersection could be directed manually
until repairs could be accomplished.
After notice was received in the instant
case, Riverton City responded by sending an
individual to repair the sign rather than
calling the police to regulate traffic until
the sign could be raided, Whether it
should, and if so could) have responded
more effectively and quickly is a matter for
trial.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
costs.

No

HALL, C.J., and OA^KS, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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CHASE v. DAWSON et ux.
No. 7363.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 2S. 1930.
Action by John II. Cha^e airalnst Kirlw S.
Dawson and wife, to foreclose a materialman's lien.

) I I T E K , 2d

SI:KU:S

U.C.A.1°43, and t h i t su.h not : cc U *,. .,,.
deficient for failure to state: fa) Thture and amount n" the mater: il lur.,'",], \
by VAQ cteimrnt; ( r ) the i:-e to whit'i thmaterials were a [ ; / c i ; (c) to whom th"
same were deliver^ i: (d) the terms of fj«
contract and cor/.it : ons of the CDrtr.ic*
under wv : ch t b ' y were- furnished; %<,]
C'w) the status of the one with whom th •
clrimant made an oial contract, whether
ag:nt, contractor cr cthenv^c.

The Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, J. Allan Cnckctt, J., entered
judgment lor the plaintiff foreclosing the
The notice of lien is no nr»del. However
lion, and the defendants Appealed.
substantia! comphancc with the statute is
Tho Supreme Court, MdD noujrh, J., held all that is require i. The particular portions
the notice of the lien substantially complied of the statute which appellants claim were
with the statutory requirements.
disregarded, in the notice of lien in controversy, read as folljws: " * * * a
Judgment a fanned.
claim in writing. containing a notice of
intention to hold a r i claim a lien, and a
Mechanics liens O I 3 4
Where notice of materialman's lien statement of his demand after denuctir^
showed that building materials were fur- all just credits and onsets, with the name of
nished to defendants and used on and about the owner, if known, and also the name
house on their realty and realty was fully of the person by whom he was employed oi
and legally described by lot and subdivision, to wdiom he furnished the material, with
and notice recited that materials were a statement of the terms, time given and
furnished to owners, notice of lien sub- conditions of his contract, spec: n nig the
stantially complied with requirements of time when the first and last labor was performed, or the first and last material was
lien s;atute. U.C.A. 1943, 52— 1—7.1
furnished, and also a description of the
property to be charged with the lien, sufficient for identification, * * *."

Odiously, the statute does not require
L. B. Wight, Salt Lake City, for appel- that a materialman shall include an itemized
lants.
list of buildincr materials, specifying nails,
Ray S. McCarty, Salt Lake City, for door-knDbs and other items. The instrument here in question clearly shows that
respondent.
building materials were fumizhed to the
owner, the first named defendant, and u-ed
McDOXOUGH, Justice.
"on and about the house on said land",
Defendants appeal from a district court which land is fulK* and legally described by
judgment whereby a materialman's lien was lot and subdivision. The notice recites that
foreclosed. There is no dispute as to the the materials were furnished to the owner'
fact that the materials were actually fur- Kirby S. Dawson, so that it matters not
nished and were used on the premises in whether the nrtteriaN were ordered by the
construction of a hou c e, and that defend- general contractor, or as to who signed for
ants are the owners for whom the house them on the job.
was built. The sole question for review
This case does not involve a situation
relates to the legal sufficiency of the notice where the claim of lien does not show that
of lien.
the material was delivered for use on or
Appellants contend that the notice of about the structure erected on the land to
Hen does not comply with section 52—1—7, which it is claimed that the lien attaches,
I. Morrison, Merrill & Co. v. Willard ct al., 17 Utah :j00, 33 P. S"2f TO Am.St.K'p. 7S1.
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., tlic case in iMorr^on, Merrill & and to present e\idenc: of items in account
\ . ' w i i l a w ct r.L, 17 Utah 306, 53 P. stated therein v*r« r o : an ab ise bf discre*.' ;<• Am St.Rcp. 7S4. The notice rc- tion. U.C.A. IS43, 10-^—14—4.
:'iat the owner agreed to pay cash,
2. Pleadsng C=>324
;h"-f ti.ere were no t:rms for deferred
In action for an recounting £nd a disr..:::s to be stated. Hov\e\er irformal
solution of joint enterprise, bill of particu•rw- cf t*»e phrases in the notice of Lcn,
lars filed by defendant showing rate cf pay
t ^ o was sub^tantirl compliance with the
and amount sought for s e n ices I rendered
cM*»:*.e and no fatal omission.
was sufficient.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
3. Trial 0397(1)
< v .ts to respondent.
Where plairtiff and defendant, while
r ^ A T T , C . ' j . , and W A D E , W O L F E , engaged to be married, entered into joint
venture to construct and operate lbdge, and
a u ] LATIMER, J J , concur.
plaintiff subsequently sought an apcount.ng
and dissolution, evidence showing that
lodge never operated at a profit e|>:cept for
a month or so, that both parties advanced
monies to venture and that there Were debts
still owing, implied that no partnership
funds were available for payment] of debts
or for sums one party advanced, and failure of trial court to make finding} whetbe r
BALLEN v. G^SPARAC.
there had been any monies available from
No. 73"iJ.
j artnership accounts which could have been
SupiHine Court of Utah.
used to pay partnership debts instead of
Ma a h 2, 30.>».
from party's personal funds was not erroneous.
Action by M.ir;. B.^len nsain-t Oeor-'e A.
C pirno. J r . f^r an nt^omitins and di**o- 4. Joint adventures 0=5(1)
ti n of a joint enr* r\ rNe entered into l»eIn action for an accounting i and disu eon parties Defendant filed a counter- solution of a joint enterprise, wherein
< ram for labor and monies expended.
counterclaim was filed by defendant for
The P i ^ r i ' t Court of Summit County, J. sen*ices rendered, where no records were
A,Ian Oockolt, J , found that plaintiff bad a kept and it was practically impossible to
" > p^r cent interest in property and re=pond- get mere specific evidence as to actual time
< «it had a 27 per cent interest in it, oidered
defendant worked, finding that defendant
}';.>',erty Suid, ik-bt< pud, and proceed* disworked
ten and then seven hoars a day at
lV^ued accordingly between panics, and
SI 50 an hour was proper.
I' aintiff aj.jifal^d.
The SnpreiLe Court, Wade, J., held that 5. Joint adventures C=5(2)
fc .dii.gs were supported by the evidence.
In action for accounting and dis-olu•"iin'jriDert affirmed.
tion of jomt enterprise, fixing of valje of
Latiiner and Wolfe, J J , d i l u t e d .
defendant's services for purposes pf establishing amount of his counterclaim! at same
I- Appeal anJ error C=I92(4)
rate of pay laborer whom he siu erfvised reWhere plaintiff did not claim she was
ceived was not unreasonable, and was supprejudiced in presentation of case by trial
ported by a preponderance of the Evidence.
court's permitting bill of particulars to be
filed late by defendant, and plaintiff did not
£t trial object to filing bill on ground that
W . D. Eeatie, Salt Lake City, for apr.D application for relief for failure to file
m time was made by defendant before of- pellant.
fering to file bill, trial court's action in alClarence C. Neslen, Salt Lake f i t } , fur
lowing defendant to file bill of particulars respondent.
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^ ^ executed. After they arrived a t T liberally construed; the section evpre^ly re*' * *' / ,,, of the a t t o r n e y who p r e p a r e d t h e quipnc that it be "substantially" in the fonn
r
t° there was some d:-'*u^sion as to w h e t h - given therein.
3. Iiev. St. Idaho. § 2£C»S, provides that the
^ ' x , plaintiff should dispone of t h e prop- ceiuh\a.te of a< Luo\\ kd^meiit n u M be suhst i iC - t v *v>iil or by deed. Plaintiff w a s in tialh in tin* following foim (omitting the forUiil
day of
in the
" - (f n u k i n g a will, b u t t h e defendants part*!): "On this —
before me * * * ppisonally ap* \ * \* w h e n c e a n y more money to pro- p ep *t ure d
known to me (or p n n e d to me
:
/ * : ' f l v «p<?ity and i m p r t n e it and help J on the oath of
) to be t.ie person v\hose
' t\ rtilT unless the conveyance w a s by j n ' i n e is <=ub«^ibevl to th rt wuhin instrument,
:
and
ncLnowlfdjr^d
to
me
that he (or they) exe* which they had a perfect r i g h t to do.
u e ^aiiie.'' The a. kuo^ kd-rment to a
» '"r r t t e r vshat moral o b h g i t . o n s they w e r e cuted
chattel l o i t ^ a - e recited loiihtting tne formal
, ,r* f"> take c a r e °f plaintiff a n d protect
p - r - i - " U i th s r»th day of September. 100«».
1 -' property, it m u s t be conceded t h a t t h e y personally a p p r i r e d before r o P.. the dinner of
under no legal obligation to do so. the above instrument, w ho f\^r acknowlo Isred to
n
me that he executed the «*. .
The alhda\it
*•"•» pjMntiff finally, in opposition to the ad- immediately preceding the dow.v,w ledgment, and
**a ct her attorney, decided to m a k e a G^ed, vhiCh v>as subscribed and s u o r n to "before the
same notary, lecited that " P . , the moitgacror
was done. D e f e n d a n t Mrs. Moser,
N cj
* * * named in the foregoing m o r t g a g e "
v :!i the exception of alx>ut five years, had
declares that the mortgage is made in good
T i*. all her life wi + h her mother, and had faith, etc. Held that, reading the certificate in
., 1 a large family under t h e s a m e roof, ronnecticn with the affilavit, it clearly apr
1
had recently c r i e d for and n u r s e d her peared that the one who executed the mortt " \ r c : h a severe spell of sickness. Defend- c i g e v>as the same person who acknowledged
j n* execution, and thtie was a sufficient com5i/> Lad for s e \ e r a l years given plaintiff I plianre -With the statute
n oney to pay t h e taxes assessed a g a i n s t t h e
4 Rev. St. Idaho § 33^>. requires a chattel
p perty
T h e p r o p e i t y had been sold for mo^tsraee to be accompanied by an affidavit
a^essments made for t h e extension of wa- that it is made in good faith, and without any
desicn to h u d e r , dela\, or defraud ci e d i t o r .
t r mains, and more t a x e s , a m o u n t i n g to j He d that an affidavit v>ns not bad for merely
51150. would soon be due, w h i c h plaintiff i on^ttinsr the v>ord "defraud."
5 Under the express provisions of Rev. St.
T-ra* unable to pay. In addition to t h e care,
arention a n d assistance t h u s extended, t h e Idaho, section 33bt), a chattel mortarasre is only
v iid as against cieditors and buhsequent pui<Kendants, by the provisions of t h e lease
chasers, etc. in good faith, where not accom
were obbgated to c o n t m u e to assist and pro- I panicd bj art1 davit that it is n n d e in good tauii
vide fcr plaintiff during the r e s t of her life. and net properly acknowledged and filed for
Pnder these circumstances, coercion and un- record.
G One seeding to defend against a defectdue influence will Lot be infeired.
TYmle ivelv executed chat^e 1 moitc^^e on the ground
courts of equity will carefully scrutinize that hp is a bona fid* purchaser of the propel tv must plead surh defence.
transactions of this character, w h e n entered
7. The burden is on him to sustain the dem f o between p a r e n t and child, y e t w h e n , as fense
in this case, a s shown by t h e record, no unRolapp, District Judge, dissenting.
d'ie influence has been used, such contracts
Appeal from District Court, Cache C o u n t y ;
will not be disturbed, provided t h e complaining p a r t y at the time of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n h a d C. H. H a r t , Judge.
Action by t h e Deseret National B a n k of
if gal and m e n t a l capacity to c o n t r a c t
Salt L a k e City, a corporation, a g a m s t William
We a r e of t h e opinion, and so hoi 1, t h a t K i d m a n and E p h r a i m K i d m a n . Verdict difindings Nbs. 9, 10 12, a n d IS a r e not sup- rected for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
ported by t h e evidence. T h e case is reversed, Reversed.
with directions to t h e trial court to set aside
Young & Movie, for appellant. Geo Q.
the decree entered in the case, and to disRich and F r a n k K. Nebek^r. for respondents.
miss t h e action.
BASKIN, C. J., and B A R T C H , J., concur.

B A S K I N , C. J . This is an action of reI plevin. T h e a n s w e r denies the plaintiff's alleged right to t h e possession of about 700
I head of sneep claimed from d e f e n d a n t s a n d
D E S E R E T XAT. BANK O F S A L T L A K E ' alleges t h a t t h e defendants are t h e o w n e r s
CITY v. K I D M A N et al.
| of, and entitled to the possession of, the same.
A j u r y being impaneled in t h e case, the plam(Supreme Court of Utah. March 23, 1903.)
CHATTEL MORTGAGE — ACKNOWLEDGMENT — I tiff placed Orson Rainel upon t h e Witness
AFFIDAVIT OF GOOD FAITH—DEFECTS—VA- ! stand, and he testified as follows: " I k n o w
LIDITY AS AGAINST MORTGAGOR—BON \ FIDE
PLRCHASERS — PLEADING — BURDEN OF i t h e signature of E a r n e s t A. P u r n e l l . H a v e
seen him w r i t e his n a m e several times. I
PROOF.
1. In the absence of statutory provisions, s a w him w r i t e his n a m e to t h e promissory
the law does not permit an officer to take the note." And after identifying t h e n o t e a s
acknowledgment of a stranger without satisfac- j t h e one set out in t h e mortgage, h e further
tory proof of his identity.
2. A certificate of acknowledgment to an in- testified "that a t the time Mr. P u r n e l l signed
strument made pursuant to Rev. St. Idaho, § said note he signed w h a t p u r p o r t e d to be a
295S, prescribing the form therefor, should be
«f 4. Petrovitzky v. Bngham. 47 Pac. 665. 14 Utah.
%L See Acknowledgment, vol. 1, Cent. Dig. $ 123. 4T2.
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chattel mortgage. The chattel mortgage was
g ven to secure the abo\e-inentioued note,
and Mr. Purnell received ^J.-iuo on tbe n »I •
and mortgage. No payments have been made
by Mr. Purnell thereon, either piincipal or
interest, excepting two Interest payments.
Mr. Purnell is still owing the bank the note.
I witnessed the signature of Mr. Fumell to
the mortgage, and after it was Signed, acknowledged, and sworn to, and the notary's
signature and seal to the affidavits attached.
1 took it myself and mailed it, addressed to
the county recorder of Oneida county, state
of Idaho." No objection was inte:rosed by
the defendants to this testimony.
Tne plaintiff then offered in evidence a
chattel mortgage of a lot of she?p, in which
were included the 700 in dispute, executed
by one Earnest rurnell. of Cache county,
Utah, in favor of the plaintiff, to secure a
note for 52,400, dated at Salt Lake City September 5, 11*00, and payal le on<» year after
date, with interest at the rate of 8 per cent,
pt-r annum. The sheep at the time said
mortgage was executed were on the range in
Oneida county, state of Idaho. Among other stipulations the mortgage contained tbe
following: "It is further agreed and stipulated that if said mortgagor shall fail to
make any payment, as in said promissory
note provided, or in case said mortgagee shall
at any time deem its debt insecure, the said
mortgagee, or its assigns, may, in its option,
declare the principal of said debt to be due.
and may take possession of said mortgaged
property wherever located together with the
increase thereon, if any, using all necessary
force for that purpose."
Attached to the mortgage were the following affidavit and certificates of acknowledgment and recordation of mortgage:
"State of Utah, County of Salt Lake—ss.:
Earnest A. Purnell, the mo:tgagor, H. S.
Young, the cashier and agent for the mortgagee, named in the foregoing mortgage, being duly sworn, severally declare, each on
oath, that this chattel mortgage is made in
good faith to secure the am »unt and debt
therein specified, and without any design to
hinder or delay the creditors of said mortgagor. Earnest A. Purnell. H. S. Young.
"Subscribed and sworn to before me a notary public in and for said county at Salt
Lake City, Utah, this 5th day of September,
A. D. 1900. Hyrum J. Young. [Seal.l
"United Stntt* of Amerka. St. tu of Utah.
County of Salt Lake—ss.: On this 5tb day
of September, 1900, personally appeared before me Earnest A. Purnell. the signer of the
above instrument, who duly acknowledged
to me that he executed the same. Hyrum J.
Young, N. P. My commission expires November 24, 1900."
* Indorsed:
"Chattel Mortgage No. 4S0. Recorded at
tne request of H. S. Young, September Sth,
A. D. 1900, at 5 minutes past 9 a. m., in Book

U-,

B, Ch.ittil Mortgages, page 123. JD. %j ,,
olds, Recorder.
• •i i
"State of Idaho, County of Onefda-o s .
D. J. Le\no)(is ucoider of Oneida coJ '
Idaho, do hereby certity thj aboife ai..» j '*
going to he a frll. True, and cbrre>Y \ "
of the chattel monzc.-e now on rile fa'***
ciiiee. VUuu'S^ my Laud and scil of ni\1'*
lice at Malad City, Idaho, this the lr.t;/ /''
of SeptomUr, U 01. [S.gned] D. J. i»< >',VV,
Recoider, by W. II. Richards rJcput^/''''"
Defendants' attorney oljectcdl to the z
minion of the mortgage in evidence ori »
following giuunds: U) The mortgage M
not dated; (2) that tLe affidavit]Uat&it * *
made in good faith was sworn io by Xj V
Young in his individual capacity, and \ ' t
as an officer or agent cf the plaintiff Corp..
tion; (3) that said affidavit alleged to 1\.-,
been svsorn to by H. S. Young £md Lara *
A. Purnell did not contain, as is required i
the statute of the state of Idaho, the wc:\
"defraud," or any word of similar impr. •
(4) that the notary's certificate did not rec.tv
that Earnest A. Purnell was known to Jnm
to be, or proven on the oath of any one \
be, the signer of the instrument, as is required by the statutes of the state of Ida:.*,
to wit, sections 2053 and 2953 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho of ISSTJ (5) for V-M
reason that it was not recorded in the county
of Cache, state of Utah; <G) that the allcg \\
seal of the alleged county reco1 ier of Oneida
county was not attested as provided in seetions 337S. 33S7, subd. 7, Rev. St. Utah IS'JS;
(7) that the evidence is insufficient to show
that plaintiff is entitled to any j of the re! ef
prayed for. The objections were overruled,
and the mortgage admitted "supject to said
objections."
Plaintiff thereupon introduced evidence that
the 7Ur» sheep claimed were a part of tlieband of sheep which was mortgaged by the
said Earnest A. Purnell, and [of which he
was the owner; that previous t^> the institation of this suit the plaintiff demanded from
the defendants the sheep in dispute; and
that the defendant refused to i deliver them
to the plaintiff. Hyrum J. Young, the notary public before whom the nportgage was
acknowledged, testified, on behalf of plaintiff, in substance, that he was personally acquainted with the said Earnest A. Purnell.
and that on or about the 5th Of September,
19U0, the said Purnell appeared before bini,
the said Hyrum J. Young, and made the affidavit and acknowledgment hereinbefore set
out.
Plaintiff also introduced in I evidence tbe
said William Kidman's statements that be
bought the sheep in question 4>f Earnest A.
Purnell some time in November, 1900; that
at the time of the purchase the sheep trere
iu Oneida county, state of Idifho; and that
be brought them into Utah—aid the following provisions of the Idaho Statutes:
"Sec. 33S5. Chattel mortgaged may be made
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H property, goods or chattels not de- tiff; and, when it rested, the defendants'
•'V'j t>r statute to be real estate."
attorney moved that the chattel mortgage be
" # ^ , X>07. If the mortgagor of any prop- stricken out on th? grounds of the original
*' Bioruas^ i n pursuance of the provi- objections. This motion was denied, where\.\\ of t I l i s c n n P t e r » w n ite such mmgaire upon the "plaintiff then admitted that de^f*^* unsatisfied, in whole or in part, vsill- fendants Lad no ether notice of the mortr^v'r^nH'Ves from the county or counties gage, except the notice imparted by the recmortgage is recorded, destroys, ord of it in Oneida county, and that it was
^ r e Ic,thesells,
r ^,,
or in any manner disposes not recorded in Cache county, Utah.'*
%l
^ t I j > property mortgaged, or any part there- "Thereupon the defendants moved the court
% 'without consent of the holder of said to instruct the jury, upon the evidence of
' ^ • : , i ; \ be is guilty of larceny and such plaintiff, to bring in a verdict in favor of
| the defendants and against plaintiff, and
^vVr transfer is void."
*"** See. 29~2. The proof of acknowledgment upon the ground* stated above as objections
,t an instrtiment may be made without this I to the introduction of the chattel mortgage."
, Vntory, but within the United States, and ' The court, on the grounds that the affidavit
[\\»\ in the jurisdiction of the officer, before | and the acknowledgment of the chattel mortI gage were not in accordance with the proviti;Ler » * * a notary public," etc.
"Sec. 2955. The acknowledgment of an in- | slons of the statute of Idaho, and that the
ctnnuent must not be taken unless the officer chattel mortgage v>as not sufficient to charge
fakir? it knows, or has satisfactory evidence, ' defendants v>ith notice of its existence, inon oath or affirmation of a creditable witness, | structed the jury to return a verdict for the
tint tbe person making such acknowledg- defendants, which was done, and judgment
ment is the individual who is described in, rendered thereon against the plaintiff.
or, If
1. In the absence of statutory provisions
s:id v*ko executed the instrument;
executed by p. corporation, that the person such as are contained in section 2955 of the
making such acknowledgment is the presi- i Idaho Statutes, the law does not permit an
dent or secretary of such corporation."
officer to take the acknowledgment of a
"Sftc. 295S. The certificate of acknowledg- strmger without satisfactory proof of his
ment, unless it is otherwise in this chapter idertity. and when so taken it is a flagrant
provided, must be substantially in the follow- ! violation of official duty. As it is a preing form: Territory of Idaho, County of sumption that officers perform their duty,
ss.: On this
day of
in and only a substantial, and not a strict,
1
tbe year — — before me (here insert the compliance with the form set out in the
nan">e and quality of the officer) personally Idaho statute is required by that statute,
appeared
known to me (or proved to the acknowledgment in question should not
Lie on the oath of
) to be the person be literally, but liberally, construed. In KelTvhose name is subscribed to the within in- ly v. Calhoun. 93 U. S. 713, 24 L. Ed. 5-14,
strument, and acknowledged to me that he Mr. Justice Swayne said: "Instruments like
this should be construed, If it can be rea(cr they) executed the same.' "
Also Session Laws of Idaho of 1899, p. sonably done, 'Ut res magis, valeat quam
pereat' It should be the aim of courts in
121, as follows:
"Section 1. That title 12 of chapter 4, sec- cases like this to preserve, and not to detions 33S6 and 33S7, be amended so as to stroy. Sir Matthew Hale said they should
read as follows: 'Sec. 33S6. A mortgage of be astute to find means to make acts effeclersonal property is void as against creditors tual, according to the honest intent of the
of the mortgagor and subsequent purchas- parties. Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Wall. 513,
ers, and incumbrances of the property in 19 L. Ed. 426." There are many decisions
good faith and for value, unless: First. It which hold that "it is the policy of the law
is accompanied by the affidavit of the mort- to construe acknowledgments liberally, and
gagor that it is made in good faith and not to allow a conveyance to be defeated by
without any design to binder, delay or de- unsubstantial and technical objections to the
fraud creditors. Second. It is acknowledged certificate of acknowledgment." Wells v. Ator proven as grants of real estate and the kinson, 24 Minn, 105. Certificates in the
mortgage, or a true copy thereof, is filed for same form as the one in question, made unrecord with the county recorder of the coun- der statutes which prescribe the form of the
ty where such property is located, and kept.' certificate, and require only a substantial
"Sec. 2. Section 33S7 is amended to read as compliance therewith, have been sustained
follows: 'Sec. 33S7. Upon the receipt of any in the following cases: Warnder v. Henry,
such Instrument, the recorder shall endorse 117 Mo. 530, 23 S. W. 776; Wilson v. Quigupon the back the time of receiving it, and ley, 107 Mo. 98, 17 S. W. 891; Hiles v. La
shall file the same in his office, to be kept Flirfj, 59 Wis. 765, 18 N. W. 435; Harris v.
there for the inspection of all persons inter- Pratt, 37 Kan. 316, 15 Pac. 216; Burbank v.
Ellis, 7 Neb. 156. In Northwestern Pac. Hyested,' " etc.
potheek
Bank v. Rauch (Idaho) 51 Pac. 764,
"Sec. 3. All acts and parts of acts inconthe certificate of acknowledgment was obsistent with this act are hereby repealed."
Seme other evidenco, which it is not nec- jected to on the ground that it did not comessary to set out, was introduced by plain- ply with sections 2921, 2922, 2960, Rey. S t
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Idaho. The statutes in force at the time the sonable and fair construction of 4j,n
certificate was made, as appears from the instrument, the eertucate ^ill be ]».!./' !H4*
I U t l *«**
opinion, did not "require a literal, but a sub- cient."
stantial, compliance therewith'*; and the
This brings us to the question wi
court held that the certificate objected to, certificate in this case suh^tantL
and which is as- follow*: *% L. F. Williams. plies with the pre-jnbod form. T |ie M,..„
a notary public in and for the said county cf the mortgagor and his ackmA
and siate, do hereby certify that on this GOih are the es-erai;.l faits required to[
day of Jan., 1S03. personally appeared before by the ccrtiiicate. If it docs this t « u i , ^ . .
me. A. •Rauch and Margaret E. Pauch, his tially complies with the statute I 1 " W . J . T *
wife, to me known to be the individuals de- v. Henry, 117 Mo. o3S. 5G'J. 23 ?. Y\\
scribed In, and who executed, the within in- court said: "The point of the of
strument and acknowledged that they s ^ e d that the acknowledgment omits the v.-.
and sealed the same as their free and volun- 'to me personally kLown,' a f u r the v,,
tary act and deed, for the uses and purposes 'George W. Warder/ where they firr? t ap
therein mentioned. And I further certify in the acknowledgment Now, talj<e th«. htl ,.
that I did fully apprise the said Margaret ute, and it will be seen that the oflfeer shoir
E. Rauch, wife of the said A. Rauch, of the certify that 'before me appeared George \\
contents of said instrument, and of her rights Warder, to me personally known.^ The c» -i
thereto, and the effect of signing the same, tificate states, 'before me personally A v
and that she did then, freely and voluntarily, peared/ etc. The officer, in miking ti 1
separate and apart from her said husband, statement that G.-orcre W. Warderf personal 7
sign and acknowledge said instrument. Giv- I appeared before him, includes therein tJ-e»
en under my hand and offcial seal this 30th | proposition that Warder was td him pt»r„
day of Jan., 1S03. L. F. Williams, Notary I sonally known; for, unless personally known,
Public. [Seal.]"—was a substantial eoinpli- j how could he say Warder personally appearance with the following form pre-cribed by ed? The meaning and sense of Ithe certJ-j.
section 2900 of said statute: "Territory of cate of acknowledgment is the sime as tb*
Idaho, County of
ss.: On thi<*
j statute." In the case of Harris y. P r a t t r,7
day of
, in the year of
before me j Kan. 310. 15 Pac. 216, there were' two deed .
(here insert the name and quality of the offi- j the acknowledgments of which were concer) personally appeared
known to me j tested. It was held that an acknchvledgmt vr
(or proved to me on oath of
) to be the i of the first, which was made byi register in
person whose name is subscribed to the with- \ bankruptcy, was not required bjf the bankin instrument, described as a married worn- | rupt law. In respect to the othejr the court
an. and, upon an examination without the J said: "The second deed, made jby the a^
hearing of her husl and. I made her acquaint- | signee of said estate to George P|. Anderson,
ed with the contents of the instrument, and ! was acknowledged before a notary public
thereupon she acknowledged to me that she j The objection to this acknowledgment is that
executed the same, and that she d'»es not | the notary in his certificate does not show
wish to retract such execution." This deci- j that the a l i e n e e was personally known to
sion is sustained by the same court in the | him to be the person who signed the conca«es of Jaeckel v. Pease. 53 Pac. 300; Chris- veyance. * • • Now, while th|e certificate
tenson T. Hollimrswortb, 53 Pac. 211; Curti9 does not say in so many words that the
et al. v. Bunnell, etc., 55 Pac. C»r»9. In the grantor was personally known to| him to b*
case of Northwestern & P. Hypotheek Bank the person who signed the conveyance, y *t
T. Rauch (Idaho) 51 Pac. 7G4, the language it does state that the assignee personally apof the form set out in the territorial statute peared before him. and that his signature
was followed in the certificate, but differed is to the conveyance. We think this wa-5 a
therefrom in several particulars, and failed substantial compliance with ouJ* statute"
to state in the expressed terms of the pre- In the case of Munroe v. Ea^tmaju, 31 Mich*
scribed form that the wife, without the hear- 2S5, the form of the acknowledgment was
ing of her husband, acknowledged that she not prescribed, but the statute! required a
did not wish to retract the execution of the deed to be acknowledged by the party or
instrument The court, in holding that the parties executing the same. The Certificate of
certificate wa*s a substantial compliance with acknowledgment was objected tc^ because it
the statute, quoted the following from the failed to show that the grantor was kno^ti
case of Belcher v. Weaver, 40 Tex. 293. 20 to the officer before whom it wasl made. Mr.
Am. Rep. 2G7: "The general rule upon this Justice Cooley, in the opinion, said: "The
subject is that there must be a substantial, Justice certifies that the signer and sealthough not a literal, compliance with the er of the subjoined deed acknowledged i t
terms of the statute, and that, although words and this implies a knowledge on his part of
not In the statute are used in place of oth- the fact." Under a statute wbteh require*
ers that are, or words in the statute are the acknowledgment to an instrument, the
omitted, yet if the meaning of the words identification by the certificate Of the party
used is the same, or they represent the same executing it is as essential as undler the Idaho
fact, or if the omi*<=ion of a word or word9 statute. In the case of Carpenter v. Dexter,
.s immaterial, or can be supplied by a rea- 8 Wall. 513-«27, 19 L. Ed, 426, (Mr. Justice
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.- <•>!!:* "The law of Illinois in force
^ - V'»on + ' u ' nianner of taking aeknowl.",':-. provid. * that no oilicer shall take
'**:*' k , l i v j i!-rn.» lit of any person unless
* ,* ? r wo:i vh.k.'l be personally known to
., \,* the real person who (executed the
• ' ,,i.d in vbo-e name such acknowlodg'• ]- propo^'d to be made, or shall be
r
4
j t 0 bo such by a credible witness.' and
' » personal knowledge or proof shall bo
' ..' i iu the certificate Looking now to
*•'. il-vd itself, we rind that the attestation
*,» states that.it was 'signed, sealed, and
/• \ered' in the presence of the prescribing
rm>*?es. One of these witnesses was the
'•vtioe of the peace before whom the acI." .Vledinnent was taken; and he states in
. i certificate, following immediately after
t, .^ attestation-clause, that the 'above-named
William T. Davenport, who has signed, seal^\ and delivered the above instrument of
wr:Kiir. per-om-Ily appeared' before him and
«. knewiedged the same to be his free act
«:.d deed. Read thus with the deed, the
certificate amounts to this: that the grantor personally appeared before the officer,
and in his'presence signed, sealed, and delivered the instrument, and then acknowledged the same before him. An affirmation
lu the word* of the statute could not more
clearly expre-s the identity of the grantor
T\ith the party making the acknowledgment."
In the case at bar. looking at the affidavit
attacked to the mortiiaee, immediately preceding the acknowledgment, we find from the
jurat fdiat the affidavit was subscribed and
sworn to before the same notary public who
took the acknowledgment of the mortgage.
The certificate, read with this affidavit, clearly shows that the party who executed the
mortgage was the same person who acknowledged the execution of the same. "An affirmation, in the words of the [Idaho] statute, couid not more clearly express the identity of the grantor [named in the chattel
mortgage] with the party making the acknowledgment."
2. A mortgage of personal property is required by section 33S6 of the Idaho Statutes
to be accompanied by the affidavit of the
mortgagor "that it is made in good faith and
without any design to hinder, delay or defraud creditors." Section 150 of the Revised
Statutes of Utah requires a chattel mortgage to be accompanied by the affidavit of
the parties thereto "that the same is made
in good faith to secure the amount named
therein and without anv^esign to hinder or
delay the creditors of^..e mortgagor." The
mortgage in quest 5 *^ was executed in Utah,
and the affidavi^of the parties thereto is
in strict conformity with the statute of this
state. The second ground upon which the
trial court directed a verdict for the defendants was that the certificate did not comply with the statute of Idaho. The specific
objection urged by defendants' counsel is that
the words "or defraud creditors" are omit1

FT:

ted in the affidavit of the parties to tlK
mortgage. Notwithstanding the words "or
defraud creditor*" are not used in the Utah
statute, we think that its purp >se and legal
effect are the same as the 1 laho statr.u.
In the case of Hoffman et al. v. Macknll et
al., r» Ohio St. 12i-r:.\ -It; Am. Doc. 037.
Mr. Justice Hartley said: "It is argued that
an alignment in tru^t for credit' rs. which
by its provis'ons tend* to hinder and delay
creditors, is fraudulent and void. The pro\ision of the statute of the 13th Elizal ith,
^Lich was held to be declaratory of tl/»
common law in England, and which is said
to have been followed literally in the statute
of frauds in New York, declares 'every conveyance or assignment,' etc., 'made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors,'
etc., void. The provision in the Ohio statute
omits the word* 'hinder and delay.' But I
am not aware that this difference of pi ra*vology is the foundation of any material distinction, in legal effect, between the English
statute and that of Ohio. That hinderincr and
delaying of a creditor which would bring
an assignment within the operation of the
statute of England would, I apprehend, constitute a fraud under the statute of Ohio."
In the case of Petrovity.ky v. Brigham, 14
Utah, 472, 47 Tac. 066, the appellant omitted
the word "hinder," but used the words "delay or defraud," and this court held that the
affidavit substantially complied with the provisions of the statute of Utah before referred to. Mr. Justice Miner, in the opinion,
said: "The question is raised whether the
words 'delay or defraud,' as used in the
affidavit, is a substantial compliance with
the statute, without the use of the word
'hinder.' The words 'hinder' and 'delay' are
used as synonymous terms. * * * The
Encyclopaedia Dictionary defines the word
'defraud' as meaning to deprive of a right
by withholding from another, by indirection
or device, that which he has a right to claim
or obtain. The words 'hinder' and 'delay'
are so practically of the same meaning that
the omission of the word 'hinder' in the affidavit does substantially detract from the
object of the statute, or lessen the force of
the words used in the affidavit, so as to make
it defective, when used in connection with
the word 'defraud.' A substantial compliance with the statute is all that is required.
To hinder or delay is to do something with
an intent to defraud." In 14 Am. & Eng.
Ei.cy. of Law <2d Ed.) p. 244, it is stated:
"But in order to render a deed fraudulent,
it is not necessary that the debtor should
intend to defeat the creditor in the collection of his claim. Creditors are entitled not
only to be paid, but to be paid as their
claims accrue; and a debtor has no more
right to postpone payment simply for his
own advantage, than to defeat it altogether.
A purpose to hinder and delay a creditor is
therefore fraudulent, although the debtor
may honestly intend that all his debts shall
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ultimately be paid." The term "creditor."
in its widest sense, is one who has a right to
Ormand'-nnd recover of another a sum of
money on a ' y account whatever. Anderson's
Law Diet, 2Ca; Winfield's Word* & Finales,
102; TVaples, Debtor & Creditor, § 8. In
this sense the term "creditors" was used in
the Idaho statute. It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff paid to the mortgagor
£2,400 as a consideration for the note and
mortgage. The mortgagor had the legal
right, in good faith, and without any intention of impairing the legal rights of creditors,
to execute the mortgage to secure the payment of the note; and. if made in good faith
and witr-out any such intention, it was no
infraction of the legal rights of any creditor.
There is no legal remedy for fraud unless it
impairs a legal right. An act which neither
hinders nor delays the creditor in the attainment of his legal rights cannot in any
view, defraud him. Therefore the averment
in the affidavit in question that "the mortgage is made in good faith to secure the
amount and debt therein specified, and without any design to hinder or delay the creditors of said mortgagor," is a negation of any
design to defraud them.
3. The execution of the mortgage was
shown by the testimony of Orson Rumel,
/who signed the same as a witness, and by
o*her evidence. The mortgage was therefore
valid, as against the mortgagor, and only
vuid under the Idaho statute as against his
creditors and subsequent purchasers in good
faith and for value, even if it were conceded
that the affidavit and certificate of acknowledgment are not sufficient, and that the
mortgage was not filed for record in Idaho or
Utah. The purchase of property in good
faith for value is not available as a defense
against a mortgage or conveyance which is
valid as against the mortgagor or grantor,
unless it is pleaded; and the burden of proving such a defense is upon the defendant,
and in his answer he is required, among
other things, to allege the consideration, and
that it was bona fide and truly paid by him
for the property purchased. 3 Estee, PI. §
3S30; Maxwell. Code PL p. 432 et seq.; 1
Mod. Eq. Prac. 346. The answer in this case
fails to allege that defendants were bona ride
purchasers, or that they purchased the sheep
from the mortgagor or any other person, and
the evidence fails to show that they have
actually paid or agreed to pay any money or
other consideration for the sheep which the
evidence shows they claimed to have purchased from the mortgagor.
Under the facts disclosed by the record,
the mortgage was properly admitted in evidence, and the court below erred in directing
tbe Jury to return a verdict for the defendants.
Prom the views we have expressed, it is
tmneeessary>to pass upon tbe other question
raised by c unsel.
The ju o'Luuiit of the lower court is re-

versed, with costs, and the ca$*
for a new trial.

L

- - ...

BARTCH, J., concurs.
ROLAPP, District J u d - . I i ,
the views expressed by the l o l r n ^ « *
Ju^tic.-* as to the sufficiency of L e - \
attached to the chattel mortgngo[i n <!, *\ r
I fully agree with the opinion eLpriV^"**
this court in the case of Fetrovittky v" v *"*
ham, 14 Utah, 471, 47 Pac. r,«L-; t i a ,
word5 "hinder" and "delay" ard pr.j< /
synor.ymous terms. Under ourlstat'jt»
use of either word in tbe affidavit w r ^
make it valid, and the use of a n t additl<vL
words, frucb as "defraud," etc.! \ i 0 r \ j *T
treated as mere surplusage. Pveo[l v. W-V*
ington, 9 Bosw. G17. But und-A- a su*-\
T\Licb provides that a chattel mortgage***,
absolutely void as to subsequent bona ftC
purch~sTs of the mortgaged property unleT
it is accompanied by the affidavit of the uiori
gagor that the mortgage is made "wit *.ov
any design to hinder, delay, or defaud/* *
think that the omiss.'on of the word **&.
fraud," or the absence of some wjord of Ai.;<
ilar import, is fatal to the validity of ih,
document It does not seem to me that ai*s
amount of reasoning will make I the worn"
"hinder or delay*' include the word "defraud." The former words simply mean t:\
effort to temporarily impede or int rcej:
some right, property, or interest, which, bowever, will be ultimately secured; but Ui
word ''defraud" means an effort by unlawful mean* to absolutely withhold and deprive of such right, property, or i n t e r s .
While I concede that the word "defraii«l"
may include the words "delay" or "hinder.**
I cannot concur that th? latter words indud •
the former. In the absence of statutory pre
visions to the contrary, tbe word* "delay*
and "hinder" involve no criminal intent,
while the v>ord "defraud" does. It is tru**
that under certain circumstances an effort to
hinder and delay might be evidence of an Intent to defraud. As was said by the conn
in the case of Hoffman et al. v. Mtckall t*:
ah, 5 Ohio St. 124, 46 Am. Dec. 637, quoted
by the Chief Justice in the majority opinion.
"that certain kind of hindering and delaying
of a creditor which would bring an assignment within the operation of the statute of
England would, I apprehend, constitute a
fraud under the statute of Ohio/ To emphasize the view of that court that [the worrt*
"hinder and delay" are not, in ana of t b ^ ;
selves, synonymous with the word rdefraud,
the court further on in the sanje opinion
states: "By a reasonable construction, SUCH
hindrance and delay only as would opcrat^
as a fraud, and are designed as a frAtHj
come within the operation of the * t a t u t t v
And it was held in that very opinion that tfl*
hindrance and delay disclosed by the facts U|
that case did not come within the definition
"defraud," under the Ohio statute. | So 1 » D a
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, c a s e s that hold proven intent to hin- |
Suit by Warden P. Noble and others
« ^ fai\y conclusively shows intent to de- against Eugene Amoietti, Jr., troisjrer and
J r
" °\ Nn*l olson v. Leavitt 6 X. Y. 150, 57 collector of taxes of Fremont county. The
fr ll
vec. 4W- I ' u t a I 1 t n e s e cases simply adtrial court reserved certain questions for the
Ktl
' !' •» the doctrine that, as matter of evi- Supreme Court. Quesuuns ans^eied.
**'j?\ it s*iall be cons dered prima facie or
Clark & Breckons. for plaintiffs. W. E.
^.""jtL-h el} shown that pn established purHardin and 2s. E Curthell, for defendant
4%lu
, t ^ inoder or delay a creditor -v^ 111 have
1
* fleet to defraud such creditor. 14 Am.
POTTER, J. From 1S03 to 1809 the plainf ' p . - . Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 244. I have
f ,« u'n.ible, however, to find any case in tilts were 1-censed Indian traders doing busi*\oli the statute requires the word "de- 1 ness wnhm the bhoshone Indnn reservation
fl.ul" i° De contained in an affidavit or ac- in this state; said reseivation being located
..\wU dement which has held that the use within the boundaries of Fremont couuty.
,f jjjjt word might be obviated by the use of They are the owneis of improvements locat!*e Voids "hinder or delay." On the con- ed upon land within the reservation, and a
•Vrv, .in a well-considu-ed opinion by the stock of goods, wares, and merchandise also
«Vi>reme Court of Wisconsin, we are warned located on said reseivation. Such improve! V -the distinction between a mere intent ments and merchandise were owned and used
I'J hinder and delay creditors and the intent by them in connection with their occupation
to defraud them must not be confounded. or business as licensed traders with the InTr-e statute clearly recognizes this distmc- dians. It is agieed that their stock of goods
r..n, and makes void all conveyances made v\as kept and employed in trade with the
v 1th intent to hinder, delay, or defraud cred- Indians, and also with white people, residents
jfors. This language implies that the intent on and off the reservation, and that without
to defraud is something distinct from the said stock of goods and improvements the
meie intent to delaj, and it is frequently the business of plaintiffs as Indian tt iders could
case that debtors, with an honest intention not have been carried on. During each of the
to pay their creditors in the end, make some years mentioned the authorities of the counsLift or transfer merely to gain time " Pill- ty of Fremont assessed said impro\ements
ing v. Otis, 13 Wis. 405; Crow v. Beardsley, and stock of goods for taxation, and levied
against the same certain taxes. There is no
CS Mo. 439.
contention that the property was assessed or
For these reasons, I think the lower court the taxes levied except in the same manner
properly held that the chattel mortgage in- as all other property in the county of like
troduced by plaintiff below as the only basis character was taxed during the same peiiod
of its title was fatally defective, and void as of time, nor is there any showing of disarainst the defendants, who were admittedly crimination in respect to this property. On
bona fide purchasers, without actual notice.
or about the 1st day of January, 1001, the
county treasurer, as tax collector, seized the
stock of goods of the plaintiffs located on
said reservation for the unpaid and delinNOBLE et al. T. AMORETTI, County Treas- quent taxes for .the years named, and adverurer.
tised the same for sale. Thereupon plaintiffs instituted these proceedings to have the
(Supreme Court of Wyoming. March 19,
1903.)
sale restrained. The cause wTas submitted to
the district court upon an agreed statement
TAXATION—STOCK OF INDIAN TRADER—DELINQUENT LIST—DISTRESS
of facts, and that court reserved ceitam
1. A state tax on the stock of goods of a quest, »ns, deemed to be important^and diullicenced Indian trader, located on the reserva- cult, lor the decision of this court. The t<ix
tion, is not a tax on an agency of the general
government, or on a regulation of commerce collector for the several years in question
vwth the Indians.
had not made out and certified, and caused
2. Under Rev. St. 1899. § 1S75, authorizing to be filed in the office of the county treasthe collector to collect delinquent taxes by dis- urer, a list of all delinquent taxes, as retress, and providing that the delinquent tax
libt alone shall be a sufhaent warrant for such quired by law, but an uncertified list was
distress, there can be no distress therefor with- kept in a book in the office of the treasurer,
out such list.
who was also collector of taxes, ex officio.
3. Under Rev. St. 1899, §§ 1871. 18S2, providing that at a certain time each year the The character of that book and the entries
county collector of taxes shall from the tax therein made will be more specifically referlist make out a conipl te Ii^t of delinquent tax- red to when we come to a consideration of
es for that and preceding years, attach his cer- the questions relating to the authority of the
tificate thereto, and file it in the office of the
county treasurer, which shall be at all times a taxing officer to collect the taxes by distress
sufhefent warrant and authority for the col- of personal property. The reserved questions
lector of taxes upon "vs hi^h to proceed to col- are as follows:
lect delinquent taxes, the keeping of a book, in
which at the end of the year each collector enFirst Under the laws of the state of Wyoteis merely the delinquent taxes for that year, ming, is personal property located upon and
Without any certificate, is insufficient.
within the limits of the Shoshone Indian
Reserved Case from District Court, Fre- resenation in Fremont county, Wyo., which
mont County; Charles W. Bianiel, Judge.
pergonal property is used by the plamtiiis
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board of review as to the facts if supported
by evidence, shall be conclusive and the
jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to
questions of law." Therefore, under § 354-l0(i) the role of this Court is to sustain
the findings of the Board of Review unless
the record clearly and persuasively shows
the Board's decision to be arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.6 If there is substantial evidence that supports the Board's
determination, it must be affirmed.7

concerning her self-employment and the income from gratuities in order to obtain
unemployment benefits to which she was
not entitled. Decision affirmed.
STEWART, OAKS and DURHAM, JJ.,
concuf.
HOWE, J., concurs in the result.
WhJMBnTsYrtM/

[3,4] Further, there does not have to be
an admission or direct proof of an intent to
defraud by knowingly failing to report a
material fact on an unemployment claim.
As we said in Mineer i\ Board of Review:8
The intention to defraud is shown by the
claims themselves which contain false
statements and fail to set forth material
facts required by statute. The filing of
such claims evidences a purpose or willingness to present a false claim in order
to obtain unlawful benefits and hence are
manifestations of intent to defraud.9
(Citations omitted.)
[5] The Board found that plaintiff was
self-employed during the weeks in question
since she was substantially involved in the
operation of the restaurant as evidenced by
her title interest in the restaurant and extensive time contributed to daily management. Her testimony that, although she
received no direct wages, she expected to
build the restaurant into a paying venture
in the future for both herself and her mother and felt entitled to compensation from
her mother for her share of the business
further bolstered this finding. The Board
also concluded that plaintiff received
wages since she "received" tip^, even
though she might not have used them.
The record clearly supports these findings.

David E. FRISBEE and Lois I. Fnsbee,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
K & IK CONSTRUCTION CO. (a Utah
Corporation), Kenneth H. Anderson, an
indi idual, and Ke\en Finnert}, Defendants and Respondents.
and
Kenneth H. ANDERSON, Third-Part}
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

FRISBEE ENTERPRISES, a Partnership,
Contractors Realt> and Development.
Inc..|a Utah Corporation, and Alton D.
Fristyee, an individual. Third-Part) Defendants and Appellant.
No. 18394.
Supreme Couit of UtalJan 11 1984.

Therefore, we hold that the Board of
Review did not err in finding that plaintiff
knowingly withheld material information

Vehdors of real property brougn: action against purchasers to foreclose two
trust deeds executed by the purchasers in
exchange for the detds to the property,

6.

8. Supra n. 7.

Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, Uah, 568 P.2d 727 (1977).

7. Aluieer v. Board of Re\te\v of Indus Comm'n,
I'tah, 572 P2d 1364 (1977). See afro Taylor v
Department of Emplo\ment Sec, Utah, 647 P.2d
1 (1982).
676PJd—10

9. Id. at 1366.
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alleging that the purchasers had defaulted
on the payments. One purchaser, as thirdparty plaintiff, claimed that third-party defendants should indemnify them for any
judgment against them on behalf of vendors, and asked that title to lots be quieted
in purchasers. The Fourth District Court,
Utah County, J. Robert Bullock, J., entered
summary judgment for purchasers, and
vendors and third-party defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held
that genuine issues of material fact existed
as to meaning of hold harmless and indemnity agreement and as to third-party defendant's alleged agency to act for vendors, precluding summary judgment for
purchasers.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Judgment ®=>181(2, 3)
Summary judgment is proper only
where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and moving party is entitled
to judgment as matter of law, and should
be granted only when it clearly appears
that there is no reasonable probability that
party moved against could prevail. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
2. Judgment <3^181(2, 3), 185(2), 186
Summary judgment is proper only if
pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law;
if there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, doubt should be
resolved in favor of opposing party, and
thus court must evaluate all evidence and
all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from
evidence in light most favorable to party
opposing summary judgment. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 56(c).
3. Judgment <S=>185.2(1, 4, 9)
It is not always required that party
opposing summary judgment proffer affidavits in order to avoid judgment against
him; response in opposition to motion must
be supported by affidavits or other documents only in order to demonstrate that
there is genuine issue of facts for trial, but

where party opposed to motion submits n
documents in opposition, moving party ma;
be granted summary judgment only if aj
propriate, that is, if he is entitled to judg
ment as matter of law. Rules Civ.Proc
Rule 56(c).
4. Judgment e=*185.2(9)
Where moving affidavit shows on it
face that there is material issue of fac
summary judgment may not be entere<
even if responsive affidavits are not file*
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
5. Judgment <S=>185.3(15)
In action by vendor of land to foreclos
twro trust deeds executed by purchaser
purchaser's affidavit in support of motic
for summary judgment and supporting do
uments presented conclusions with no su
porting facts, and showed unresolved i
sues of fact concerning meaning of allegi
hold harmless and indemnity agreemei
third-party defendant's alleged agency
act for vendors, and third-party defer
ant's alleged agency for company named
seller of property at suit, which compa
was not party to suit, precluding summa
judgment for purchasers, notwithstandi.
vendors' failure to proffer affidavits in <
position to motion. Rules Civ.Proc, Ri
56(c, e).
6. Judgment ®=»181(8)
Ambiguity in written instrument
and of itself may make summary judgm<
inappropriate. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 56
7. Judgment G=*1S5.2(5)
Conclusions alone are not enough
support summary judgment; nor do bi
contentions, unsupported by any facts,
solve genuine issues of fact crucial to re
lution of case. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56

Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City,
plaintiffs and appellants.
Bruce A. Embry, Salt Lake City, for
fendants and respondents.
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HALL, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs David E. Frisbee and Lois I.
Frisbee brought this action to foreclose
two trust deeds executed by defendants K
& K Construction Co., Kenneth H. Anderson and Keven Finnerty, alleging that defendants had defaulted on the agreed-upon
payments.
Defendant Kenneth Anderson counterclaimed and, as a third-party plaintiff, filed
a complaint against Alton D. Frisbee, Frisbee Enterprises and Contractors Realty &
Development, Inc. (Contractors). Plaintiffs
and third-party defendants appeal from a
summary judgment entered against them
on Anderson's counterclaim and third-party
claim. We reverse.
On August 29, 1978, K & K Construction
Co., Kenneth Anderson and Keven Finnerty purchased certain real property from
plaintiffs, including lots 8 and 17 in the Tri
City Park Subdivision, the subject of plaintiffs' foreclosure action. Defendants executed trust deeds and promissory notes in
exchange for the deeds to the property.
Plaintiffs brought this action, alleging that
defendants had defaulted on their payments. Kenneth Anderson, respondent
here, denied there was default and alleged
that plaintiffs' interest in lots 8 and 17 had
been released due to performance of an
agreement, signed bv Alton D. Frisbee, to
hold harmless and indemnify Kenneth Anderson. Anderson counterclaimed for the
value of a mobile phone, Husky credit card
purchases, a semitractor and trailer and a
dump truck, all of which he alleged were
due and owing him from Contractors. Finally, Anderson, as third-party plaintiff,
claimed that the third-party defendants
should indemnify defendants for any judgment against them on behalf of plaintiffs
and asked that title to lots 8 and 17 be
quieted in defendants.

[1, |2] Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that summary
judgment is proper only where there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.1 It should be granted
only when it clearly appears that there is
no reasonable probability that the party
moved against could prevail.- As this
Court explained the standard:
^ummary judgment is proper only if
the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and
adrhissions shov% that there is no genuine
issik of material fact and that the movparty is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. If there is any doubt or
uncertainty concerning questions of fact,
the doubt should be resolved in favor of
the opposing party. Thus, the court
mu^t e\aluate all the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from
the evidence in a light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment.3
(Citations omitted.)
In ^his case, the motion for summary
judgment was supported by an affidavit of
Kenneth Anderson setting forth a prima
facie tase for .summary judgment. Appellants did not proffer affidavits in opposition t0 the motion.

On December 14, 1981, defendants made
a motion for summary judgment accompa-

[3] We have said that an opponent of a
motioh for summary judgment must timely

1. Bangerter
(1983).

3.

2.

v. Poulton,

Utah, 663 P.2d

100

Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., Utah, 646 P.2d
715 (1982).

nied by an affidavit of Kenneth Anderson
and a memorandum of points and authorities. Appellants failed to respond, and on
January 18, 1982, the judge granted defendants' motion. The summary judgment
was entered on February 11, 1982. It was
only I after entry of judgment that appellants! responded to the motion for summary
judgment in any way: appellants made a
motion to amend the judgment, which motion the court denied. On appeal, appellants seek a reversal of the summary judgment and an opportunity to present their
case kt trial.

BoM en v. Riverton City, Utah, 656 P.2d 434,
436 (1982). See also Lockhart Co. v. Equitable
Real\y Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 1333 (19S3).

390

Utah

676 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

file responsive affidavits raising factual issues or risk the trial court's conclusion that
there are no factual issues.4 However, it is
not always required that the opposing party proffer affidavits in order to avoid judgment against him.5 As this Court said in
Olwell v. Clark:6
Rule 56(e) states specifically that a response in opposition to a motion must be
supported by affidavits or other documents only in order to demonstrate that
there is a genuine issue of fact for trial.
Where the party opposed to the motion
submits no documents in opposition, the
moving party may be granted summary
judgment only "if appropriate," that is, if
he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.7
(Citation omitted.)
[4,5] Where the moving affidavit
shows on its face that there is a material
issue of fact, summary judgment may not
be entered, even if responsive affidavits
are not filed.8 In this case, Anderson is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
His affidavit and supporting documents
presented conclusions with no supporting
facts and show unresolved issues of fact.
The hold harmless and indemnity agreement alone constitutes a basis for the conclusion that summary judgment was inappropriate. The hold harmless agreement
represents a dissolution of the relationship
existing between Alton Frisbee and Kenneth Anderson, as evidenced by Contractors, a corporation formed by Kenneth Anderson, Alton Frisbee and Keven Finnerty.
The typewritten agreement provides that
Alton Frisbee will indemnify Anderson for
any liabilities arising against Contractors.
In exchange, in a handwritten addendum to
the face of the agreement, Anderson
agrees to sign over stock and all right, title
and interest in Contractors. This handwritten addendum is signed by Kenneth Ander4.

Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e); Franklin Financial v. New
Empire Dew Co., Utah, 659 P.2d 1040 (1983).

5.

Olwell v. Clark, Utah, 658 P.2d 585 (1982).

6.

Id.

7. Id. at 586.

son. In a further handwritten addend
signed by no one, Alton Frisbee "agrees
assume existing loan on lot 18 TCP ;
cancel all debts owed on all lots in TCP
Ken Anderson."
[6] In his affidavit, which relies on
agreement for support, Anderson sta
that this clause means that he, Anders
was to receive clear title to all lots in
City Park Subdivision that had not pr<
ously been sold, except lot 18, free \
clear of any obligation to Frisbee Eni
prises. Anderson's interpretation of
agreement points up the ambiguities app
ent on the face of the agreement, clea
raising genuine material issues of fact,
we said in Amjacs Intenvest, Inc. v. i
sign Associates:9 "[AJmbiguity in a w
ten instrument in and of itself may mi
summary judgment inappropriate." 10 1
determine that to be the case here.
[7] Further, Anderson makes bare c
tentions and conclusions in his affida
unsupported by any facts, such as tl
Alton Frisbee is the agent of Frisbee
vestment Co. and can thus bind the com
ny. Conclusions alone are not enough
support summan r judgment. Anders
also claims that the investment companj
the seller of the property in question in t
case. As far as we can determine, Frist
Investment Co., if it exists at all, is no1
party to this suit. Further, the conclus;
that Frisbee is its agent is just thatconclusion supported by no facts. B<
contentions, unsupported by any facts,
not resolve genuine issues of fact crucial
resolution of the case. Alton Frisbee's
leged agency to act for his parents, L
and David Frisbee, is a genuine issue
fact upon which much of the outcome
this case depends. His alleged agency i
a company named as the seller of the pr<
erty at suit, which company is not a pai
8. See Franklin, supra n. 4.
9.

Utah. 635 P.2d 53 (1981).

10. Id. at 55.
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to the suit, raises genuine material qu£Stions. Therefore, summary judgment was
not appropriate in this case.
The summary judgment is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for tri&h

n|ey fees under earnest money receipt and
offer to purchase, which provided for attorney fees, and (2) fees awarded against vendor should be reduced to conform to the
evidence.
Remanded with directions.

STEWART, OAKS, HOWr and DURHAM, JJ., concur.

(O
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Ronald P. JENKINS, Plaintiff,
v.
Ronald L. BAILEY, Defendant, ThirdParty Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
ZION REALTY, Dixie Realtors, and
David Limbacher, Third-Party Defendants, Counter-Claimants and Respondents,
v.
Mike EAGER and Ronald P. Jenkins,
Third-Party Defendants.
No. 18536.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 12, 19S4.
Original service station owner brought
action against vendor after he was unable
to return signposts. Vendor admitted liability and joined as third-party defendants
broker and purchaser, who counterclaimed
for conversion of cross-beam and sign panel. The Fifth District Court, Washington
County, J. Harlan Burns, J., granted judgment to original owner and also granted
judgment to vendor against third-party defendants but refused to award attorney
fees, and granted judgment to third-party
defendants on counterclaim and awarded
them attorney fees, and vendor appealed.
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that:
(1) vendor was entitled to award of attor-

l.| Costs 0 1 7 2
It was not proper to award attorney
febs for services on counterclaim for conversion of sign panel by vendor and then to
retuse to award vendor any fees for
services on his breach of contract claim,
and thus vendor was entitled to reasonable
aukrd of attorney fees against purchaser
anp broker, who together with vendor executed earnest money receipt and offer to
purchaser in which they expressly agreed
to pay all expenses of enforcing agreement, including reasonable attorney fee.
2. Costs O207
While amount of award of attorney
feds rests within sound discretion of the
tri^l court, amount must nonetheless, ju*t
as any other judicial determination, be supported by the evidence.
3. Costs <s>207
Even allowing that estimate made by
attorney for broker and purchaser was a
''very* conservative" one, nothing supported
substantial deviation from attorne\ 's testimony as to $178 value of his services, and
thus award of $600, or over three times
amount supported by the evidence, in connection with purchaser and broker's counterclaim against original vendor constituted
an abuse of discretion.
4. Costs <s=*252
Vendor, who was entitled to reasonable attorney fee against purchaser and broker) based on earnest money receipt and
offelr to purchase in which they expressly
agreed t(f pay all expenses of enforcing
agreement, including reasonable attorney
fee, was also entitled to reasonable fee for
bringing appeal.
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, e n the warrant is issued. § 77-23-4(1).
* ,'i the earlier Code and the current provik
* contain an express direction that a
/^mal departure from the prescribed proce1 »Ve shall not render a pleading or proceedV* invalid unless it shall have actually
^judiced the defendant in respect to a
fktantial right. U.G.A., 1953, § 77-53-2
Repealed 1980);. U.C.A., 1953, § 77-23-12
,nacted 19S2).6 We therefore decline to
4.,n]v the 3-2 Jasso decision to the facts of
• ••;* case, and reject the argument that the
I no warrant was invalid because it was not
tv.>ed on a signed writing.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
HALL, C.J., STEWART and HOWE, JJ.,
and CALVIN GOULD, District Judge, concur.
DURHAM, J., having disqualified herself,
does not participate herein; GOULD, District Judge, sat.

Kelly GRAFF and Keri Graff, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 18062.

Court, Utah County, David Sam, J., granted
summary judgment against owners, and
they appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall,
C.J., held that notice of claim of mechanic's
lien was invalid where the notice failed to
designate persons to whom the materials
were furnished and where notice lacked
proper verification due to absence of a
name appearing to identify the person verifying the claim and absence of signature of
person who purportedly swore under oath
as to veracity of the claim.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Mechanics' Liens &=> 157(1)
Doctrine of substantial compliance with
statutory requirements for giving notice of
claim of mechanic's lien has validity and has
application in an appropriate case. U.C.A.
1953, 38-1-7.
2. Mechanics' Liens <s=>135, 154(2)
Notice of claim of mechanic's lien was
invalid where the notice failed to designate
person to whom the materials were furnished and where notice lacked proper verification due to absence of a name appearing
to identify the person verifying the claim
and absence of signature of the person who
purportedly swore under oath as to veracity
of the claim. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7.
Earl D. Tanner, Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and appellant.
Robert D. Maack, Vincent C. Rampton,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

In action by equitable owners of property to invalidate mechanic's lien claimed
against the property, the Fourth District

HALL, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs brought this action for the purpose of invalidating a mechanic's lien
claimed against their property. Both sides
moved for summary judgment and the trial
court ruled in favor of defendant, concluding that the notice of intention to claim a

6. In addition, the record shows that apart from
the contested oral deposition of the oificer the
t'no warrant was also based on a written affidavit the officer signed before the magistrate.
That affidavit is not in the record. Since we

assume regularity in the absence of record evidence to the contrary, State v. Jones, (1982),
Utah, 657 P.2d 1263 p. 1267, we are entitled
to assume that the affidavit provided an independently sufficient basis for the warrant.

Supreme Court of Utah.
March 9, 1983.
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Hen which was recorded by defendant was
in substantial compliance with statutory requirements.
The facts are not in dispute. At the time
defendant filed the notice of lien, Roncor,
Inc., was the record owner of the property.
However, plaintiffs were the equitable
owners as evidenced by an agreement that
was subsequently made of record in the
office of the Utah County Recorder.
The notice of lien reflects that the materials were requested by and furnished to
defendant Boise Cascade Corporation.
However, that is patently erroneous.
The signature block on the notice of lien
reflects that it was signed by one Berk
Buttars, as agent of Boise Cascade Corporation. The verification block which follows
contains a line for insertion of the name of
the person to be sworn, followed by a line
for the signature of the person sworn.
However, both of these lines were left
blank. Those portions of the notice appear
as follows:
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION.
Bv / s / Berl Buttars
Agent
State of

Utah

County of

Utah

Being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and
says: that he is an agent of BOISE CASCADE
CORPORATION, a corporation, the claimant
herein and makes this verification for and on its
behalf; that he has read the foregoing notice and
claim of hen and knows the contents thereof and
believes the same to be true and just.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
day of November . 1979.
/s/ Michael H Spokman
Notary Public

9th

of law inasmuch as it does not set! forth tV
name of the person that requested the ma
tenals and because it was not properly veH
fied Defendant's rejoinder is that the
omissions on the face of the ikotice are
simply inconsequential shortcomings and
that the trial court appropriately app];C(j
the doctrine of substantial compliance in
ruling in its favor.
[1] The doctrine of substantial comph.
ance has validity and it has application in
an appropriate case.1 However, the particular facts of this case preclude its application.
[2] UC.A., 1953, §38-1-7 specifically
requires, inter alia, that the notic^ of intention to claim a lien contain the name of the
person to whom the material was [furnished,
and that the claim be verified under oath.
In the recent case of First Security Mortgage O. v. Hansen,2 we construbd the requirement of verification as set forth in the
foregoing statute and concluded that the
lack of verification is not a hyperjtechnicality that the Court is free to discount, but
that verification is a mandatory condition
precedent to the very creation knd existence of a lien 3
Defendant makes an effort to distinguish
Hansen by contending that in that case the
only fact sworn to was the identity and
authority of the person signing the notice
of claim, whereas in the instant case the
verification was complete except for the
fact that the lien claimant's signature appears on the wrong line. We &re not so
persuaded.

Residing at Orem, Utah
My Commission expires 3-21-83

In order to adopt defendant's contention,
it must be assumed that the name and the
signature of Berk Buttars were ijitended to
be affixed on the blank line prbvided for
verification of the notice of clairn. We are
not free to make those assumptions.

Plaintiffs' sole contention on appeal is
that the notice of lien is invalid as a matter

In the absence of a name appearing to
identify the person verifying the claim, and

1. Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 295, 215 P.2d 390 3. HA.M.S Co v. Electrical Contractors of
Alaska, Inc, Alaska, 563 P.2d 258 (1977).
(1950).
2. Utah, 631 P.2d 919 (1981)

f r,vber absenc*
ur--»n wfto purp
, /.», 4«s to the verao
, r.uui'e as we did in
;re notice of claim o
tnf«cat»on and that t
tnt> ha\c rot been s
,*.h Haung so con
iJrt ^ wh» ther the f<
• *t n >tice of hen the
rnatcnals were furnis
*.artul compliance. S
„ch failure, when cot
M-.ficanon, renders th
v

:*c\er*ed and remar
vl tnU^ng judgment I
t rrether with costs.
STEWART, OAKS,
HAM, JJ., concur.

<d?5S
Santos CRUZ, Plaint
v.
Val MONTOYA, Mih
Defendants and
Santos CRUZ, Plainti
v.
Val MONTOYA, e1
and App
Nos. 17671
Supreme Cou
March 11
Action was institi
kjredly sustained by pi
tlc
n with defendants.
c
°urt, Salt Lake Coun
Son
> J., entered judgm*
,n
£ damages against
directed a verdict in U
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the further absence of the signature of
person who purportedly swore undo*
*h a* to the veracity of the claim, we
.elude as we did in Hansen, supra, that
r e notice of claim of hen clearly lacked
M.nfication and that the statutory requirements have not been substantially complied
* th Having so concluded, we need not
address whether the failure to designate in
p e notice of hen the person to whom the
r aerials were furnished constitutes substantial compliance. Suffice it to say that
$ueh failure, when coupled with a lack of
verification, renders the notice of lien inval!.

i<

Re\ersed and remanded for the purpose
o* entering judgment in favor of plaintiffs,
t ->gether w ith costs.
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur.

ant, and appeaK were taken. The Supreme
Court, Howe, J , held that: (1) award of
$9,000 in general damages in favor of plaintiff was not a product of passion, prejudice
or corruption by jury and, hence, was not
excessive, but awrard of $12,000 in punitive
damages was excessive under evidence and
w as subject to being reduced to $6,000, and
(2) a question for jury was presented as to
whether second defendant participated in
altercation which resulted in injuries to
plaintiff which were subject of action and,
hence, trial court committed error in directing verdict as to that defendant, but since
jury was allowed to consider all of the
evidence concerning the defendant, there
was no necessity for a new trial, and it was
only necessary to set aside the directed verdict and to remand case with instructions to
enter a judgment on the verdict against the
second defendant.
Modified and affirmed in part, and set
aside and remanded writh instructions in
part.

Santos CRUZ, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Val MONTOYA, Mike Montoya, et a!.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Santos CRUZ, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Val MONTOYA, et al., Defendants
and Appellants.
Nos. 17670, 17646.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 15, 1983.
Action was instituted for injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff in an altercation with defendants. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkins
°n, J., entered judgment on verdict awardln
g damages against one defendant, but
Greeted a verdict in favor of other defend-

1. Damages <s=>95
There is no set formula to compute
amount of damages where personal injuries
involve a loss of employment, personal inconvenience, and pain and suffering.
2. Appeal and Error <@=*1004.1(4)
A reviewing court will defer to the
damage verdict of a jury unless it is so
excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury.
3. Assault and Battery <s=>40
Award of $9,000 in general damages to
individual wTho, in the result of altercation
which was subject of suit, underwent the
pain and suffering of a bruised and battered body and head as well as puffed and
bleeding lips and loss of a patch of hair
from his scalp wras not a result of passion,
prejudice or corruption by jury and was not
excessive.
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Jolene STAHL, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a public
agency, Defendant and Respondent.

supplying signed accident form and medical
release to authority's insurance adjuster
who was authorized by law to handle approval or denial of victim's claim and thus
acted as agent of the authority. U.C.A.
1953, 11-20-56.

No. 16419.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 12, 19S0.
Motorist brought action against public
transit authority to recover damages sustained in automobile accident involving a
bus owned by the authority and driven by
one of its employees. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Christine M. Durham, J., entered judgment of default due to
plaintiff's failure to comply with statutory
notice provision, and plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that
motorist substantially complied with the
statute by furnishing signed accident report
and medical release to defendant's insurance adjuster, who acted as defendant's
agent.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Statutes <s=>223.1
Statutory provision must be construed
so as to make it harmonious with other
statutes relevant to the subject matter.
2. Statutes c=>227
Generally, a direction in a statute to do
an act is considered "mandatory" when consequences are attached to the failure to act;
conversely, when a statute requires an action to be taken without prescribing a penalty for failure to so act, the requirement is
not often deemed mandatory.
3. Statutes <e=*184
A statute is to be construed in light of
its intended purpose.
4. Automobiles *=»230
Motorist, who was involved in automobile accident allegedly caused by bus owned
by public transit authority, substantially
complied with statutory notice provision by

Wendall E. Bennett, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Rex J. Hanson, David H. Epperson, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
On September 9,1976, in Salt ^ake City a
bus owned by the Utah Transit Authority
("UTA") and driven by a UTA emplo/ee
collided with the rear end of an automobile
which in turn collided head-qn with an
automobile driven by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff was taken to the Valley West Hospital for examination. Upon returning to
work that same day plaintiff was contacted
by Thomas Vance, an insurance adjuster for
Brown Brothers Insurance, wfiich represents UTA's insurer, Transit Casualty. He
obtained a statement from heri concerning
the accident and wrote a two-page report
based on her answers to his inquiries.
Vance also had plaintiff sign a statement
and a medical information release allowing
her personal physician to discldse information to him.
On December 28, 1976, after 3Vz months
had elapsed with no action by the insurance
company or UTA, plaintiff retained counsel.
The following day counsel ser^t a written
notice of claim to the Utah Transit Authority and to the Utah Attorney General. Suit
was filed in district court July 14, 1977.
On motion the case was dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff thein filed an
amended complaint, along with depositions
of herself and the insurance adjuster,
Vance. UTA moved for summary judgment for failure to comply with § 11-20-56
U.C.A., as amended, a part pf the Utah
Public Transit District Act. That section
provides:
Claims against district-Recjuirements.Every claim against the district for
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death, injury or damage alleged to have
been caused b} the negligent act or omission of the district shall be presented to
the board of directors in writing within
thirty days after the death, injury, or
damage, signed and verified by the claimant or his duly authorized agent, stating
the time and place where the injury or
damage occurred and a general statement
of the cause and circumstances of the
death, injury or damages. No action under this section shall be commenced until
sixty days after presentation, or unless
the board of directors shall sooner deny
claim. [Emphasis added.]
On the basis of that statute a judgment
of dismissal was entered, and this appeal
ensued. For the purpose of this appeal we
state the facts developed in discovery in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that the provision
above cited was not intended to be a statute
of limitations and that § 63-30-12 of the
Governmental Immunity Act provides the
relevant statute of limitation in this case.
Plaintiff also contends that UTA is estopped from relying on § 11-20-56 as a
result of the actions of the insurance adjustor.
[1] Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26
Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971), held that
it is for the judiciary to assume that each
term of a statute was advisedly adopted by
the Legislature. It is also our duty to construe a statutory provision so as to make it
harmonious with other statutes relevant to
the subject matter. The language in the
Utah Public Transit District Act stands in
direct contrast to the general notice of
claim provision found in the Governmental
Immunity Act enacted in 1965, four years
prior to the Public Transit Act. The Governmental Immunity Act makes clear that a
failure to comply with the notice provision
results in a bar to prosecution of the action.
Section 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated
(1953), as amended, provides that:
Claim against state or agency-Notice
to attorney general and agency-Time for
fihng.-A claim against the state or any
agency thereof as defined herein shall be
6/8 P2d—U

fore\er barred unless notice thereof is
filed with the attorney general of the
state of Utah and the agency concerned
within one year after the cause of action
arises. [Emphasis added ]
Section 63-30-13 includes the same mandatory language in prescribing the penalty
for noncompliance with the notice requirement regarding claims against political subdivisions.
[2] We are guided in construing the language of the instant statute by the principle that generally a direction in a statute to
do an act is considered "mandatory" when
consequences are attached to the failure to
act. Conversely, when a statute requires
an action to be taken without prescribing a
penalty for failure to so act, the requirement is not often deemed mandatory.
Whitley v. Superior Ct, 18 Cal.2d 75, 113
P2d 449 (1941). See Barton v. Atkinson,
228 Ga. 733, 187 S.E.2d 835 (1972); Paul v.
City of Manhattan, 212 Kan. 381, 511 P.2d
244 (1973), State ex rel Ferro v. Oellermann, Mo., 458 S.W.2d 583 (1970); Dunker
v. Brown County Bd. of Ed., 80 S.D. 193,
121 N.W.2d 10 (1963), Chisholm v. Bewley
Mills, 155 Tex. 400, 287 SW.2d 943 (1956);
State e,\ rel. Werlein v. Elamore, 33 Wis.2d
288, 147 N.W.2d 252 (1967).
Further assistance in this case is provided
by viewing the pertinent language in light
of our Legislature's choice of language construction in similar provisions. The difference thus uncovered signifies a purposeful
selection and indicates the intended meaning. See Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, 96 Utah
450, 85 P.2d 831 (1939); Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Board of Review, 118 Utah 619,
223 P.2d 586 (1950); Ballou v. Kemp, 92
F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Commonwealth v.
Reick Investment Corp., 419 Pa. 52, 213
A.2d 277 (1965).
The express bar against maintaining an
action for noncompliance with the notice
provision in the Governmental Immunity
Act, when compared with the Utah Public
Transit District Act, which contains no such
language, indicates an intent on the part of
the Legislature not to impose a bar for
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noncompliance with the notice provision of
the latter act. It is not for the Court to
read into the statute an intention to establish a statute of limitations which is not
expressly stated in the statute.
The cases cited by defendant which hold
a statutory notice requirement mandatory
and a bar to filing an action without strict
compliance with the time limitation involve
statutory language which unequivocally
designates a legislathe intent to have the
failure to comply stand as a bar to further
action. These cases therefore are not controlling in the instant case. See Crowder v.
Salt Lake County, Utah, 552 P.2d 646
(1976); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah
2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972); Peterson v.
Salt Lake City, 118 Utah 231, 221 P.2d 591
(1950).
Moreover, there was substantial compliance with the 30-day notice provision and
defendant was in no way prejudiced by
plaintiffs failure to comply with the formality of filing a claim.
[3] A statute is, of course, to be construed in light of its intended purpose.
Child v. City of Spanish Fork, Utah, 538
P.2d 184 (1975). It is necessary to consider
the policy of the notice requirement so that
in any particular case the facts can be evaluated to determine if the intent of the
statute has been accomplished by substantial compliance with the statutory directive.
Smith v. State, Ala., 364 So.2d 1 (1978).
This Court has previously stated that the
primary purpose of a notice of claim requirement is to afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue a
proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to arrive at a timely
settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding
the expenditure of public revenue for costly
and unnecessary litigation. Sears v. Southworth, Utah, 563 P.2d 192 (1977); Ga//egos
v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d
1335 (1972).
We view plaintiff's contention that the
notice given to the insurance adjuster in
this case constituted compliance with the
statute in light of these policy considerations. First, we note that § 63-30-14 of

the Governmental Immunity ^ct equates
the authority of the insurance cjarrier with
that of the governmental entity [concerning
the notice to claimant of the Approval or
denial of a claim for injury. Thus the
insurance agent is authorized by law to
handle the approval or denial of plaintiff's
claim, representing the interests of the
government. Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969).
Further, Vance testified in this case that all
claims against UTA are handled directly by
his office and specifically by himself. The
record also reveals that UTA informed
Vance of the accident shortly after its occurrence. He immediately contacted plaintiff on the same day as the accident, obtained a signed statement of her version of the
incident, and received a medical release
form from her. In light of tpese facts,
Vance's actions in obtaining a signed statement of plaintiffs version of the accident
were for all practical purposes the acts of
UTA.
[4] Clearly there was substantial compliance with the notice provision. No undue hardship resulted from the njotice being
given to an agent of the party named in the
statute. Considering the duties delegated
to the insurance agent, it appears that the
person entrusted with the investigation and
settlement procedures received tne requisite
information in a timely fashion and within
the time constraints imposed by the statute.
Furthermore, conceding there is some validity to the necessity of having a notice in
writing to guard against the unreliability of
memory, the information given was committed to writing in a two-page report and
signed by plaintiff, thus recording plaintiff's account of the accident.
A case closely in point with the case at
bar is Badger v. Upper Darby Township,
348 Pa. 551, 36 A.2d 507 (1944). Plaintiff's
counsel, within the prescribed period, gave
written notice to the insurance carrier for
the defendant township rather than the
clerk or secretary of such municipality, as
required by statute. The court, in allowing
plaintiff to maintain an action for damages,
declared:
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a failure to file
the act should be
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In determining, in its discretion, whether
a failure to file the notice prescribed by
the act should be excused, a weighty circ jnistance to be considered by the court
JN whether or not the municipality has
sjffered any undue hardship. Here there
!> nothing to indicate that it did so suffer.
Of controlling importance is the fact that
v ithin the prescribed period the insurance company was notified that claim
uas being made, was furnished with the
essential facts in regard to the accident,
and, by designating a physician to examine plaintiff, apparently admitted its responsibility to investigate the claim. If,
as uou/d appear, the insurance company
is the real party in interest, a decision
denying plaintiff the right to prosecute
her claim because of failure to give written notice to the township would be one
of sheer literalism, for, had such notice
been given, the township wculd undoubtedly, in due course, have turned it oxer to
the company to which plaintiffs counsel
had sent it m the first instance. It is not
unusual for lawyers representing claimants in accident cases to communicate
with insurance companies directly rather
than with defendants, since the former
control the negotiations for settlement
and prepare the defense in case of litigation. [Emphasis added] [36 A.2d at
508-09 ]
The instant case is clearly distinguishable
from Moran v. Salt Lake City, 53 Utah 407,
173 P. 702 (1918). In that case a notice was
presented to a party other than the recipient prescribed by statute. The Court consequently found the notice to be inadequate.
The Court in Moran specifically found that
the board to whom notice had been gi\en
lacked authority to consider or settle damage claims against the city for any acts of
negligence. In the instant case, as pointed
above, the insurance carrier through its
agent has specific authority to consider and
settle damage claims.
The cases cited by defendant in support
of the contention that notice to the insurance agent does not comply with the notice
requirement are distinguishable from the
instant case. In those cases, the applicable

statutes contained words of absolute prohibition as a consequence of noncompliance,
thus suggesting a stricter standard of adherence Sears \. Southworth, Utah, 563
P.2d 192 (1977); Scarborough v. Granite
School District, Utah, 531 P.2d 4^0 (1975),
Yaroz \. Sever, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d
435 (1973); Roo^endaal Construction and
Mining Corp. \ Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396,
503 P.2d 446 (1972) Furthermore, it should
be noted in the instant case that plaintiff
met the strict requirements placed on the
cause of action by (1) the statute of limitation found in § 63-30-12 of the Go\ernmental Immunity Act and (2) the prohibition
against any action being brought until sixty
da}s after presentation of notice found in
§ 11-20-56 of the Utah Public Transit District Act.
Other courts have also construed similar
statutory notice requirements to hold that
substantial compliance meets the statutory
requirements e\en in the face of mandatory
language. Ra) v. City of Council Bluffs,
193 Iowa 620, 187 N.W* 447 (1922); Brichell
\. Kansas City, 364 Mo. 679, 265 S.W.2d 342
(1954), Peterson v. Kansas City, 324 Mo
454, 23 S W.2d 1045 (1930); Shaw v. City of
New York, 83 A D. 212, 82 N.Y S. 44 (1903).
In sum, the purpose of the notice requirement was satisfied.
Plaintiffs second contention is that UTA
is estopped from relying on the notice of
claim requirement in light of the insurance
adjuster's conduct. Whether the facts in
this case support an estoppel or waiver theory need not be decided in light of the
foregoing.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a
trial on the merits.
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.
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38-1-25. Abuse of hen right - Per.aitj.
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38-1-1. Public buildings not subject to act.
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to
any public building, structure or improvement. 19S3
3S-1-2. "Contractors* and "subcontractors"
defined.
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by
contract, express or implied, with the owner, as in
this chapter provided, shall be deemed an original
contractor, and al! other persons doing work or
furnishing materials shall be deemed subcontractors.
1953

3S-1 3. Those entitled to lien - What may be
at icbed • Lien on ores mined.
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any services or furnishing or renting any
materials or equipment used in the construction,
alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any
manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish
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matcHals for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining claim, mine,
quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications,
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional
service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon
the property upon or concerning which they have
rendered service, performed labor or furnished or
rented materials or equipment for the value of the
service rendered, labor performed or materials or
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively,
whether at the instance of the owner or of any other
person acting by his authority as agent, contractor
or otherwise. Such hens shall attach only to such
interest as the owner may have iri the property, but
the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or
deposit, whether working under bond or otherwise,
shall for the purposes of this chapter include products mined and excavated while the same remain
upon the premises included within the lease.
mi
38-1-4. Amount of land affected - Lots a&i
subdivisions - Mines - Franchises, fixtures and
appurtenances.
The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to
and cover so much of the land whereon such building* structure or improvement shall be made as
may be necessary for the convenient use and occupation thereo\ and in case any such building shall
occupy two or more lots or other subdivision of
land< such lots or subdivisions shall be deemed one
for the purposes of this chapter; and when two or
more mining claims, mines or valuable deposits,
whether owned by the same person or not, shall,
with the consent of all, be worked through a
common shaft, tunnel, incline, drift or other excavation, then all the mining claims, mines or valuable
deposits so worked shall for the purposes of this
chapiter be deemed one; and the liens in this chapter
provided for shall attach to all franchises, privileges,
appurtenances, and to aU machinery and fixtures,
pertaining to or used in connection with any such
lands, buildings, structures or improvements, mining
clainiis, mines or valuable deposits.
1953
38-1*5. Priority - Over other encumbrances.
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to,
and jtake effect as of, the time of the commi ncement to do work or furnish materials on the ground
for the structure or improvement, and shall have
priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the
time when the building, improvement or structure
was commenced, *ork begun, or first material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage
or other encumbrance of which the lien holder had
no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the
building, structure or improvement was commenced,
work begun, or first material furnished on the
groujnd.
i*$3
38-lj4>. Priority over claims of creditors of
original contractor or subcontractor.
No attachment, garnishment or levy under an
execution upon any money due to an original contractor from the owner of any property subject to
lien 'under this chapter shall be valid as against any
lien pf a subcontractor or materialman, and no such
attachment, garnishment or levy upon any money
due i to a subcontractor or materialman from the
contractor shall be valid as against any Irn of a
laborer employed by the day c piece.
m3
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38-1-17.

38-1-7. Notice of claim - Contents - Recording
furnished as provided in this chapter shall be upon
- Service on owner of property.
an equal footing, regardless of date of filing the
(1) Every original contractor within 100 days after notice a n d claim of lien a n d regardless of the time
the completion of his contract, and except as prov- of performing such work a n d labor or furnishing
ided in this section, every person other than the such material.
19^3
original contractor who claims the benefit of this 38-1-11. Enforcement - Time for - Lis pendens
chapter within 80 days after furnishing the last
- Action for debt not affected.
material or performing the last labor for or on any
Actions t o enforce the liens herein provided for
land, building, improvement, or structure, or for must be begun within twelve months after the
any alteration, addition to, repair of, performance completion of the original contract, or the suspenof any labor in, or furnishing any materials for, any sion of work thereunder for a period of thirty day^.
mine or mining claim, shall file for record with the Within the twelve months herein mentioned the lien
county recorder of the county in which the property, claimant shall file for record with the county recoor some part of the property, is situated, a written rder of each county in which t h e lien is recorded a
notice to hold and claim a lien.
notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting provided in actions affecting the title o r right t o
forth the following information:
possession of real property, o r the hen shall be void,
(a) the name of the reputed owner if except as t o persons who have been made parties t o
known or, if not known, the name of the record the action a n d persons having actual knowledge of
owner;
the commencement of the action, and the burden of
(b) the name of the person by whom he proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those
was employed or to whom he furnished the mate- claiming under him t o show such actual knowledge.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed t o
rial;
(c) the time when the first and last labor impair or affect the right of any person to whom a
was performed, or the first and last material was debt m a y be d u e for a n y work done o r materials
furnished t o maintain a personal action t o recover
furnished;
iw3
(d) a description of the property, sufficient the same.
for identification; and
38-1-12. Repealed.
im
(e) t h e signature of the lien claimant or his 38-1-13. Parties - Joinder - Intervention.
authorized agent, and the date signed.
Lienors not contesting the claims of each other
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, may join as plaintiffs, and when separate actions aje
the lien claimant shall deliver or m a i l ' b y certified commenced the court may consolidate them and
mail t o either the reputed owner or record owner of make all persons having claims filed parties to the
the real property a copy of the notice of lien. If the action. Those claiming liens who fail or refuse to
record owner's current address is not readily avail- beccne parties plaintiff may be made parties defeable, the copy of the claim m a y be mailed t o the last nda: ., and any one not made a party may at any
known address of the record owner, using the names time before the final hearing intervene.
1953
and addresses appearing o n the last completed real 38-1-14. Decree - Order of satisfaction.
property assessment rolls of the county where the
In every case in which liens are claimed against
affected property is located. Failure t o deliver o r
the same property the decree shall provide for their
mail the notice of lien t o t h e reputed owner o r
satisfaction in the following order:
record owner precludes the lien claimant from an
(1) Subcontractors who are laborers or mechaaward of costs a n d attorneys' fees against t h e
reputed owner or record owner in an action t o nics working by the day or piece, but without furnishing materials therefor;
enforce the lien.
(2) All other subcontractors a n d all materia(4) When a subcontractor or any person furni- lmen;
shes labor or material as stated in Subsections (1)
(3) The original contract or s.
1953
through (3) at the request of an original contractor,
38-1-15.
Sale
Redemption
Disposition
of
then the final date for the filing of a notice of intproceeds.
ention to hold and claim a lien for a subcontractor
T h e court shall cause the property t o be sold in
or a person furnishing labor or material at the
request of an original contractor is 80 days after satisfaction of the liens a n d costs as in tK* case of
completion of the original contract of the original foreclosure of mortgages, subject t o the saui? right
contractor.
ins of redemption. If the proceeds of sale after the
payment of costs shall not be sufficient t o satisfy
38-1-8. Liens on several separate properties in
the whole amount of liens included in the decree,
one claim.
Liens against two or more buildings, mining then such proceeds shall be paid in the ordei above
claims or other improvements owned by the same designated, a n d p r o rata t o the persons claiming in
person or persons may be included in one claim; but each class where the sum reaLzed is insufficient to
pay t h e persons of such class in full. An> excess
in such case the person filing the claim must desigshall be paid to the owner.
1953
nate therein the amount claimed to be due to him
on each of such buildings, mining claims or other 38-1-16. Deficiency judgment.
Every' person whose claim is not satisfied as
improvements.
1V53
herein provided m a y have judgment docketed for
38-1-9. Notice imparted by record.
the balai ce unpaid, and execution therefor against
The recorder must record the claim in a book the part> personally liable.
1953
kept by him for that purpose, a n d from the time of
38-1-17.
Costs
Apportionment
Costs
and
the filing thereof for record all persons shall be
attorneys' fee to subcontractor.
deemed to have notice thereof.
1953
As between the owner and the contractor the
38-1-10. L a b o r e r s ' and materialmen's lien o n
court shall apportion the costs according to the right
equal footing regardless of time of filing.
of the case, but in all cases each subcontractor
The liens for work and labor done or material exhibiting a lien shall have his costs awarded to him,
Code •Co
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including the costs of preparing and recording the
notice of claim of lien and such reasonable attorney's fee as may be incurred in preparing and
recording said notice of claim of lien.
IMI
38-1-18. Attorneys' fees.
In any action brought to enforce any lien under
this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to
recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by
the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the
action.
mi
38-1-19. Payment by owner to contractor Subcontractor's hen not affected.
When any subcontractor shall have actually begun
to furnish labor or materials for which he is entitled
to a lien no payment to the original contractor shall
impair or defeat such lien; and no alteration of any
contract shall affect any lien acquired under the
provisions of this chapter.
1953
38-1-20. When contract price not payable in cash
- Notice.
A s to all liens, except that of the contractor, the
whole contract price shall be payable in money,
except as herein provided, and shall not be diminished by any prior or subsequent indebtedness, offset
or counterclaim in favor of the owner and against
the contractor, except when the owner has contracted to pay otherwise than in cash, in which case the
owner shall post in a conspicuous place on the premises a statement of the terms and conditions of the
contract before materials are furnished or labor is
performed, which notice must be kept posted, and
when so posted shall give notice to all parties interested of the terms and conditions of the contract.
Any person willfully tearing down or defacing such
notice is guilty of a misdemeanor.
1953
38-1-21. Advance payments - Effect on
subcontractor's lien.
N o payment made prior t o the time when the
same is due under the terms and conditions of the
contract shall be valid for the purpose of defeating,
diminishing or discharging any lien in favor of any
person except the contractor; but as to any such lien
such payment shall be deemed as if not made, notwithstanding that the contractor to whom it was
paid may thereafter abandon his contract or be or
become indebted to the owner for damages for
nonperformance of his contract or otherwise.
1953
38-1-22. Advance payments under terms of
contract - Effect on liens.
The subcontractors' liens provided for in this
chapter shall extend to the full contract price, but if
at the time of the commencement to do work or
furnish materials the owner has paid upon the contract, in accordance with the terms thereof, any
portion o f the contract price, either in money or
property, the lien of the contractor shall extend only
to such unpaid balance, and the lien of any subcontractor w h o has notice o f such payment shall be
limited to the unpaid balance of the contract price.
N o part of the contract price shall by the terms of
any contract be made payable, nor shall the same or
any part thereof be paid in advance of the commencement of the work, for the purpose of evading or
defeating the provisions of this chapter.
1953
38-1-23. Creditors cannot reach materials
furnished, except for purchase price.
Whenever materials have been furnished for use
in the construction, alteration or repair of any buiIdinr, work or other improvement mentioned in
section 38-1-3 such materials shall not be subject
to attachment, execution or other legal process to
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enforce any debt due by the purchaser of such
materials, other than a debt due for the purchase
money thereof, so long as in good faith the same
are about to be applied to the construction, alteration or repair of such building or improvement. 1953
38-1-24. Cancellation of record - Penalty.
The claimant of any lien filed as provided herein,
on the payment o f the amount thereof together with
the costsj incurred and the fees for cancellation, shall
at the request of any person interested in the property charged therewith cause said lien to be canceled
of rccorjd within ten days from the request, and
upon fajlure to so cancel his lien within the time
aforcsaicj shall forfeit and pay to the person making
the request the sum of $20 per day unii! the same
shall be canceled, to be recovered in the same
manner as other debts.
1953
38-1-25. Abuse of lien right - Penalty.
Any person who knowingly causes tc be filed for
record a claim of lien against any property, which
contains 1 a greater demand than the sum due him,
with the J intent t o cloud the title, or to exact from
the owne|r or person liable by means of such excessive clairn of lien more than is due him, or to
procure ^ny advantage or benefit whatever, is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
1953
38-1-26. Assignment of lien.
All lierps under this chapter shall be assignable as
other choses in action, and the assignee may commence and prosecute actions thereon in his own
n a m e i n t n e manner herein provided.
1953

Chapter 2. Miscellaneous Liens
38-2-1. Uejn 00 livestock - For feed and care.
3S-2-2. Litns of hotels and boardinghouse keepers.
38-2-3. Repairman's lien on personal propert) - Lien
subject to rights of secured parties.
38-2-3.1. Special lien on personal property for services
rendered) - General lien of dry cleaning establishments,
laundries, and shoe repair shops.
38-2-3.2. Sale of unclaimed personal property.
38-2-4. Disposal of property by lienholder - Procedure.
38-2-5. Actjion for deficiency.

38-2-1. l i e n on livestock For feed and care.
Every ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of caule,
tavern keeper or livery stable keeper to whom any
domestic ^nimals shall be entrusted for the purpose
of feeding, herding or pasturing shall have a lien
upon sucrj animals for the amount that may be due
him for sjuch feeding, herding or pasturing, and is
?uthorizec^ to retain possession of such animals until
such amoijint is paid.
1953
38-2-2. Liens of hotels and boardinghouse
keepers.
Every innkeeper, hotel keeper, boardinghouse or
lodginghouse keeper'shall have a lien on the baggage
and other! property in and about such inn belonging
to or und^r control of his guests or boarders for the
proper charges due him for their accommodation,
board and lodging, for money paid for or advanced
to them, And for such other extras as are furnished
at their rejquest. The innkeeper, hotel keeper, boardinghousej or lodginghouse keeper may detain such
baggage and other property until the amount of
such charge is paid, and the baggage and other
property shall not be exempt from attachment or
execution until the hotel or boardinghouse keeper's
lien and the costs of enforcing it are satisfied.
1953
38-2-3. Repairman's lieo on personal property Lien subject to rights of secured parties.
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, r~.-w.. "«•« a*j«"i maice, alter or repair, or
bestow labor upon, any articie of personal property
at the request o f the owner or other person entitled
t o possession thereof shall have a hen upon such
article for the reasonable value o f the labor performed and materials furnished and used in making
such article or in altering or repairing the same, and
may retain possession thereof until the a m o int so
due is paid; provided such hen and right t o possession shall be subject and subordinate t o the rights
and interests of any secured parties in such personal
property unless such secured party has requested
such person to make, alter or repair or bestow labor
upon such property.
- 1977
38-2-3.1. Special lien o n personal property for
services rendered - General lien of dry cleaning
establishments, laundries, and shoe repair shops.
Every person w h o , while lawfully in possession of
an article of personal property, renders any service
to the owner or owners thereof, by labor or skill
performed upon said personal property at the
request or order o f said owner, has a special hen
thereon, dependent o n possession, for the compensation, if any, which is due t o him from the owner
or owners for such service; and every laundry proprietor, person conducting a laundry business, dry
cleaning establishment, proprietor and person conducting a dry cleaning establishment, shoe repair
establishment proprietor and person conducting a
shoe repair establishment has a general lien, dependent o n possession, upon all personal property in his
hands belonging to a customer, for the balance due
him from such customer for laundry work, and for
the balance due him for dry cleaning work, and for
the balance due him for shoe repair work; but
nothing in this section shall be construed to confer a
lien in favor o f a wholesale dry cleaner o n material*
received from a dry cleaning establishment proprietor or a person conducting a dry cleaning establishment. The terms "person" and "proprietor* as used
in this section shall include an individual, firm,
partnership, association, corporation and company.
38-2-3.2. Sale of unclaimed persona! property.
(A) A n y garments, clothing, shoes, wearing
apparel or househe d goods, remaining in the possession o f a person, o n which cleaning, pressing,
glazing, laundry or washing or repair work has been
done or upon which alteration or repairs ha e been
made or o n which materials c r supplies have been
used or furnished by said person holding possession
thereof, for a period of 90 days or more after the
completion of such services or labors, m a y be sold
by said person holding p o s s e s i o n , to pa> the unpaid
reasonable or agreed charges therefor and the costs
of notifying the owner or owners as hereinafter
provided; provided, however, that the person to
w h o m such charges are payable and owing shall first
notify the owner or owners of such property o f the
time and place o f such sale; and provided farther,
that property that is t o be placed in storage after
an> o f the services or labors mentioned herein shall
not be affected by the provisions o f this subsection.
(B) All garments, clothing, shoes, wearing
apparel o n which any o f these services or labors
mentioned in the preceding subsection have been
performed and then placed in storage by agreement,
and remaining in the possession o f a person without
the reasonable or agreed charges having been paid
for a period o f 12 months may be sold to pay such
charges and costs o f notifying the owner or owners
as hereinafter provided, provided, however, that the
<-ode*Co
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person to whom the charges are payable and owing
shall first notify the owner or owners of such property o f the time and the place o f sale, and provided, further, that persons operating as warehouses
or warehousemen shall not be affected by this subsection.
(C) 1. T h e mailing o f a properly stamped and
registered letter, with a return address marked
thereon, addressed t o the owner or owners of the
property as aforesaid, at their address given at the
tune o f delivery o f the property t o such person to
render any o f the services or labors set out in this
article, or if n o address was s o given, at their
address if otherwise known, stating the time and
place o f sale, shall constitute notice as required in
this article. Said notice shall be mailed at least 20
da>< before the date o f sale. The cost of mailing
said letter shall be added to the charges.
2. If n o address was given at the time of
delivery o f the property as aforesaid, or if the
address o f the owner or owners is not otherwise
known, such person w h o has performed the services
or labors as aforesaid shall cause t o be published at
least once in a daily or weekly newspaper in the city,
town, city and county, wherein such property was
delivered to such person, a notice o f the time and
place of sale and such notice shall be published at
least twenty days before the date o f sale. Such
notice constitutes notice as required in this article 1.'
notice cannot be mailed as aforesaid. The costs of
one such publication shall be added t o the charges.
(D) The person to whom the charges are
payable and owing shall from the proceeds of the
sale, deduct the charges due plus the costs of notifying the owner or owners and shall immediately
thereafter mail to the owner or owners thereof at
their address, if known, a notice of the holding of
such sale and the amount of the overplus, if any,
due the owner or owners, and at any time within 12
months after such notice, such person shall upon
demand by the owner or owners, pay to the owner
or owners such overplus in his hands. If no such
demand is made within such 12 month period, or, if
the address of the owner or owners is unknown and
no demand is made by the owner or owners within
12 months after the date of sale, then such overplus
shall become the property of persons who have
performed the services or labors as aforesaid.
(E) Eacl person taking advantage of this article
must keep posted in a prominent place in his receiving office or offices at all times t w o notices which
shall read as follows:
"All articles, cleaned, pressed, glazed, laundered, washed, altered or repaired, and not called for
in 90 days will be sold to pay c h a r g e s /
"All articles stored by agreement and charges
not having been paid for 12 months will be sold to
pay charges."
The rights and benefits provided for in this
section shall be and are in addition t o the rights and
benefits provided for in section 38-2-4.
I9S3
38-2-4. Disposal of property b> lienholdei Procedure.
(1) A n y party holding a lien upon personal property as provided in this chapter m a y dispose of such
property in the manner provided in subsection (2) o f
this section.
(2) The lienor shall give notice t o the owner o f
the property, t o the customer as indicated on the
work order, and t o all other persons claiming an
interest in or lien thereon, as disclosed by the
records o f the department o f motor vehicles, lieutUTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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cnani governor s 01 nee, or oi corresponding agencies of any other state in which the property appears
registered or an interest in or lien thereof is evidenced if known by the lienor. The notice shall be sent
by certified mail at least 30 days before the proposed or scheduled date of any sale and shall contain:
(a) A description o f the property and its
location;
(b) The name and address o f the owner of
the property, the customer as indicated o n the work
order, and any person claiming an interest in or lien
thereon;
(c) The name, address, and telephone
number of the lienor; (d) Notice that the lienor claims a lien on
the property for labor and services performed and
interest and storage fees charged, if any, and the
cash sum which, if paid to the lienor, would be
sufficient to redeem the property from the lien
claimed by the lienor;
(e) Notice that the lien claimed by the
lienor is subject t o enforcement under this section
and that the property may be sold to satisfy the lien;
( 0 The date, time, and location of any
proposed or scheduled sale o f the property and
-whether such sale shall be private or public; no
property may be sold earlier than 45 days after
completion of the repair work; and
(g) Notice that the owner of the property
has a right to recover possession o f the property
without instituting judicial proceedings by posting
bond.
(3) If the owner of the property is unknown or
his whereabouts cannot be determined, or if the
owner or any person notified under subsection (2)
fails to acknowledge receipt of the notice, the lienor,
at least 20 days before the proposed or scheduled
date of sale of the property, shall publish the notice
required by this section once in a newspaper circulated in the county where the vehick* is held.
(4) A lienee m a y have his property released
from any lien claimed thereon under this chapter by
filing with the clerk of a small claims, circuit, or
district court a cash or surety bond, payable to the
person claiming the lien, and conditioned for the
payment of any judgment which may be recovered
on said lien, with costs, interest and storage fees.
(5) The lienor shall have 60 days after receiving
notice that the lienee has filed the bond provided in
paragraph (4) to file suit t o foreclose his lien; if the
lienor fails t o file such action timely, the clerk o f
the court shall release the bond.
(6) Property subject to lien enforcement under
this section may be sold by the lienor at public or
private sale; however, in the case o f a private sale,
every aspect of the sale, including the meihod,
manner, time, place, and terms, shall be commercially reasonable.
(7) Nothing contained in this section shall be
'construed as affecting an owner's right to redeem
his property from the lien at any time prior to sale
by paying the amount claimed by the lienor for
work done, interest and storage fees charged, and
any costs incurred by the repair shop for utilizing
enforcement procedures under this section.
mi
38-2-5. Action for deficiency.
Nothing in this chapter shall take away the right
of action of the party to whom such lien is given for
•his charges, or for any residue thereof, after such
sale of the property.
if53
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Chapter 3, Lessors' Liens
38UM Lien for rent due.
38-3-t2. Priorit> of lessor's lien.
38-3 3. Attachment in aid of lien.
38-i
1-344,. Attachment - Affidavit and bond.
38-3-fe . When attachment will issue • Determination of
priorities.
381-3-6 . Execution of writ of attachment.
38-3 7. Release of attach men t - Bond.
38-3-fe When chapter not applicable.

38-3-1. Lien for rent due.
Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall have
a lien for rent due upon all nonexernpt property of
the lessee broughi or kept upon the leased premises
so long as the lessee shall occupy said premises and
for thirty days thereafter.
1953
38-342. Priority of lessor's lien. «
The lien provided for in this chapter shall be
preferred to all other liens or claims except claims
for taxes and liens of mechanics under chapter 1 of
this title, perfected security interests, and claims c»r
employees for wages which are preferred by law;
pro\ ded, that when a lessee shall be adjudicated a
bankrupt, or shall make an assignment for the
benefit of creditors, or when his property shall be
put into the possession of a receiver, the lien herein
provided for shall be limited to the rent for ninety
days prior thereto,
1S07
38-3-3. Attachment in aid of lien.
Whenever any rent shall be due and unpaid under
a lease, or the lessee shall be about to remove his
property from the leased premises, the lessor may
have the personal property of the lessee which is
upon the leased premises and subject to such hen
attached without other ground for such attachment.
1*53
38-3-4. Attachment - Affidavit and bond.
The lessor shall before the issue of such writ of
attachment file a complaint, and an affidavit duly
sworJi to setting forth the amount of rent due over
and above all offsets and counterclaims and a brief
description of the leased premises, and shall further
state, under oath that such writ of attachment is not
sued put for the purpose of vexing or harassing the
lessee; and the person applying for such writ of
attachment shall execute and file a bond as in other
cases o f attachment.
i*53
38-3-5. When attachment will issue •
Determination of priorities.
Upon the filing of such complaint, affidavit ar.d
bond it shall be the duty of the court wherein the
same are filed to issue a writ of attachment to the
proper officer, commanding him to seize the property ^f the defendant subject to such lien, or so
muchl thereof as will satisfy the demand, and to
make a determination o f the priorities of the claims,
liens, and security interests in such property.
i^71
38-3-6. Execution of writ of attachment.
It sliall be the duty o f the officer to whom the
writ o f attachment is directed to seize the property
o f s u p lessee subject to such lien, or as much
therebf as shall be necessary t o satisfy such debt and
costs, and to keep the same until the determination
of the action, unless the property is sooner released
by bond or the attachment is discharged.
i* 3
38-3-7. Release of attachment - Bond.
A bond for the release of the attached property
may be given, and motion to discharge the attachment may be made, as provided in the Code of Civil
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Procedure in cases of attachment.

.1953

38-3-8. When chapter not applicable.
This chapter shall not be applicable to a written
lease for a term of years in which, as part of the
consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns sftall
erect a building or improvements upon the leased
premises.
i*53

Chapter 4. Common Carriers' Liens
38-4-1 through 38-4-3. Repealed.
38-4-4. Unclaimed shipments - Delivery to
warehouseman.
38-4-5. Repealed.
38-4-1 through 38-4-3. Repealed.

tm

38-4-4. Unclaimed shipments - Delivery to
warehouseman.
W h e n e v e r any railroad c o m p a n y or other
c o m m o n carrier, except an express company, s M l
have transported any baggage or freight to the place
of consignment within this state, and the owrier,
consignee or person entitled to receive the same shall
omit, for the period of sixty da>s after the arrival of
the baggage or freight at the place o f consignment.
to accept and remove the same and pay the charges
thereon, it shall be lawful for such earner to deh v er
such freight for storage to some person or company
conducting the business o f storing g o o d s , subject to
the charges thereon for transportation, storage by
the carrier and conveyance and drayage to the p l a c e
o f storage, accompanied by a copy o f the bill of
lading in case o f freight, or, in case o f baggage, by
a statement of the. place, (torn w h i c h , a u d the place
to which, such baggage was transported, together
with the check n u m b e s ; and any carrier whose
route reaches into this state may collect and store as
aforesaid at any station in this state the unclaimed
freight from all or any points or stations on its line
within this state.
i*5*
38-4-5. Repealed.

1977

Chapter 5. Judgment Lien - United
Stales Courts
38-5-1. Docketing with clerk o f district court Effect.
Transcripts of judgments or decrees rendered in
the district court o f the United States within the
state of Utah may be filed and docketed in the
office of the clerk o f the state district court of any
county in this state, and when so filed and docketed, such judgments oi decrees shall have the s ^ e
force and effect as a lien as judgments rendered #nd
docketed in a district court o f this state in and for
such county.
* 971

Chapter 6. Federal Tax Liens
38-6-1.
38-6-2.
38-6-3.
38-6-4.

Notice b> Tiling with county recorder.
Recorder's duties.
When certificate of discharge is filed.
County to furnkh indexes and files.

38-6-1. Notice by filing with county recorder.
Notices of liens for taxes payable to the United
States o f America, and certificates discharging such
liens, shall be filed in the office o f the county recorder of the county within which any property
subject t o such Hen is situated.
1953
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38-6-2. Recorder's duties.
When a notice of such lien is filed the county
recorder shall forthwith enter the same in an alphabetical federal tax hen index, showing, on one line,
the name and residence of the taxpayer named in
such notice, the collector's serial number of such
notice, the date and hour of filing and the amount
o f tax with interest, penalties and costs. He shall file
and keep all original notices so filed in numerical
order in a file designated "Federal Tax Lien
Notices."
1953
38-6-3. When certificate of discharge is filed.
When a certificate of discharge of any tax lien
issued by the collector o f internal revenue, or other
proper officer, is filed in the office of the county
recorder where the notice of lien is filed, such recorder shall enter the same with date of filing in the
federal tax hen index on the line where notice of the
lien so discharged is entered, and shall permanently
attach the certificate of discharge to the notice of
hen.
1953
38-6-4. County to furnish indexes and files.
The federal tax hen index arid file for federal tax
lien notices shall be furnished t o the county recorders in the manner provided by law for the furnishing of books in which deeds are recorded.
1953

Chapter 7. Hospital Lien Law
38-7-1. Lien of hospital on judgment, settlement or
compromise in certain accident cases authorized.
38-7-2. Notice of hen required - Filing wit* count}
clerk - Mailing to injured person, hei^s or legal
representative and insurance carrier.
38-7-3. Parties or insurance carrier making payment
liable for satisfaction of lien - Enforcement of Hen.
38-7-4. Hospital lieo docket provided b> couiitv clerk Contents.
38-7-5. Release of lien by hospital - Execution and
filing.
38-7-6. Fees and charges of county clerk for filing lien or
certifying lien claim.
38-7-7. Interest of hospital in claim settlement limited.
38-7-8. Short title.
38-7-1. Lien of hospital on judgment, settlement
or compromise in certain accident cases
authorized.
(1) Every hospital located within the state that
furnishes emergency, medical or other service to a
pattern injured by reason of an accident not covered
by workmen's compensation is entitled to assert a
lien upon that portion of the judgment, settlement
or compromise going or belonging to such patient,
or, in the case of death, to such patient's heirs or
personal representatives, less the amount paid b> the
patient or on behalf of such patient by heirs or
personal representatives for attorney's fees, court
costs and other necessary expenses incidental to
obtaining the judgment, settlement or compromise;
provided, that no reduction o f the asserted hen
amount other than the amount paid by the patient
or such patient's heirs or personal representatives
for attorney's fees, couit costs and other necessary
expenses incidental to litigation is allowed, unless
otherwise agreed to in writing by the lien claimant.
The hospital hen, however, shall not apply to any
judgment, settlement or compromise where the
amount is $100 or less. This subsection shall apply
to any lien on f\k in the office o f the county clerk
on the effective date o f this act.
(2) A hospital lien may be filed upon damages
recovered, or to be recovered, either as a result of a

For ANNOTATIONS, consul" the UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

389

judgment, or upon a contract of settlement or
compromise, for the amount of the reasonable,
usual and necessary hospital charges for treatment,
care and maintenance of the injured party in the
hospital up to the date of payment of the damages.
1977
38-7-2. Notice of lien required - Filing with
county clerk - Mailing to injured person, heirs
or legal representative and insurance carrier.
N o hospital lien upon damages recovered or to be
recovered for personal injuries or death shall be
effective unless:
(1) A written notice is filed in the office of the
county clerk of the county in which the hospital
asserting the lien is located containing the following
information:
a. an itemized statement of all claims certified as correct by an agent of such hospital;
b. the date and place of the accident;
c. the name and location of the hospital;
and
d. the name of the person, firm or corporation alleged to be liable to the injured party for
the injuries and damages sustained; and
(2) The hospital sends by certified mail with
return receipt requested, prior to the payment of
any money to the injured person or his attorney or
heirs or legal representatives as compensation for
the injuries and/or damages sustained, a copy of
the written notice, together with a statement of the
date of filing, to the person, firm or corporation
alleged to be liable to the injured party for the injuries and/or damages sustained; and
(3) The hospital mails a copy of the written
notice by certified mail with return receipt requested
to the home office of any insurance carrier that has
insured the person, firm or corporation against liability, if the name and address is known.
1*65
38-7-3. Parties or insurance carrier making
payment liable for satisfaction of lien Enforcement of lien.
(1) Ajiy person, firm or corporation, including an
insurance carrier, making any payment to a patient
or to his attorney, heirs or legal representative as
compensation for the injuries and/or damages
sustained, after the filing and, if applicable, receipt
of written notice of the lien, as aforesaid, and
without paying the hospital asserting the lien the
amount of its lien or that portion of the lien which
can be satisfied out of the money due under any
final judgment or contract of compromise or settlement, less payment of the amount of any prior
liens, shall be liable to the hospital for the amount
that the hospital was entitled to receive.
(2) Liability of the person, firm or corporation
for the satisfaction of the hospital lien shall continue for a period of one year from and after the
date of any payment of any money to the patient,
his heirs or legal representatives as damages or
under a contract of compromise or settlement. Any
hospital may enforce its lien by a suit at law against
the person, firm or corporation making the
payment. In the event of a suit to enforce a lien the
hospital may recover a reasonable attorney's fee
and the costs of filing and recording the lien.
1965
38-7-4. Hospital lien docket provided by county
clerk • Contents.
Every county clerk shall, at the expense of the
county, provide and maintain a suitable bound book
to be called the hospital lien docket, and in which
shall be entered any hosj ital lien claim filed. The
county clerk shall enter the name of the injured

390

person, the name of the person, firm or corporation
alliged to be liable for the injuries and damages, the
dale and place of the accident, and the name of the
hoipital or other institution making the claim. The
clerk shall also maintain a proper index of the hospital lien docket under the name of the injured
person.
ms
38-7-5. Release of lien by hospital • Execution
and filing.

The hospital shall, upon receipt of payment of the
lien or the portion recoverable under. the lien,
execute and file, at the expense of the hospital, a
release of lien.
i%5
38-p-6. Fees and charges of county clerk for
filing Hen or certifying lien claim.
County clerks shall be entitled to charge for their
services for entering and filing a lien statement
under the provisions of this act, a fee of $1.00, and,
when requested to do so, a fee of $1.10 per hour for
searching and certifying as to a lien claim.
ms
38-7-7. Interest of hospital in claim settlement
limited.

Nothing in this act shall be* construed to permit
any hospital to be a party to or to have any interest
in the amount or manner of any settlement of any
claim on which a lien has been filed other than the
lien rights as provided in this act.
i%s
38-7-8. Short title.
This act may be known as the Hospital Lien Law.
1965

Chapter 8. Self-service Storage Facilities
38-&1. Definitions.
3$-»>2. Uen against stored property - Attachment and
duration • Search for financing statement prerequisite to
enforcement of lien.
38 S[3. Enforcement of lien - Notice requirements Sale procedure and effect,
38-SM. Posting of notice.
3S-S-5. Other liens unaficcted.

38-8-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Default" means the failure to perform in a
timely manner any obligation or duty set forth in
this chaptt. or the rental agreement.
(2^ "Last known address* means that address
provided by the occupant in the latest rental agreement or the address provided by the occupant in a
subsequent written notice of a change of address.
(3) "Occupant" means a person, or his sublessee! successor, or assign, entitled to the use of the
storage space at a self-service storage facility under
a rental agreement, to the exclusion of others.
(4) "Owner" means the owner, operator, lessor,
or sublessor of a self-service storage facility, his
agent, or any other person authorized by him to
manage the facility or to receive rent from an occupant under a rental agreement.
(5) "Personal property" means movable property not affixed to land and includes, but is not
limned to, goods, merchandise,and household items.
(6) "Rental agreement" means any written agreement or lease which establishes or modifies the
terms, conditions, rules, or any other provisions
concerning the use and occupancy at a self-service
storage facility and which contains a notice stating
that all articles stored under the terms of the agreement will be sold or otherwise disposed of if no
payment has been received for a continuous 30-day
periid. The agreement shall contain a provision
directing the occupant to disclose any lienholders
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an interest in property that is or will be stored
in the self-service storage facility.
(7) "Self-service storage facility" means any
real property designed and used for the purpose of
renting or leasing individual storage space to occupants who are to have access to the facility for the
purpose of storing and removing personal property,
jsio occupant may use a self-service storage facility
for residential purposes. The owner of a selfservice storage facility is not a warehouseman as
used in subsection 7DA-7-102(l)(h). If an owner
issues any warehouse receipt, bill of lading, or other
document of title for the personal property stored,
the owner and the occupant are subject to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the
provisions of this chapter do not apply.
mi
38-8-2. Lien against stored property Attachment and duration - Search for financing
statement prerequisite to enforcement of lien.
Where a rental agreement, as defined in Subsection 38-8-1(6), is entered into between the owner
and the occupant, the owner of the self-service
storage facility and his heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns have a lien upon all
personal property located at the self-service storage
facility for rent, labor, or other charges, present or
future, in relation to the personal property and for
expenses necessary for its preservation or expenses
reasonably incurred in its sale or other disposition
under this chapter. The lien attaches as of the date
the personal property is brought to the self-service
storage facility and continues so long as the owner
retains possession and until any default is corrected,
or a sale pursuant to a default is conducted, or the
property is otherwise disposed of to satisfy the lien.
Before taking enforcement action under Section 388-3, the owner shall determine if a financing statement filed in accordance with Section 70A-9401, et seq. has been filed with the Division of
Corporations and Commercial Code concerning the
property to be sold or otherwise disposed of.
1984
38-8-3. Enforcement of lien - Notice
requirements - Sale procedure and effect.
A claim of an owner which has become due
against an occupant and which is secured by the
owner's lien may be satisfied as follows:
(1) N o enforcement action may be taken by the
owner until the occupant has been in default continuously for a period of 30 days.
(2) After the occupant has been in default
continuously for a period of 30 days, the owner may
begin enforcement action if the occupant has been
given notice in writing. The notice shall be delivered
in person or sent by certified mail to the last known
address of the occupant, and a copy of the notice
s
hall, at the same time, be sent to the sheriff of the
county where the self-service storage facility is
located. Any lienholder with an interest in the property to be sold or otherwise disposed of, of whom
the owner has knowledge either through the disclosure provision on the rental agreement or through
!
he existence of a validly filed and perfected UCC1 financing statement with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or through other
v#
fiUen notification, shall be included in the notice
Process as set forth in this section.
(3) This notice shall include:
(a) an itemized statement of 1 the owner's
c
fcu'm showing the sum due at the time of the notice
*nd the date when the sum became due;
(b) a brief and general description of the
{^rsonal property subject to the lien, which descri-

38-8-3.

ption shall be reasonably adequate to permit the
person notified to identify the property; except that
any container including, but not limited to, a trunk,
valise, or box that is locked, fastened, sealed, or
tied in a manner which deters immediate access to
its contents may be described as such without describing its contents;
(c) a notification of denial of access to the
personal property, if such denial is permitted under
the terms of the rental agreement, which notification
shall provide the name, street address, and telephone number of the owner or his designated agent
whom the occupant may contact to respond to the
notification;
(d) a demand for payment within a specified lime not less than 15 days after delivery of the
notice; and
(e) a conspicuous statement that, unless the
claim is paid within the time stated in the notice, the
personal property will be advertised for sale or other
disposition and will be sold or otherwise disposed of
at a specified time and place.
(4) Any notice made under this section shall be
presumed deli\ered when it is deposited with the
United States postal service and properly addressed
with postage prepaid.
(5) (a) After the expiration of the time given in
the notice, an advertisement of the sale or othei
disposition shall be published once a week for tv,o
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of gei.eral circulation in the county where the self-service storage
facility is located. The advertisement shall include:
(i) a brief and general description of
the personal property reasonably adequate to permit
its identification as provided for in Subsection
(3)(b); the address of the self-service storage facility and the number, if any, of the space where the
personal property is located; and the name of the
occupant and his last known address; and
(ii) the time, place, and manner of the
sale or other disposition, which sale or other disposition shall take place not sooner than 15 days
after the first publication.
(b) If there is no newspaper of general
circulation in the county where the self-service
storage facility is located, the advertisement shall be
posted at least ten days before the date of the sale
or other disposition in not less than six conspicuous
places in the neighborhood where the self-service
storage facility is located.
(6) Any sale or other disposition of the personal
property shall conform to the terms of the notice
provided for in this section.
(7) Any sale or other disposition of the personal
property shall be held at the self-service storage
facility or at the nearest suitable place to where the
personal property is held or stored.
(8) Before any sale or other disposition of personal property under this section, the occupant may
pay the amount necessary to satisfy the lien and the
reasonable expenses incurred under this section and
thereby redeem the personal property; upon receipt
of this payment, the ownei shall return the personal
property, and thereafter the owner shall have no
liability to any person with respect to that personal
property.
(9) A purchaser in good faith of the personal
property sold to satisfy a lien as provided for in this
chapter takes the property free of any rights of
persons against whom the lien was valid and free of
any rights of a secured creditor, despite noncompliance by the owner with the requirements of this
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section.
(10) In the event of a sale under this section,
the owner may satisfy his lien for the proceeds of
the sale, subject to the rights of any prior lienhoIder; the lien rights of the prior lienholder are automatically transferred to the proceeds of the sale; if
the sale is made in good faith and is conducted in a
reasonable manner, the owner shall not be subject
to any surcharge for a deficiency in the amount of a
prior secured lien, but shall hold the balance, if any,
for delivery to the occupant, lienholder, or other
person in interest; if the occupant, lienholder, or
other person in interest does not claim the balance
of the proceeds within one year of the date of sale,
it shall become the property of the Utah state treasurer as unclaimed property with no further claim
against the owner.
(11) If the requirements of this chapter are not
satisfied, if the sale of the personal property is not
in conformity with the notice of sale, or if there is a
willful violation of this chapter, nothing in this
section affects the rights and liabiliJtties of the
owner, occupant, or any other person.
i9W
38-8-4. Posting of notice.
Each owner acting under this chapter shal. keep
posted in a prominent place in his office at all times
a notice which reads as follows:
'All articles stored by a rental agreement, and
charges not having been paid for 30 days, will be
sold or otherwise disposed of to pay charges."
mi
38-8-5. Other liens unaffected.
Nothing in this section shall be construed as in
any manner impairing or affecting the right of
parties to create liens by special contract or agreement, nor shall it in any manner affect or impair
other liens arising at common law or in equity, or
by any statute of this state.
mi

Misdemeanor.
A person described in Section 38-9-1, who
willfully refuses to release or correct the document
of record within 20 days from the date of written
request from the owner or beneficial title holder of
the real property:
(1) is liable to the owner or beneficial title
holder of the real property for the sum of not less
than SI,000, or for treble the actual damages caused
by the recording or filing, whichever is greater, and
for reasonable attorney fees and costs of the action;
and
(2) is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
i9es
38-9-4. Action may be brought in district court
- Costs and attorney fees.
The owner or beneficial title holder of the real
property may bring an action under this chapter in
trie district court of the county in which the real
property is located for such relief as is required to
immediately clear title t o the real property or may
join that action with an action for damages as described in this chapter, after giving the notice required in Section 38-9-1.- In either case, the owner
or beneficial title holder may recover reasonable
attorney fees atid costs of the action if he prevails.

Chapter 9. Penalty for Wrongful Lien.
38-9-1. Liabilil) of person filing wrongful Hen.
38-9-2. Claim of lien not authorized is invalid.
38-9-3. Liability of person refusing to correct document
containing wrongful lien - Penalty - Misdemeanor.
38-9-4. Action may be brought in district court - Costs
and attorney fees.

38-9-1, Liability of person filing wrongful lien.
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or
encumbrance against, real properly, who causes or
has caused a document asserting that claim to be
recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder, who knows or has reason to know that the
document is forged, groundless, or contains a material misstatement or false claim, is liable to the
owner or title holder for SI,000 or for treble actual
damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable
attorney fees, and costs as provided in this chapter,
if he willfully refuses to release or correct such
document of record within 20 days from the date of
written request from the owner or beneficial title
holder of the real property. This chapter is not intended to be applicable to mechanics* or materialmen's liens.
1985
38-9-2. Claim of lien not authorized is invalid.
A document purporting to claim an interest in, or
a lien or encumbrance against, real property not
authorized by statute, judgment, or other specific
legal authority is presumed to be groundless and
invalid.
ms
38-9-3. Liability of person refusing lo correct
document containing wrongful lien • Penalty -
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TITLE 46. NOTARIES PUBLIC
AND COMMISSIONERS OF
DEEDS
Chapter 1. Not trie* Public.
Chapter 2. Commissioners of Deeds.

Chapter 1. Notaries Public
46-1-1. Qualifications - Appointment - Term Removal.
46-1-2. Master list of notaries public - Commissions
certified to clerks of district courts - Names of governor
and division director printed on certificate.
46-1-3. Oath and bond.
46-1-4. Action on bond - Parties - Limitation of
action.
46-1-5. Powers.
46-1-6. Record of protests - Evidence.
46-1-7. Seal.
46-1-8. Affix to signature place of residence and date
commission expires.
46-1-9. Acting after commission expires - Penalty.
46-1-10. Disqualification because of interest.
46*1-1. Qualifications - Appointment - Term

- Removal,
A notary public shall be 18 years of age or older
and be a resident of this state 30 days immediately
preceding the filing for a notary public appointment. The governor may appoint and commission as
many notaries public as he considers necessary.
Each notary public shall hold office for the term of
four years from and after the date of their commission, but the governor may remove any notary
public from his appointed term of office. Each
commission shall be filed and recorded with the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. 19*5
46-1-2. Master list of notaries public Commissions certified to clerks of district courts
- Names of governor and division director
printed on certificate.
Hereafter, whenever a notarial commission is
issued to any person, the governor and the director
o f the Division o f Corporations and Commercial
Code shall certify to a master list of notaries public.
• The issuance of all commissions shall be certified to
each of the several clerks o f the district courts giving
the dates of issuance and expiration o f same. All
notary certificates shall have printed thereon the
names o f the governor and the director o f the Division of Corporations and Commercial C o d e .
WM
46-1-3. Oath and b o n d .
Each notary public before entering upon his official duties shall take the constitutional oath and
post a bond naming the state as obligee in the penal
sum of $5,000, conditioned for the faithful perfor. mance of the duties of his office. Such bonds shall
be approved by the Division o f Corporations and
Commercial Code and filed in its office.
19M

46-1-5. Powers.
Notaries public may exercise the following p
within this state: Administer ail oaths provid*
law, acknowledge powers of attorney and all
instruments of writing conveying or affecting
erty in any part of this state, or elsewhere as m
lawful; take affidavits and depositions; make
arations and protests; and do all other acts m
done by notaries public.
46-1-6. Record of protests - Evidence.
Each notary' public shall keep a fair record <
notices of protest made by him, noting the tim<
manner in which they were served, the names <
parties to whom they were directed and a de$
tion and the amount of the instrument protc
Such record shall be competent evidence to f
such notices. When required and the fees the
are paid each notary public shall give a cerl
copy of any official record of paper in his office,
46-1-7. Seal.
Each notary public shall have an official
with which he shall authenticate all of his ofl
acts. It must contain the words "State of Utah,"
"Notary Public* or 'Notarial Seal," with
surname and at least the initials of his Chri
name.
46-1-8. Affix to signature place of residence and
date commissi* n expires.
To all acknowjedgments, oaths, affirmations
instruments of even' kind taken and certified I
notary public he shall affix to his signature his
icial title and his place of residence and the dat<
which his commission expires.
46-1-9. Acting after commission expires Penalty.
Any person who willfully affixes his signature
seal as notary public to any instrument after
expiration of his commission as such notary pu
is guilty of a misdemeanor.
46-1-10. Disqualification because of interest.
Any notary public who is a stockholder, direc
officer or employee of a bank or other corporal
may take the acknowledgment of any party to
written instrument executed to or by such corp<
tion, and may administer an oath to any other s
ckholder, director, officer, employee or agent
such corporation, and may protest for nonacc*
ance or nonpayment bills of exchange, dra
checks, notes and other negotiable instrume
which may be owned, or held for collection, by si
corporation; but it shall be unlawful for any not
public to take the acknowledgment of any person
an instrument executed by or to a bank or oti
corporation of which he is a stockholder, direct
officer or employee where he is a party to si
instrument, either individually or as a representat
of such corporation, or to protest any negotial
instrument owned or held for collection by su
corporation where he is individually a party to su
instrument.
i

Chapter 2. Commissioners of Deeds

46-1-4. Action on bond - Parlies - Limitation
of action.
The bond of a notary' public may be sued on by
any person injured through official delinquencies
against which it is intended to provide; provided,
that such action shall be instituted within three years
from the time such cause o f action shall have
accrued.
1953

46-2-1. Appointment - Term - Removal.
46-2-2. Powers.
46-2-3. Affix to signature place of residence aad date
commission expires.
46-2-4. Force and effect of official acts.
46-2-5. Official oath.
46-2-6. Oaths and seals of commissioners to be Tiled. •
46-2-7. Fees.
46-2-8. Copy of laws to accompany commission.
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jfrlA. Appointment - Term - Removal.
The governor may appoint and commission in
^ c h state and territory of the United States, except
t n is state, and in any foreign country, one or moie
commissioners o f deeds, to hold office for the term
of four years from and after the date of their commissions, but the governor may remove from office
ftny commissioner during the term for which he was
appointed. The commission shall be filed and recorded with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code.
W4
46-2-2. Powers.
Every commissioner o f deeds has power within
the state or country for which he was appointed:
(1) T o administer and certify oaths.
(2) T o take and certify depositions and affidavits.
'
(3) T o take and certify the acknowledgment or
proof of powers of attorney, mortgages, transfers,
grants, deeds or other instruments for record.
(4) To provide and keep an official seal, upon
which must be engraved his name, the words
•Commissioner of Deeds for the State of Utah,"
and the name of the state or country' for which he is
commissioned.
(5) T o authenticate with his official seal all of
his official acts.
iv$3
46*2-3. Affix to signature place of residence and
date commission expires.
T o all acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations and
instruments of every kind taken and certified by a
commissioner of deeds he shall affix to his signature
his official title and his place of residence and the
date on which his commission expires.
1953
46-2-4. Force and effect of official acts.
All oaths administered, depositions and affidavits
taken, and all acknowledgments and proofs certified, by commissioners of deeds have the same force
and effect, to all intents and purposes, as if done
and certified in this state by any officer authorized
by law to perform such acts.
1953
46-2-5. Official oath.
Before a commissioner of deeds can perform any
of the duties of his office, he shall take and subscribe an oath that he will faithfully perform his
duties, which oath shall be taken and subscribed
before some judge or clerk of a court of record in
the state, territory or foreign country in which the
commissioner is to exercise his functions, and shall
be certified under the hand of the person taking it
and the seal of his court.
1953
46-2-6. Oaths and seals of commissioners to be
filed.
The official oaths of commissioners of deeds and
impressions of their official seals must be filed uith
the Division of Archives within six months after
they are taken and adopted.
19»4
46-2-7. Fees.
The fees of commissioners of deeds are the same
as those prescribed for notaries public.
1953
46-2-8. Copy of laws to accompany commission.
The Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code must transmit with the commission to the
appointee a certified copy of this chapter and of the
laws prescribing the fees of notaries public.
19*4
46-2-9. Commissioners of other states and
countries residing here.
Commissioner of deeds for other states or counCode • Co
Piovo. tuh

tries residind in this state shall file with the Division
of Archives a certified copy of their commissions,
together witji a statement of their places of residence.

£
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TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
Chapter 1. Conveyances.
Chapter 2. Acknowledgements.
Chapter 3. Recording Conveyances.
Chapter 4. Validating Certain Conveyances.
Chapter 5. Plats and Subdivisions.
Chapter 6. Occupying Claimants.
Chapter 7. Townsiles.
Chapter 8. Condominium Ownership Act.
Chapter 9. Marketable Record Title.
Chapter 10. Utah Co-ordinate System.
Chapter 11. Land Sales Practices.
Chapter 12. Relocation Assistance.
Chapter 13. Solar Easements.
Chapter 14. Limitation of Landowner Liability - Public
Recreation.
Chapter 15. Assumption of Indebtedness on Residential
tUz't Property.
Chapter 16. Mobile Home Park Residency.
Chapter 17. Residential Renters' Deposits.
Chapter 18. Conservation Easement Act.

Chapter 1. Conveyances
57-1-1. •Conveyance* defined.
57-1-2. Words of inheritance not required to pass fee.
57-1-3. Grant of fee simple presumed.
57-1-4. Attempted conveyance of more than grantor
owns - Effect.
57-1-5 Grant to two or more - Tenancy in common
presumed - Joint tenancy - Creation of joint tenancy
in owner and others - Interest of joint tenants.
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice Operation und effect - Interest of person not named in
instrument.
57-1-7. Applicability of section.
57-1-8. Powers of attorney • To be recorded.
57-1-9, Revocation to be recorded.
57-1-10. After-acquired title passes.
57-1-11. Claimant out of possession may convey.
57-1-12. Form of warranty deed - Effect.
57-1-13. Form of quitclaim detd - Effect.
57-1-14. Form of mortgage - Effect.
57-1-15. Revocation or termination of power executed by
persons in armed forces - Merchant seamen - Effect of
actual notice or knowledge.
. 57-1-16. Affidavit of lack of notice or knowledge Effect of - Recordation of.
57-1-17. Report of "missing" - Effect of as notice.
57-1-18. Effect of provisions in power.
57-1-19. Trust deeds - Definitions of terms.
57-1-20. Transfers in trust of real property - Purposes
- Effect.
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds - Qualifications.
57-1-22. Successor trustee - Appointment by beneficiary
- Effect - Substitution of trustee - Notice Recording - Form.
57-1-23. Sale of trust property - Power of trustee Foreclosure of trrst deed.
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee - Notice of
default.
57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale - Description of
propert v • Time and place of sale.
57-1-26. Requests for copies of notice of default and
notice of sale - Mailing by trustee or beneficiary Publication of notice of default.
57-1-27. Sale of trust property b> trustee - Public
auction - Conduct by attorney for trustee - Trustor
may direct order in which trust property sold - Bids Postponement of sale.
57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee - Payment of
bid - Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser - Recitals
- Effect.
57-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's sale - Disposition.

12
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57-1-30. Sale of trust property bv trustee - Corporate
slock evidencing water rights given to secure trust deed.
57-1-31. Trust deeds - Default in performance of
obligations secured • Reinstatement - Cancellation of
recorded notice of default.
57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee - Action to
recover balance due upon obligation for which trust deed
was given as security • Collection of costs and
attorney's fees.
57-1-33. Satisfaction of obligation secured by trust deed
- Reconveyance of trust property.
57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee - Foreclosure
of trust deed • Limitation of actions.
57-1-35. Trust deeds - Transfer of debts secured by Transfer of security.
57-1-36. Trust deeds - Instruments entitled to be
recorded - Assignment of a beneficial interest.
57-1-1. "Conveyance* defined.
, The term "conveyance* as used in this title shall
be construed to embrace every instrument in writing
by which any real estate, or interest in real estate, is
created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except wills, and leases for a term not exceeding one year.
1953
57-1-2. Words of inheritance not required to pass
fee.
The term 'heirs," or other technical words of
inheritance or succession, are not requisite to transfer a fee in real estate.
1953
57-1-3. Grunt of fee simple presumed.
A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to
pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless it appears
from the conveyance that a lesser estate was intel
nded.
*
1953
57-1-4. Attempted conveyance of more than
grantor o w n s - Effect.
A conveyance made by an owner of an estate for
life or years, purporting to convey a greater estate
than he could lawfully transfer, does not work a
forfeiture o f his estate, but passes to the grantee all
the estate which the grantor could lawfully transfer. _
1953

57-1-5. Grant to t w o or more - Tenancy in
c o m m o n presumed - Joint tenancy - Creation
of joint tenancy in owner and others - Interest
of joint tenants.
Every interest in real estate granted to two or
more persons in their own right shall be a tenancy in
c o m m o n , unless expressly declared in the grant to be
otherwise. Use o f words "joint tenancy* or "with
rights of survivorship* or "and to the survivor of
them" or words of similar import shall declare a
joint tenancy. A sole owner of real property shall
create a joint tenancy it; himself and another or
others by making a transfer to himself and such
other or others as joint tenants by use of such words
as herein provided or by conveying to another
person or persons an interest in land in which an
interest is retained by the grantor and by declaring
the creation o f a joint tenancy by use of such words
as herein provided. In all cases the interest of joint
tenants must be equal and undivided.
1953
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice Operation and effect - Interest of person not
named in instrument.
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing setting forth an agreement to
convey any real estate or whereby any real estate
may be affected, t o operate as notice to third
persons shall be proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in
which such real estate is situated, but shall be valid
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binding between the parties thereto without
such proofs, acknowledgment, certification or
record, and as to all other persons who have had
actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument,
recorded as herein provided, recites only a nominal
consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such
instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise purports to be in trust without
naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms of the
trust, shall operate to charge any third person with
notice of the interest of any person or persons not
named in such instrument or of the grantor or grantors, but the grantee may convey the fee or such
lesser interest as was conveyed to him by such instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed by
the instrument or by an instrument recorded as
herein provided setting forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and describing the property charged with such interest.
1953
57-1-7. Applicability of section.
This act shall app!\ to all instruments, whether
recorded prior to or subsequent to the effective date
hereof, but as to instruments which have been recorded prior thereto, ii shall not apply until one year
from its effectiv e date.
1953
57-1-8. Powers of attorney - T o be recorded.
Every power of attorney, or other instrument in
writing, containing a power to convey any real
estate as agent or attorney for the owner thereof, or
to execute as agerj or attorney for another any
conveyance whereby any real estate is conveyed or
may be affected, shall be acknowledged or proved,
and certified and recorded, as conveyances whereby
real estate is conveyed or affec: d are required to be
acV;<\<y*\t<A%,td o\- proved &wd cwufvtd wvd itco^d^d57-1-9. Revocation to be recorded.
N o such power of attorney or other instrument
shall be deemed to be revoked by any act o f the
person by whom it was executed until the instrument
containing such revocation shall be filed for record
in the same office in which the instrument containing the power is recorded, or until it is canceled of
record as provided by law.
1953
57-1-10. After-acquired title passes.
If any person shall hereafter convey any real
estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same
in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the time of
such conveyance have the legal estate in such real
estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the
legal estate subsequenth acquired shall immediately
pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors or assigns,
and such conveyance shall be as valid as if such
legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of
the conveyance.
1953
57-1-11. Claimant out of possession may convey.
Any person claiming title to any real estate may,
notwithstanding there may be an adverse possession
thereof, sell and convey his interest therein in the
same manner and with the same effect as if he were
in the actual possession thereof.
i*s3
57-1-12. Form of warranty deed - Effect.
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the
following form:
W A R R A N T Y DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of residence), hereby conveys and
warrants to
(insert name), grantee, of
,
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following described tract
of land
*n
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the
Code* Co

premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
dav
of '
19
^uch deed when executed as required by law shall
havie the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the
gtahtee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises
therein named, together with all the appurtenances,
rights and privileges thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the
premises; that he has good right to convey the same;
thai he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns
in the quiet possession thereof; that the premies are
frei from alt encumbrances; and that the grantor,
his I heirs and personal representatives will forevrr
warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee,
his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such covenant! may be
briefly inserted in such deed following the description of the land.
1953
57-1-13. Form of quitclaim dteC - Effect.
Conveyances of land may also b. substantially in
the following form:
QUITCLAIM DEED
_ (here insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of residence), hereby quitclaims to
_ ^ _ _ (insert name), grantee, of
(here insert
place of residence), for the sum of
dollars,
the following described tract
of land in
'
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the
premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
day
of
19
Such deed when executed as required by law shall
havt the effect of a conveyance of all right, title,
interest and estate of the grantor in and to the premises therein described and all rights, privileges and
appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date of
such conveyance.
1953
57-1-14. Form of mortgage - Effect.
A mortgage of land may be substantially in the
following form:
I
MORTGAGE
J
(here insert name), mortgagor, of
(insert place of residence), hereby mo tgafes to
^_^_ (insert name), mortgagee, of
(insert
place of residence), for the sum of
dollars,
the following described tract
of land in
_^___ County, Utah, to wit. (here describe the
premises).
This mortgage is given to secure the following
indebtedness (here state amount and form of indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and to whom
payable and where).
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and assessmehts on said premises, and the sum of
dollars attorneys' fee in case of foreclosure.
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this
dv* to* , \9
S^ich mortgage when executed as required by law
shal( have the effect of a conveyance of the land
therein described, together with all the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the
mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal representatives i as security for the payment of the indebtedness
thereon set forth, with covenants from the mortgagor of general warranty of title, and that all taxes
and assessments levied and assessed upon the land
described, during the continuance of the mortgage,
will be paid previous to the day appointed for the
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a«it ui sutn ianas tor taxes; and may be foreclosed
obligation of the grantor or other person named
as provided by law upon any default being made in
the deed to a beneficiary.
any of the conditions thereof as to payment of
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to r
either principal, interest, taxes or assessments.
1953
property is conveyed by trust deed, or his success
57-1-IS. Revocation or termination of power
in interest.
executed by persons in armed forces - Merchant
(5) "Real property" means any estate or interest
seamen - Effect of actual notice or knowledge.
land, including all buildings, fixtures and impro\
N o agency created by a power of attorney in
ments thereon and all water rights, rights of wa
writing given by a principal who is at the time of
easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenement
execution, or who, after executing such power of
hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances ther
attorney, becomes, either:
unto belonging, used or enjoyed with said land, <
any part thereof.
(a) A member of the armed forces of the United
States, or ,
(6) "Trust property" means the real proper)
(b) a person serving as a merchant seaman outside
conveyed by the trust deed.
19*
the limits of the United States, included within the
57-1-20. Transfers in trust of real property forty-eight states and the District of Columbia, or
Purposes - Effect.
(c) a person outside said limits by permission,
Transfers in trust of real property may be mad
assignment, or direction of any department or offito secure the performance of an obligation of th
cial of the United States government, in connection
trustor or any other person named in the trust cleei
with any activity pertaining to or connected with the
to a beneficiary. All right, title, interest and claim ii
prosecution of any war in which the United States is
and to the trust property acquired by the trustor, o
then engaged, shall be revoked or terminated by the
his successors in interest, subsequent to the execu
death of the principal as to the agent or other
tion of the trust deed, shall inure to the trustee a:
person who, without actual knowledge or actual
security for the obligation or obligations for whicr
notice of the death or [of] principal shall have acted
the trust property is conveyed in like manner as il
or shall act, in good faith, under or in reliance upon
acquired before execution of the trust deed.
wi
such power of attorney or agency, and any action so
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds - Qualifications.
taken, unless otherwise invalid or unenforceable
(1) The trustee of a trust deed shall be:
shaJl be binding on the heirs, devisees, legatees, or
(a) any member of the Utah State Bar;
personal representati ves of the principal.
1953
(b) any bank, building and loan association,
57-1-16. Affidavit of lack of notice or knowledge
savings and loan association, or insurance company
- Effect of - Recordation of.
authorized to do business in Utah under the laws of
A n affidavit, executed by the attorney in fact or
Utah or the United States;
agent, setting forth that he has not, or had not at
(c) any corporation authorized to conduct a
the time of doing any act pursuant to the power of
trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the
attorney, received actual knowledge or actual notice
United States;
of the revocation or termination of the power of
(d) any title insurance or abstract company
attorney, by death or otherwise, or notice of any
authorized to do business in Utah under the laws of
facts indicating the same, shall, in the absence of
Utah;
fraud, be conclusive proof of the nonrevocation or
(e) any agency of the United States government;
nontermination of the power at such time. If the
or
exercise of the power requires execution and delivery
( 0 any association or corporation which is licof any instrument which is recoidable under the
ensed, chartered, or regulated by the Farm Credit
laws of this state, such affidavit (v>hen authenticated
Administration or its successor.
for record in the manner prescribed by law) shall
This subsection is not applicable to a trustee of a
likewise be recordable.
19S3
trust deed existing prior to the effective date of this
chapter, nor to any agreement which is supplemental
57-1-17. Report of "missing" - Effect of as
to that trust deed.
notice.
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the
N o report or listing, either official or otherwise,
beneficiary therein, unless the beneficiary is qualiof "missing" or "missing in action," as such words
fied to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(b), (c), (e),
are used in military parlance, shall constitute or be
Or (f).
1^85
interpreted as constituting actual knowledge or
57-1-22. Successor trustee - Appointment by
actual notice of the death of such principal or notice
of any facts indicating the same, nor shall it operate
beneficiary - Effect - Substitution of trustee to re\ oke the agency.
1953
Notice - Recording - Form.
(1) The beneficiary may appoint a successor
57-1-18. Effect of provisions in power.
trustee at any time by filing for record in the office
This act shall not be construed so as to alter or
of the county, recorder of each county in which the
affect any provision for revocation or termination
contained in such power of attorney.
1953 trust property or some part thereof is situated, a
substitution of trustee. From the time the substitu57-1-19. Trust deeds - Definitions of terms.
tion is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed
As used in this act:
to all the power, duties, authority and title of the
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or
trustee named in the deed of trust and of any succotherwise designated in a trust deed as the person
essor trustee.
for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his succ(2) The substitution shall identify the trust deed
essor in interest.
by stating the names of the original parties thereto
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real
and the date of recordation and the book and page
property by a trust deed as security for the perforwhere the same is recorded or the entry number,
mance of an obligation.
shall state the name of the new trustee and shall be
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in confexecuted and acknowledged by all of the beneficiaormity with this act and conveying real property to
ries under the trust deed, or their successors in inta trustee in trust to secure the performance of an
14
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(3) If not previously recorded, at the time of recording the notice of default, the successor trustee
shall file for record the substitution of trustee, and a
copy thereof shall be sent in the manner provided in
section 57-1-26 to all persons to whom a copy of
the notice of default would be required to be mailed
by section 57-1-26. In addition thereto, a copy
shall be sent to the pnor trustee by regular mail to
his last known address.
(4) A substitution of trustee shall be sufficient if
made in substantially the following form.
Substitution of Trustee
(insert nam* and address of new trustee)
is hereby appointed successor trustee under the trust
deed executed b>
as trustor, in which
is named beneficiary and
as trustee, and
filed for record
, 19 , and recorded in Book
, Page
, Records of
Count), (or filed
for record
, 19
, with recorder's entry No.
.County), Utah.
Signature

1981

57-1-23. Sale of trust property - Power of
trustee - Foreclosure of truM deed.
A power of sale is hereb> conferred upon the
trustee which the trustee may exercise and under
which the fust property may be sold in the manner
hereinafter provided, after a breach of an obbgation
for which the trust property is conveyed as security;
or, at the option of the beneficiary, a trust deed
ma> be foreclosed in the manner provided by law
fo? the foreclosure of mortgages on real property.
The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee
without express provision therefor in the trust deed.
1961
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee Notice of default.
' The power of sale herein confen ed upon the
trustee shall not be exercised until:
(a) The trustee shall first file for record, in the
office of the recorder of each count} wherein the
trust property or some part or parcel thereof is situated, a notice of default, identifying the trust deed
by stating the name of the trustor named therein
and giving the book and page where the same is
recorded or a description of the trust propert>, and
containing a statement thai a breach of an obligation for which the trust property was conveyed as
security has occurred, and setting forth the nature
of such breach and of his election to sell or cause to
be sold such property to satisfy the obligation;
(b) Not less than three months shall thereafter
elapse; and
(c) After the lapse of at least three months the
trustee shall give notice of sale as provided in this
act.
t%7
57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale - Description
of property - Time and place of sale.
(1) The trustee shall give written notice of the
time and place of sale particularly describing the
property to be sold (a) by publication of such
notice, at least three times, once a week for three
consecutive weeks, the last publication to be at least
10 days but not more than 30 days prior to the sale,
in some newspaper having a general circulation in
each county in which the property to be sold, or
some pan thereof, is situ, ted, and (b) by posting
such notice, at least 20 days before the date of sale»
in some conspicuous place on the property to be
sold and also in at least three public places of each
city or county in which the property to be sold, or
Code • Co
Pro*o, Utah

(p The sale shall be held at the time and place
desgnated in the notice of sale which shall be
between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. and 5 o'clock
p.m. and at the courthouse of the county in which
the property to be sold, or some part thereof, is
situated.
(3) The notice of sale shall be sufficient if made in
substantially the following form:
I
Notice of Trustee's Sale
The following described property will be sold at
public auction to the highest bidder, payable in
lawful money of the United States at the time of
sale, at the
in
,
County, Utah,
on
, 19
, at
.m. of said day, for the
puj-pose of foreclosing a trust deed executed by
and
, his wife, as trusto- in favor of
, covering real property locate at
,
and more particularly described as:
(Insert description)
Dated. - 1 9 _ .
Trustee
5741-26. Requests for copies of notice of default m '
and notice of sale - Mailing by trustee or
bereficiary - Publication of notice of default.
(1) Any person desiring a copy of any notice of
default and of any notice of sale under any trust
deed may, at any time subsequent to the filing for
reiord of the trust deed and prior to the filing for
record of a notice of def< ult thereunder, file for
reiord in the office of the county recorder of any
county in which an> part or parcel of the trust
property is situated, a duly acknowledged request
for a copy of any such notice of default and notice
of sale. The request shall set forth the name and
address of the person or persons requesting copies
of such notices and shall identify the trust deed by
stating the names of the original parties thereto, the
date of filing for record thereof, and the book and
page where the same is recorded or the recorder's
entry' number and shall be in substantially the following form:
Request is hereby made that a copy of any notice of
default and a copy of notice of sale under the trust
deed filed for record
, 19
, and recorded in Book
, Page
, Records of
_J
County, (or filed for record
, 19
,
with recorder's entry' number
, [
) County
as trustor, in which
Utah, executed by
as
is named as beneficiary and
trustee, be mailed to
(insert name)
at
.(insert address).
Signature
Upon filing for record of such request, the recorder shall index such request in the mortgagor's
index, mortgagee's index, and abstract record.
Except as provided in this section the trustee under
any such deed of trust shall not be required to send
notice of default or notice of sale to any person not
filing a request for notice as described herein.
(2) Not later than 10 days after recordation of
s^ch notice of default, the trustee or beneficiary
all mail, by certified or registered mail, with
stage prepa: . a copy of such r^tice with the
recording date shown thereon, adc ^ssed to each
rson whose name and address arc set forth in a
request therefor which has been recorded prior to
the filing for record of the notice of default, directed to the address designated in said request; and at

For ANNOTATIONS, consult Ibe VTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

15

least 20 days before the date of sale, the trustee
shall mail, by certified or registered mail, with
postage prepaid, a copy of the notice of the time
and place of sale, addressed to each person whose
name and address are set forth in a request therefor
which has been recorded prior to the filing for
record of the notice of default, directed to the
address designated in said request.
(3) Any trust deed may contain a Tequest that a
copy of any notice of default and a copy of any
notice of sale thereunder shall be mailed to any
person a party thereto at the address of such person
set forth therein, and a copy of any notice of
default and of any notice of sale shall be mailed to
each such person at the same time and in the same
manner required as though a separate request therefor had been filed b> each of such persons as provided in this section.
(4) If no address of the trustor is set forth in the
trust deed and if no request for notice by such
trustor has been recorded as provided in this
section, a copy of the notice of default shall be
published at least three times, once a week for three
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in each county in which the trust property, or
some part thereof, is situated, such publication to
commence not later than 10 days after the filing for
record of the notice of default. In lieu of such
publication, a copy of the notice of default may be
delivered personally to the trustor within such 10
days or at any time before publication is completed.
(5) No request for a copy of any notice filed for
record pursuant to this section, nor any statement or
allegation in any such request, nor any record
thereof, shall affect the title to trust property OT be
deemed notice to any person that any person requesting copies of notice of default or of notice of sale
has or claims any right, title or interest in, or lien or
claim upon, the trust property.
mi
57-1-27. Sale of trust property by trustee Public auction - Conduct by attorney for trustee
- Trustor may direct order in which trust
property sold - Bids - Postponement of sale.
On the date and at the time and place designated
in the notice of sale, the trustee or the attorney for
the trustee shaJl sell the property at public auction
to the highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney
for the trustee may conduct the sale and act at such
sale as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor
in interest, if present at the sale, may direct the
order in which the trust property shall be sold when
such property consists of several known lots or
parcels which can be sold to advantage separately,
and the trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, shall
follow such directions. Any person, including the
beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale. Every bid
is considered an irrevocable offer, and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the
property sold to him at the sale, the trustee, or the
attorney for the trustee, may again sell the property
at any time to the highest bidder. The party refusing
to pay the bid price is liable for any loss occasioned
thereby, including interest, costs, and trustee's and
reasonable attorney's fees. The trustee or the attorney for the trustee may thereafter reject any other
bid of such person.
The person conducting the sale may, for any
cause he considers expedient, postpone the sale up
to a period not to exceed 72 hours. Notice of such
postponement shall be given by public declaration
thereof by such person at the time and place last
appointed for the sale. No other notice of the pos-

16

tponed sale need be given unless the sale is postponed for longer than 72 hours beyond the date
designated in the notice of sale. In the event of i
longer postponement, the sale shall be cancelled anc
renoticed as provided for herein in the same mannei
as the original notice of sale is required to be given.
57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee Payment of bid - Trustee's deed delivered to
purchaser - Recitals - Effect.
(1) The purchaser at the sale shall pay the price
bid as directed by the trustee and upon receipt of
payment, the trustee shall execute and deliver his
deed to such purchaser. The trustee's deed may
contain recitals of compliance with the requirements
of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to
the exercise of the power of sale and sale of the
property described therein, including recitals concerning any mailing, personal delivery, and publication of the notice of default, any mailing and the
publication and posting of the notice of sale, and
the conduct of sale. These recitals constitute primafacie evidence of such compliance and are conclusive
evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice.
(2) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to
the purchaser, without right of redemption, the
trustee's title and all right, title, interest, and claim
of the trustor and his successors in interest and of
all persons claiming by, through, or under them, in
and to the property sold, including ail such right,
title, interest, and claim in and to such property
acquired by the trustor or his successors in interest
subsequent to the execution of the trust deed.
ins
57-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's sale Disposition.
The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the
trustee's sale, first, to the costs and expenses of
exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the trustee's and attorney's
fees actually incurred not to exceed the amount
which may be provided for in the trust deed,
second, to payment of the obligation secured by the
trust dtedt and the balance, if any, to the person or
persons legally entitled thereto, or the trustee, in his
discretion, may deposit the balance of such r3roceed!s
with the county clerk of the county in which the sale
took' place. Upon depositing such balance, the
trustee shall be discharged from all further responsibility therefor and the county clerk shall deposit
the same with the county treasurer subject to the
order of the district court of said county. .
iwi
57-1-30. Sale of trust property by trustee Corporate stock evidencing water rights given to
secure trust deed.
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water rights
used, intended to be used, or suitable for use on the
trust property and which are hypothecated to secure
an obligation secured by a trust deed may be sold
with the trust property, or any part thereof, at the
trustee's sale in the manner provided in this act.
wi
57-1-31. Trust deeds - Default in performance
of obligations secured - Reinstatement Cancellation of recorded notice of default.
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum
of any obligation secured by a trust deed has, prior
to the maturity date fixed in such obligation,
become due or been declared due by reason of *
breach or default in the performance of any obligation secured by the trust deed, including a default
in the payment of interest or of any installment o.
principal, or by reason of failure of the trustor to
Code • CO
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advances made by the beneficiary in accordance
with terms of such obligation or of such trust deed,
the trustor or his successor in interest in the trust
property or any part thereof or any other person
having a subordinate hen or encumbrance of record
thereon or any beneficiary under a subordinate trust
deed, at any time within three months of the filing
for record of notice of default under such trust
deed, if the power of sale is to be exercised, may
pay to the beneficiary or his successor in interest the
entire amount then due under the terms of such
trust deed (including costs and expenses actually
incurred in enforcing the terms of such obligation,
or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorneys fees
actually incurred) other than such portion of the
principal as would not then be due had no default
occurred, and thereby cure the default theretofore
existing and, thereupon, all proceedings theretofore
had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued
and the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated
and shall be and remain in force and effect the same
as if no such acceleration had occurred
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in the manner provided in Subsection (1),
the beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand of
any person having an interest in the trust propert),
execute and debver to him a request to the trustee to
execute, acknowledge, and delner a cancellation of
the recorded notice of default under such trust deed,
and any beneficiary under a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for a period of 30 days after such
demand, refuses to request the trustee to execute
and deliver such cancellation is liable to the person
entitled to such request for all damages resulting
from such refusal A release and reconveyance given
by the trustee or beneficiary, or both, or the execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a cancellation
of a notice of default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a
recorded notice of default under a trust deed is,
when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is
sufficient if made and executed by the trustee m
substantially the following form
Cancellation of Notice of Default
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice cf
default filed for record
, 19__, and recorded m
Book , Page__, Records of
County, (or filed
of record
, 19_, with recorder's entry No
,
__County), Utah, which notice of default refers to
the trust deed executed by
as trustor, in which
is named as beneficiary and
as trustee,
and filed for record
, 19 , and recorded in
Book
, Page
, Records of
County, (or
filed of record
, 19 , with recorder's entry
No
,
County), Utah
(legal description)
Signature of Trustee
lfS5

57-1-32. Silt of trust properly by trustee Action to recover balance due upon obligation for
which trust deed was given as security Collection of costs and tttomey's fees.
At any time within three months after any sale of
propert) under a trust deed, as heremabow provided, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust
deed was given as secunt), and in such action the
complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured b> such trust deed,
the amount for which such property was sold, and
the fair market value thereof at the date of sale

sold The court md> not render judgment for more
than the amount by which the amount of the inde
btedness with interest, costs, and expense* of sale,
including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the
fair market value of the propert) as of the date of
the sale In anv action brought under this section,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bnn
ging an action under this section
ms
57-1-33. Satisfaction of obligation secured b)
trust deed - Reconveyance of trust propert).
W hen the obligation secured b ; an) trust deed has
been iatisfied, the trustee shall, upon wrm°n request
by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust propert) The
reconveyance may designate the grantee therein as
"the person or persons entitled thereto " The beneficiari under such trust deed shall dehver to the
trustor or his successor in interest the trust deed and
the note or other evidence of the obligation so satisfied An) beneficiary under such trust deed who
refusis to request a reconvc)ance from the trustee
for a[ period of thirt) da)s after written demand
therefor is made by the trustor or his successor in
interest shall be liable to the trustor or his successor
in mierest, as the case may be for double damage
resulting from such refusal, or such trustor or hn
successor in interest ma) bring an action against the
beneficiar) and trustee to compel a reconveyance of
the trust propert) and in such action the judgment
of the coi t shall be that the t ustee recon\e> the
trust propert) and that the benefician pay to the
trustor, or his successor in interest, as th case ma\
be, the costs of suit including a reasonable attorney's fee and all damage resulting from the
refus ! of the beneficiary to jquest a recon\c>ance
as hei einabove provided
i96t
57-lJ34. Sale of trust property by trustee Foreclosure of trust deed - Limitation of
actions.
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed
shall be made, or an action to foreclose a tru^t deed
as provided b) Uv, for,the foreclosure of mortgages
on real propeny shall be commenced, wjihm the
penid prescribed b) law for the commencement of
an Action on the obligation secured by the trust
deed

i96i

57-l[35. Trust deeds - Transfer of debts secured
by - Transfer of security.
Tre transfer of an\ debt secured by a ULct deed
shal operate as a transfer of the secunt) therefor
1961
57-1^36. Trust deeds - Instruments entitled to be
1
recorded - Assignment of a beneficis inkiest
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment
of a beneficial interest under a trust deed notice of
default, trustee's de^d, reconveyance of the trust
property and an) instrument by which any trust
deed is subordinated or waived as to priority, when
acknowledged as provided b) law, shall be entitled
to be recorded, and shall, from the time of filing the
samje with the recorder for record, impart notice of
the contents thereof to all persons, including subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers for value,
except that the recording of an assignment of a
benbficial interest in the trust deed shall not in itself
be deemed notice of such assignment to the trustor,
his heirs or personal representative^, so as to invalidate any payment made by them, or any of them,
to the person holding the note, bond or other instrument evidencing the obligation b) the trust deed

Cc<>*Co
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Chapter 2. Acknowledgements
57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving
conveyances
57-2-2. Who authorized 10 take acknowledgments
57 2-3 Acknowledgment by deputy.
57-2-4 Takmg acknowledgments of persons with Lnited
States armed force*
57-2-5 Certificate of acknowledgment
57-2-6 Part\ must be known or identified
57-2-7 Form of certificate of acknowledgment
57-2-8 When grantor unknown to officer
57-2-9 When executed by attorney in fact.
57-2-10 Proof of execution - How made
57-2-11 Witness must be known or identified.
57-2-12 W hat must be proven
57-2-13 form of certificate
57-2-14 When subscribing witness dead - Proof of
handwnnng
57-2-15 V, hat evidence required
57-2-16 Subpoena to subscribing witness
57-2-17. Disobedience - Contempt - Ptoof aliunde

thereon or attach thereto a certificate substantially
in the following form
On this
day of
19 , before me
,
the undersigned officer, personally appeared
,
known to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be serving
in or with the armed forces of the United States and
to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
within instrument and acknowledged that
he
executed the, same fot the purposes the*, cm contained And the undersigned does further certify that
he is at the date of this certificate a commissioned
officer o f the rank stated below anc' is in the acttvc
service of the armed forces of the United States
Signature of Officer
Rank of Of ficer and
Command to Which
Attached
1*53

57-2-5. Certificate of acknowledgment.
57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving
Every officer who shall take the proof or acknoconveyances.
wledgment o f any conveyance affecting any real
hverv conveyance in writing whereby any real estate shah make a certificate thereof, and cause
estate s conveved or ma\ be affected shall be ack- such certificate to be endorsed on or annexed to
nowledged or proved and certified m the manner such conveyance Such certificate shall be
hereinafter provided
W3
(1) When made by any judge or clerk, under the
57-2-2. Who authorized to take
hand of such judge or clerk, anJ the seal of the
acknowledgments.
court
The proof or acknowledgment of every convey(2) When made by anv other officer, under the
ance whereby anv real estate is conveyed or may be hand and official seal of such officer
I9$3
affected shall be taken by some one of the following 57-2-6. Party must be known or identified.
officers
No acknowledgment of any conveyance whereby
(1) If acknowledged or proved within this state, any real estaie is conveyed or may be affected shall
b> a judge or clerk or a cou t having a seal, or a be taken unless the person offering to make such
notarv public, county clerk or county recorder
acknowledgment shall be personally known to the
(2) If acknowledged or proved without this state officer taking the same to be the person whose name
and within any state or termor) of the Ut ted is subscribed to such conveyance as a party thereto,
States by a judge or clerk or any court o f the or shall be proved to be such by the oath or affirUnited State, or of any state or termor), having a mation of a credible witness personally known to
seal, or by a notary public, or b) a commissioner the officer taking the acknowledgment
iso
appointed bv the governor o f this state for that 57-2-7. Form of certificate of acknowledgment.
purpose
A certificate of acknowledgment to any instru(3) if acknowledged or proved without the United ment in writing affecting the title to any real propStates, by a judge cr clerk of any court o f an) state, erty in this state mav be substantially in the follokingdom or empire having a seal, or any notary wing form*
public therein, or any ambassador, minister, com- Stare of Utah, Countv of
On the
day of
, 19 , personally appemissioner or consul of the United States appointed
, the signer of the above insto reside therein
1953 ared before me
trument, who duly acknowledged to me that he
57-2-3. Acknowledgment b> deputv.
When any of the officers above mentioned are executed the same
The cert ficate of acknowledgment of an instruauthorized bv law to appoint a deputv, such ackn
owledgnent or proof may be taken b) an) such ment executed by a corporation must be substantideputy in the name of his principal
i*S3 ally in the following form
State of Utah, County of
57-2-4. Taking acknowledgments of persons with
On the
day of
, 19 , personally appeUnited States armed forces.
, who being by me duly
In addition to the acknowledgment of instruments ared before me
in the manner and form and as otherwise authorized sworn (or affirmed), did say that he is the president
bv this chapter % an\ person serving in or with the (or other officer or agent, as the case may be) of
armed forces of the United States ma) acknowledge (naming the corporation), and that said instrument
the same wherever located before an) commissioned was signed in behalf of said corporation bv authoofficer in the active service of the armed forces of rity of its bylaws (or of a resolution of its boaid of
the United States with the rank of second lieutenant directors, as the case mav be), and said
or higher in the Arm) or Marine Corps, or ensign acknowledged to me that said corporation executed
the same
i«53
or higher in the Navy or United States Coast Guard
fhe instrument sha'l not be rendered invalid b) the 57-2-8. When grantor unknown to officer.
When the grantor is unknown to the officer
failure to state therein the place of execution or
acknowledgment N o authentication of the officer's taking the acknowledgment, the certificate shall be
certificate of acknowledgment shall be required, but substantially in the following form, to wit
the officer taking the acknowledgment shall endorse State of Utah, County

18
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On this
day of
_ • ! 9 _ _ , personally
appeared before me .
_, satisfactorily proved to
m e t o be the signer o f the above instrument b> the
oath of
, a competent and credible witness
for that purpose, by m e duly sworn, and he, the
said
acknowledged that he executed the
same
Such certificate when properly executed by an
officer authorized t o take acknov* ledgments t o m s
truments in writing affecting the title to real property m this state, and attached to a conveyance in
writing, shall be a sufficient acknowledgment and
certificate thai such conveyance was executed a<
required b> law.
i*si
57-2-9. When executed by attorney in fact.
The certificate o f acknowledgment o f an instrument executed by an attorney in fact must be substantially in the followi ig form
State o f U t a h , Count> of
On the
day of
, 19 , personally appeared before mc
, who, being b> mc duly
sworn (or affirmed) did say that he is the attorney
in fact of
(naming the grantor), and that
said instrument was signed in behalf of said grantor
by authority, and said
acknowledged to me
that he as such attorney in fact executed the same
1953
57-2-10 Proof of execution • How made.
The proof of the execution of any conveyance
whereby real estate is conveyed or may be affected
shall be
(1) By the testimony of a subscribing witness, if
there is one or,
(2) When all the subscribing witnesses are dead,
or cannot be h a d , by evidence o f the handwriting o f
the party, and pf a subscribing witness, if there is
o n e , given by a credible witness to each signatu r c
»S3

57-2-11. Witness must be known or identified.
N o proof by a subscribing witness shall be taVen
unless such witness shall be personally known t o the
officer taking the proof to be the person whose
name is subscribed to the conveyance as a witness
thereto, or shall be proved t o be such by the oath or
affirmation o f a credible witness personally known
to such officer
IWJ
57-2-12. What must be proven
N o certificate o f such proof shall be made unless
such subscribing witness shall prove that the person
whose name is subscribed thereto as a party is the
person described i n , and w h o executed, the same,
that such person executed the conveyance, and that
such person subscribed his name thereto as a witness
thereof at the request o f the make of such instru
ment.
1953
57-2-13 Form o f certificate.
The certificate o f such proof shall be substantially
in the following f o r m , t o w it
State o f Utah, C o u n t y o f
O n this
day o f
, 19__, before me personally appeared
, personally k n o * n t o m e (or
satisfactorily proved t o m e b y the oath of
, a
competent and credible witness for that purpose, by
m e duly sworn) t o be the same person whose name
is subscribed t o the a b o v e instrument as a witness
thereto, w h o , being by m e duly sworn, deposed and
said that he resides in
, county of
,
and state o f Utah, that he was present and saw
» personally k n o w n t o him t o be the signer o f
the above instrument as a party thereto, sign and
deliver the same, a n d heard him acknowledge that
h« executed the s a m e , and that he, the deponent,
thereupon signed his name as a subscribing witness
Code#Co

thereto at the request of s a i d .
57-2J14. When subscribing witness dead - Proof
of handwriting
N o proof by evidence of the handwriting o f a
party, or o f the subscribing witness or witnesses,
shall be taken unless the officer takinr the same
shall) be satisfied that all the subscribing witnesses t o
such conveyance are dead, out of the junsd.ction, or
cannpt be had to prove the executior thereof
1951
57-2 15. What evidence required
N 6 certificate o f any such proof shall be made
unless a competent and credible witres* shall state
on oath or affirmation that he personal
knew the
person whose name is subscribed therei .s a party,
well knows his signature, stating his mc rs of knowledge, and believes the name of the pari/ subscribed [thereto as a party was subscribed by <' ch
person, nor unless a competent and credible witr ss
shaU in like manner state that he personally ki cw
the person whose name is subscribed to such conveyance as a witness, wel knows his signature,
stating his means of knowledge and believes the
name subscribed thereto as a witness was thereto
subscribed by such person
1953
57-2-16. Subpoena to subscribing witness
U p o n the application of any grantee in anv c o n veyance required bv law to be recorded or of anv
person claiming under such grantee verified under
the oath o f the applicant, that anv witness to such
conveyance residing in the county where such appl
ication is made refuses to appear and testifv touc
hing the execution thereof, and thai such conveyance cannot be proved without his evidence, any
officer authorized t o take the acknowled°ment or
proof o f such conveyance may issue a subpoena
requiring such witness to appear before such officer
and testify touching the execution thereof
1953
57-2-17. Disobedience - Contempt - Proof
aliunde.
Every person w h o , being served with a subpoena,
shall without reasonable cause refuse or neglect t o
appear, o r , appearing, shall refuse t o answer upon
oath touching the matters aforesaid sha n be liab'e
to the partv injured for such damages as mav be
sustained by him on account of such neglect o r
refusal, and may also be dealt with f o r contempt as
provided by law, but n o person shall be reqjared t o
attena w h o resides out of the countv in which the
proof is t o I e taken, nor unless his reasonable exp
enses shall have first beer tendered to him prov
ided, ihat if it shaJl appear to the satisfact on to the
officer s o authorized to take such acknov ledement
that such subscribing witness p 1 posely conceals
himself, or keeps out o f the way, so that he cannot
be served with a subpoena or taken on attachment
after the use o f due diligence to that end, or in ca<e
o f his continued failure or refusal to testifv for the
space o f o n e hour after his appearance sha have
been compelled by process, then said convevance or
other instrument mav be proved and a d m t t e d t o
record in the same manner as if such subscribing
witness thereto were dead
19^3

Chapter 3. Recording Conve\ances
57-3-1 j Certificate of acknowledgment or of proof of
execution a prerequisite
S*»-3-2 Record imparts notice • Recordation not
affected by chance in interest rate
57-3-3 Effect of failure to record
57-3-4 Certified copies entitled to record in anoth r
county - Effect
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iable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
which could have been asserted against an assignor
at the time of or before notice of such assignment,
may be asserted against his assignee, to the extent
that such claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim does
not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee.
(k) Claim in Excess of Court's Jurisdiction.
Where any counterclaim or cross-claim or thirdparty claim is filed in an action in a city court or
justice's court, and due to its limited jurisdiction,
such court does not have the power to grant the
relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings
in the entire action and certify the same and transmit all papers therein to the district court of the
county in which such inferior court is maintained,
upon the payment by the party filing such counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim of the fees
required for certifying the record on appeal from
such court and for docketing the same in the district
court. The fees herein required to be paid, shall be
deposited with the clerk of the inferior court at the
time of filing such counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim. For failure so to do, the court
may, upon motion of the adverse party, after
notice, strike such counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim.
In any action so certified to the district court,
when any responsive pleading is required or permitted or a motion is allowed under these Rules, the
time in which such responsive pleading or motion
shall be made shall commence to run from the time
notice of the filing of the cause in the district court
shall be served on the party making such responsive
pleading or motion.
RULE 14. THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE
(«) Whca Defendant May Bring in Third Party,
(b) When PlalnUff M»y Bring in Third Party.

(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party.
At any time after commencement of the action a
defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a
summons and complaint to be served upon a person
not a party to the action who is or may be liable to
him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against
him. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain
leave to make the service if he files the third-party
complaint not later than ten days after he serves his
original answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on
motion upon notice to all parties to the action. The
person served with the summons and third-party
complaint, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-party
plaintiffs claim as provided in Rule 12 and his
counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff and
cross-claims against other third-party defendants
as provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant
may assert against the plaintiff any defenses which
the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's
claim. The third-party defendant may also assert
any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party
plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against
the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff,
and the third-party defendant thereupon shall
assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his
counterclaims and cross-claims as provided in Rule
13. A third-party defendant may proceed under
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this rule against any person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
claim made in the action against the third-party
defendant.
(b) When Plaintiff May Bring in Third Party.
When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in
under circumstances which under this rule would
entitle a defendant to do so.
RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL
PLEADINGS
(a) Amendments.
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence.
(c) Relation Back of Amendments.
(d) Supplemental Pleadings.

(a) Amendments.
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter
of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not
been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so
amend it at any time within twenty days after it is
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response
to an amended pleading within the time remaining
for response to the original pleading or within ten
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court
otherwise orders,
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does
not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court
shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the
objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation Back of Amendments.
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental Pleadings.
Upon motion of a party the court may," upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting
forth transactions or occurrences or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought
to be supplemented. Permission may be granted
even though the original pleading is defective in its
statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the
court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead
to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, spt"
cifying the time therefor.
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RULE 16. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE;
FORMULATING ISSUES
In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before
it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to
the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact
and of documents which will avoid unnecessary
proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the
action taken at the conference, the amendments
allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made
by the parties as to any of the matters considered,
and which limits the issues for trial to those not
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel;
and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the
trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its
discretion may establish by rule a pretrial calendar
on which actions may be placed for consideration as
above provided.
P A R T IV. Parties.
Rule 17. Parties Plaintiff and Defendant.
Rule 18. Joinder of Claims and Remedies.
Roto 19. Necessary Joinder of Parties.
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

21. Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties.
22. Interpleader.
23. Class Actions.
23.1. Derivative Actions by Shareholders.
24. Intervention.
25. Substitution of Parties.

RULE 17. PARTIES PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENDANT
(a) Real Party in Interest.
(b) Infants or Incompetent Persons.
(c) Guardian Ad Utem; How Appointed.
(d) Associates May be Sued b> Common Name.
(e) Action Against a Nonresident doing Business in this
State.

(a) Real Party in Interest.
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the* real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a
party with whom or in whose name a contract has
been made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue in his own name
without joining with him the party for whose benefit
the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another
shaft be brought in the name of the State of \)tah.
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is
not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
objection for ratification of commencement of the
action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real
Party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or
substitution shall have the same effect as if the
action had been commenced in the name of the real
party in interest.
(b) Infants or Incompetent Persons.
When an infant or an insane or incompetent
Person is a party, he must appear either by his
jSieoCo
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general guardian, or by a guardian ad litem appoin t in the particular case by the court in which the
action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be
appointed [in any case when it is deemed by the
cojurt in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted, expedient to represent the infant, insane or
k
mc ompeten|t person in the action or proceeding,
notwithstanding he may have a general guardian and
m £y have appeared by him. In an action in rem it
$n all not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad
|jtem for any unknown party who might be an
infant or an incompetent person.
( c ) Guardian Ad Litem; How Appointed.
When a guardian ad litem is appointed by a
co urt, he must be appointed as follows:
(1) When the infant is plaintiff, upon the application of the infant, if he is of the age of fourteen
y ^ s , or if kinder that age, upon the application of
a Relative or friend of the infant.
(2) When the infant is defendant, upon the application of the infant if he is of the age of fourteen
ye ars and applies within twenty days after the
sc fvice of the summons, or if under that age or if he
neglects so to apply, then upon the application of a
rc jative or friend of the infant, or of an> other
p^rty to the action.
(3) When an infant defendant resides out of this
st^te, the plaintiff upon motion therefor, shall be
entitled to an order designating some suitable person
to o* guardian ad litem for such infant defendant,
urjless the defendant or some one in his behalf
vyjthin twenty days after service of notice of such
5Vjch

infant. Service of such notice ma> be made
the general or testamentary guardian of such
defendant, if he has one in this state; if not, such
notice, together with the summons in the action,
sjtall be served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon such infant, if over fourteen
y^ars of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, b>
Sljch service on the person with whom such infant
re$ides. The guardian ad litem for such nonresident
infant defendant shall have twenty days after his
appointment in which to plead to the action.
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a
p^rty to an action or proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or incompetent person, or of any other party to the action
0 f proceeding.
u pon

(J) Associates May be Sued by Common Name.
When two or more persons associated in any
business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a common name, whether
it comprises the names of such associates or not,
ifrcy may be sued by such common name; and any
judgment obtained against the defendant in such
^ e shall bind Ithe ioint property of all the associates in the samp manner as if all had been named
defendants and had been sued upon their joint liability.
(e> Action Against a Nonresident doing Business in
this State.
I
When a nonresident person is associated in and
conducts business within the State of Utah in one or
more places in nis own name or a common trade
n ame, and said business is conducted under the
supervision of a manager, superintendent, or agent,
$ aid person may be sued in his own name in any
action arising out of the conduct of said business.
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the officer is notary public or justice of the peace is held to be sufficient without
its repetition after his signature. 8
Strict technical accuracy in gning the title of the city or county is not
essential; for example, in an acknowledgment before the mayor of "Kansas in
the county aforesaid,'' the quoted words were held sufficient for the "Citv of
K a n s a s " 9 Where a certificate recited that the notary was of one county
and he signed himself as of another, it was held not fatal. 10
§ 55. Title and residence of person taking acknowledgment.
A statement of the official position or authority of the officer taking an
acknowledgment is not essential to the \alidit\ of the certificate where the
description is not required by statute; 1 1 but the statutory requirements mav
be such as to render fatally defecthe a certificate which does not describe
the person taking the acknowledgment as an officer of any kind nor describe
his official character. 12 Howe\er, the title of the office of the person granting
the certificate need not appear more than once. 13
It is not essential to the validity of the certificate that it state the officer's
place of residence.14
Where the statute authorizes acknowledgment before judges or officers of
courts of record, there seems to be some difference of opinion as to whether
such a judge or officer must state in his certificate the fact that his court is
a court of record. 15 Under a statute providing that instruments may be
8. Colby v McOmber, 71 Iowa 469, 32 N W
459
Annotation:
29 ALR 973
9. Hubbard v SworTord Bros D r y Goods Co.
209 M o 495, 108 SW 15.
10. Merchants' Bank v Harrison, 39 M o
4 3 3 , Texas Osage Co-op Rovalty Pool v
James (Tex Civ App) 129 S \ \ 2 d 327.
Annotation:
25 ALR2d 1146, § 2 7 .
In Roberts v Robinson, 49 Neb 717, 68
NW 1035, it was held that where a deed was
actually acknowledged before a notary in the
county in which he resided, it would not be
so invalidated that it would not comey a
legal title and be entitled to admission in
evidence by the fact that the caption of
the certificate named another county and the
notary in the body of the certificate subscribed himself as an officer "qualified for and
residing in said county."
1 1 . Manbeck Motor Sales Co v Garside 208
Iowa 656, 226 NW 9 Blake v Hollandsworth,
71 W Va 387, 76 SE 814
Annotation:
29 ALR 967, 25 ALR2d 1144,
§2o
12. Johnston v Haines, 2 Ohio 55.
Annotation:
29 ALR 968, s. 25 ALR2d
1144, § 26
A statutory requirement that a certificate
of acknowledgment set forth "the title of the
court or person before whom the acknow\eccement was made" was mandatory in form. Re
Meakins (DC Iowa) 25 F2d 305.
A certificate in proper form except that
the only disclosure by the ofheer of his official
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capacity was the signature, " G H Maxev
Clerk, by G M Walker, Deputy," was he d
to be insufficient, the court taking the \i*»\
that the official character of the officer wno
made the certificate should be shown in t
either in the bodv or appended to the s w
nature, and that the word "clerk'* appencea
to the signature in this case was not sjffic e**t
for that purpose Gulf C & S F R Co v
Carter, 5 Tex Civ App 675, 24 SW 1083
T h e U'niform Acknowledgment Act requ re?
the certifying officer to give the title of ^ s
office
Uniform Acknowledgment Act § C
13. Summer v Mitchell, 29 Fla 179, 10 c ^
562, Lake Erie & \ \ R Co v Whitham, 15J
111 514, 40 NE 1014
Annotation:
29 ALR 969.
14. Griffin v Cathn, 25 Wash 474, 65 P 7^5
Annotation:
29 ALR 974, s. 25 ALR:d
1146, § 2 8 .
1 5 . Pierce v Hakes, 23 Pa 231 (statement i r t
required)
Annotation:
29 ALR 979, s. 25 ALR-1147, § 3 2 .
In Hurst v Leckie, 97 Va 550, 34 SE 4< \
it was held that where the statute spent
"a commissioner in chancery of a court | ^
record" as one of the officers authorize.!
tike acknowledgments a certificate the <"* ^
tion of which was "State of Virginia, I r
of Buena \ i s t a " and in which the o\
described himself as a "commissioner in c i J %
eery for the city aforesaid," and whicn x^
signed with the name of the officer folio^1
by the words "Commissioner in Cham l
contained a sufficient description of the c*iw **

1 Am Jur 2d

1 Am Jur 2d

ient without

acknowledged in another state before a court of record or an officer holding
the seal of such a court, a certificate by a cl erk under the seal of the court
has been held invalid where nothing showed that the court was one of record or
that the clerk was the holder of its seal.16
Inasmuch as officers habitually and customarily use abbreviations of their
titles, or initial letters only, the courts recognize this fact and hold such
abbreviations or initials sufficient to describe the officer.17
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8 56. Errors in the designation of office or tjtle.
Merely technical or clerical inaccuracies in the official title of the one issuing the certificate are not usually considered fatal defects.18 Nor, in itself,
does the fact that the title of the officer as gi^en in a certificate from another
jurisdiction varies somewhat from the title of the corresponding officer in the
local jurisdiction or from the title as given in the statutory list of officers
entitled to take acknowledgments render the certificate invalid.19
In cases where the officer taking an acknowledgment held more than one
office and signed or described himself in both capacities, the defect has generally been held not to be fatal. 20 Where the possession of the one office
necessarily entails the holding of the other office also, there seems to be little
question but that a signature in either capacity is sufficient.1
§ 57. Expiration of commission of officer.
If the commission of the officer by whom an acknowledgment was taken was
in full force and effect at that time, the fact that he does not certify when
his term will expire does not destroy the effectiveness of the instrument to
which he certifies.2 But if the commission has expired prior to the date of
the acknowledgment, it is, of course, ineffective.*
character of the person who took the acknowledgment.
16. Fogg v Holcomb, 64 Iowa 621, 21 NW
17. Harris v Zeuch, 103 Fla 183, 137 So 135;
Solomon v Dunlap-Huckabee Auto Co. 174
9 a 782, 164 SE 185; McCreary v Coggeshall,
?4 SC 42, 53 SE 978.
Annotation:
29 ALR 976, s. 25 ALR2d
H47, § 3 0 .
18. Hubbard v SwofTord Bros. Dry Goods Co.
2 "9 Mo 495, 108 SW 15.
Annotation:
29 ALR 977, 978, s. 25 ALR
^1147,131.
In McClure v McClurg, 53 Mo 173, a
' t r i i ,?^ a t t n e grantor appeared before the
f^t"
of the Greene Circuit Court, in' '*d of before "the court," was held not to
"a'idatc a certificate
&*!<! • e ! ^ c . ° ^ c e r " a Justice of the peace,
r* , *1Rr?s *"s name as such, the certificate
"* ;.°V v l t . i a t e d b>' the fact that in the body
\;.t r> ls called a notary* public. Atlantic
U

'*io CC 5 W a g n c r '

''••.f r d tl ^ Cat
?i S
^-'kiirn "ollly,>
n
"I h,„,
;^"P*on v

24

° hi ° C C

N S 275, 44

k yi a ov en c designating
himself "spe*
k ° e n held sufficient, the
"special''
being
surplusage.
Johnson, 84 Tex 548, 19 SW

19. Stooksberry v Hickman, 183 Tenn 560,
194SW2d344.
Annotation:
29 ALR 978.
20. Summer v Mitchell. 29 Fla 179, 10 So
562; Wilson v Braden, 56 W Va 372, 49 SE
409.
[
Annotation:
29 ALR 974, s. 25 ALR2d
1146, § 29.
1. Butler v Dunagan, 19 Tex 559.
Annotation:
29 ALR 975.
In Owen v Baker, 101 Mo 407, 14 SW 175,
it was held that where the clerk of the circuit court was by statute also recorder, a certificate of acknowledgment of a sheriffs dtc6
granted by him will not be invalid because
he signed it as recorder, where it was his
office o^ clerk of the circuit court which
gave hiifa authority to take acknowledgments.
2. Kaiisas City & S. E. R. Co. v Kansas
City &JS. W. R. Co. 129 Mo 62, 31 SW
451.
|
Annotation:
29 ALR 980, s. 25 ALR2d
1147, § 33.
An acknowledgment otherwise regular and
valid is not rendered void by reason of the
failure t>f a notary to follow a statute requiring him to write under his official signature the! date of the expiration of his commission, j where the requirement is contained
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Robert F. Babcock (#0158)
Darrel J. Bostwick (#4543)
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7000
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BY l£J)'Mi\LdniC)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC.,
a Utah corporation,,
AFFIDAVIT OF
GLENN M. ACOMB

Plaintiff,
vs.
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation;
et al.,

Civil No. C84-1644
Judge Judith M. Billings

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss.
)

Glenn M. Acomb, Chief Deputy County Recorder for Salt Lake County, be
first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows:
1. That I am Chief Deputy Recorder for Salt Lake County and a licensed
attorney in the State of Utah and as such make this Affidavit.
2. That since the 1985 amendments to the Utah mechanic's lien law, which
deleted the requirement of a verification in notices of lien, it has been the policy of
the Salt Lake County Recorder that mechanic's notices of lien are not required to be
acknowledged nor notarized in order to be accepted for recordation in the land records.
3. That when lien claimants inquire of the Salt Lake County Recorder's
personnel, they have been instructed to tell them that notices of lien need not be
verified nor notarized in order to be accepted for recordation in the land records.
4. That based upon my own knowledge and experience, the vast majority
of the notices of mechanic's liens that are filed in the Salt Lake County Recorder's
Office are prepared on commercially printed forms.

7d

DATED this _ /

day of May, 1986.

3L

Glenn M. Acomb
Chief Deputy Recorder, Salt Lake
County

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this / ^

day pf May, 1986,

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission expires:
-r_e-^C?

Residing

at;^V/,T~^fftf^^y

7

Robert F. Babcoek (#0158)
Darrel J. Bostwick (#4543)
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7000

:
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W THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC.,
a Utah corporation,,
Plaintiff,

:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
FRANK NELSON

!:

Civil No. C84-1644

!
:
:

Judge Judith M. Billings

vs.
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation;
et al.,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Frank Nelson, of Gem Printing, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes
and says as follows:
1.

That I am an employee of Gem Printing and as such make this Affidavit.

2. That Gem Printing is a major supplier of Notice of Lien forms in the
State of Utah.
3. That the Notice of Lien form attached hereto as attachment "A" is a
true and correct copy of Gem Printings Notice of Lien form. •
4. That Gem prints and distributes more than 4,000 Notice of Lien forms
during a one year period.
DATED this

ts/

day of May, 1986.

/
/

Frank Nelson

_^--.-^'-?-i

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this <•'/
"'?

day of May, 1986.

y '^>

,r-,

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission expires:
Residing:

<'

s-c''. C^/C y<

County

NOTICE OF LIEN
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Notice is hereby given that the undersigneddoing business as

and residing at
County of
State of Utah, hereby claim....
and intend to hold and claim a lien upon that certain land and premises, owned and reputed to be
owned by
and
situate, lying and being in
, County of
State of Utah, described as follows, to wit:

to secure the payment of the sum of
owing to the undersigned for

in, on and about the

Dollars,

.

on said land.

Thatlthe said indebtedness accrued and the undersigned furnished said materials to (or was emThat
(EriN according to tbt fact)

ployed by)
..who was the

aforesaid, under a

_owner and the reputed owner of said premises as
contract made between the said^and the undersigned

on the
day of
, 19
, by the terms of which the undersigned did agree
to
and the said..
did agree to pay the undersigned therefor as follows, to wit :..

_and under which said contract the underon the
day of
the last
on the
day of
and on and between said last mentioned
days, did
amounting
to the sum of
Dollars,
which was the reasonable value thereof, and on which the following payments have been made to wit:

signed did

the first
and did

leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of..
Dollars after deducting all just credits and offsets, and for which
demand the undersigned hold... and claim a lien by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, of Tillc
88, of the Utah Code Annotated 1953.

STATE OF UTAH,
County of
. being first duly sworn, says that he is
-Claimant— in the foregoing Notice of Lien;
that he has heard read said notice and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true of his
own knowledge.

.•<?

Subscribed and sworn to before me this.

.day

...19 ^c-

" ^ »£ ?
tAJZl±^l

/-U':^-r: , ~

--'V

Notary Public.

^

•

,.i^ 2

r

!f

w
o
o

Recorded at the request of
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby c e r t i f y
foregoing

MflWfrnmriiiTn

t h a t jS- t r u e and c o r r e c t -eepy of the
i'n

V,iippr>Ti^rffif

.-Ti^J3T^

was mailed, postage prepaid, this

Mr. Jon C. Heaton
Mr. James A. Boevers
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
Third Floor Mony Plaza
424 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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